It’s Worse than "Reverse" The Full Case Against Ultra Low and Negative Interest Rates

It is becoming increasingly accepted that lowering interest rates might at some point prove contractionary (the “reversal interest rate”) if lower lending margins cut the supply of bank loans. This paper argues that there are many other reasons to question reliance on monetary policy to provide economic stimulus, particularly over successive financial cycles. By encouraging the issue of debt, often for unproductive purposes, monetary stimulus becomes increasingly ineffective over time. Moreover, it threatens financial stability in a variety of ways, it leads to real resource misallocations that lower potential growth, and it finally produces a policy “debt trap” that cannot be escaped without significant economic costs. Debt-deflation and high inflation are both plausible outcomes.

Insights on deflation theory

ABSTRACT Irving Fisher offered a ‘tentative’ debt-deflation theory of great depressions rather than a fully consistent theory of his ‘creed’: “I say ‘creed’ because, for brevity, it is purposely expressed dogmatically and without proof. [...] it is quite tentative” (Fisher 1933, p. 337). The paper argues that prominent authors who strived to explain his ideas within the Walrasian apparatus could not deliver a consistent theory of deflation with protracted depression. This is basically because destabilizing market forces cannot dominate in that conceptual framework. By contrast, owing to the way competitive forces operate under fundamental uncertainty, Keynes’ General Theory escapes the contradiction.

Banking on a Religious Divide: Accounting for the Success of the Netherlands' Raiffeisen Cooperatives in the Crisis of the 1920s

This article investigates the impact of the socioreligious segregation of Dutch society on the asset allocation choices of rural bankers and the withdrawal behavior of their depositors during the early 1920s. Results suggest that cooperatively-owned Raiffeisen banks for both Catholic and Protestant minority groups could limit their exposure to a debt-deflation crisis, despite operating more precarious balance sheets than banks for majorities. Business histories demonstrate how strict membership criteria and personal guarantors acted as screening and monitoring devices. Banks serving minorities functioned as club goods, managing their exposure to the crisis by exploiting the confessionalized nature of Dutch society.