Endogenous Separations, Wage Rigidities, and Unemployment Volatility

We show that in microdata, as well as in a search and matching model with flexible wages for new hires, wage rigidities of incumbent workers have substantial effects on separations and unemployment volatility. Allowing for an empirically relevant degree of wage rigidities for incumbent workers drives unemployment volatility as well as the volatility of vacancies and tightness to that in the data. Thus, the degree of wage rigidity for newly hired workers is not a sufficient statistic for determining the effect of wage rigidities on macroeconomic outcomes. This finding affects the interpretation of a large empirical literature on wage rigidities. (JEL E24, J23, J31, J41, J63)

Collateral Constraints, Wage Rigidity, and Jobless Recoveries

The Great Recession has drawn attention to the importance of macro-financial linkages. In this paper I explore the joint role of imperfections in labor and financial markets for the cyclical adjustment of the labor market. I show that jobless recoveries emerge when, upon exiting a recession, firms are faced with deteriorating credit conditions. On the financial side, collateral requirements affect the cost of borrowing for firms. On the employment side, hiring frictions and wage rigidity increase the need for credit, making the binding collateral constraint more relevant. In a general equilibrium business cycle model with search and matching frictions, I illustrate that tightening credit conditions calibrated from data negatively affect employment adjustments during recovery periods. Wage rigidity substantially amplifies this mechanism, generating empirically plausible fluctuations in employment and output.

Flattening of the Phillips Curve with State-Dependent Prices and Wages

We study monetary transmission in a model of state-dependent prices and wages based on ‘control costs’. Stickiness arises because precise choice is costly: decision-makers tolerate errors both in the timing of adjustments, and in the new level at which the price or wage is set. The model is calibrated to microdata on the size and frequency of price and wage changes. In our simulations, money shocks have less persistent real effects than in the Calvo framework; nonetheless, the model exhibits a substantial degree of non-neutrality, driven mainly by wage rigidity. State-dependent nominal stickiness implies a flatter Phillips curve as trend inflation declines, because price and wage adjustments become less frequent, making short-run inflation less reactive to shocks. Our model can explain almost half of the observed decline in the slope of the Phillips curve since 2000.

One Money, Many Markets

We study heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary shocks across euro-area countries using a dynamic factor model and high-frequency identification. Deploying a novel methodology to assess the degree of heterogeneity, we find it to be low in financial variables and output but significant in consumption, consumer prices, and variables related to local housing and labour markets. We show that a large proportion of the variation in the responses to monetary shocks can be accounted for by differences in some characteristics of these markets across EA member countries: the share of adjustable mortgage contracts, homeownership rates, shares of hand-to-mouth and wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers, as well as wage rigidity.

Keynesian Production Networks and the COVID-19 Crisis: A Simple Benchmark

The COVID-19 crisis is a seemingly all-encompassing shock to supply and demand. These negative shocks affected industries differently: some switched to remote work, maintaining employment and production, while others reduced capacity and shed workers. We consider a stripped-down version of the model in Baqaee and Farhi (2020). The model allows for an arbitrary input-output network, complementarities, incomplete markets, downward wage rigidity, and a zero lower bound. Nevertheless, the model has a stark property: factor income shares at the initial equilibrium are global sufficient statistics for the production network, clarifying assumptions that must be broken if the network is to matter.

Can reference points explain wage rigidity? Experimental evidence

I examine whether reference points can provide an explanation for rigid wages in recessions. Even though a recession provides a good reason to adjust wages downward, workers’ perception of a “fair wage” may depend on their previous wage, their reference point. Using a laboratory experiment, I test this idea by varying whether initially concluded contracts—and their stipulated wages—can serve as reference points. My experimental results show that with initial contracts workers punish wage cuts even in recessions, leading to considerable more rigid wages. Surprisingly, this is even true without an “objective” justification to feel entitled to initial contracts.