Are Speculators Unwelcome in Multi-Object Auctions?

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Pagnozzi
Keyword(s):  
Complete Information ◽  
Use Value ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Auction Price ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Resale Market

I consider a uniform-price auction under complete information. The possibility of resale attracts speculators who have no use value for the objects on sale. A high-value bidder may strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the objects and then buy in the resale market, in order to keep the auction price low. Although resale induces entry by speculators and therefore increases the number of competitors, high-value bidders' incentives to “reduce demand” are also affected. Allowing resale to attract speculators reduces the seller's revenue when bidders' valuations are dispersed. Speculators increase the seller's revenue only when they are outbid. (JEL D44, D83)

scholarly journals Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (7) ◽  
pp. 2014-2048 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alp E. Atakan ◽  
Mehmet Ekmekci
Keyword(s):  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
The State ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Extra Information ◽  
Auction Price ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
The Common

We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z > k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions, there are symmetric equilibria where the auction price aggregates no information. Moreover, market statistics other than price (e.g., the amount of rationing or the bid distribution) contain extra information about the state. In contrast, in standard large auctions without actions, the price aggregates all relevant information. (JEL D44, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Alternative Auction Institutions for Electric Power Markets

1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Bernard ◽  
Timothy Mount ◽  
William Schulze
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Electric Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Power Markets ◽  
Wholesale Market ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Electric Power Markets ◽  
Price Auction

Restructuring of electric power markets is proceeding across the United States and in many other nations around the world. The performance of these markets will influence everything from the prices faced by consumers to the reliability of the systems. The challenges of these changes present many important areas for research. For much of the northeastern United States, restructuring proposals include, at least for the short term, the formation of a single-sided auction mechanism for the wholesale market. This research uses experimental methods to analyze how these markets may function. In the experiments, the two basic uniform price auction rules are tested under three different market sizes. Early experimental results suggest the commonly proposed last-accepted-offer auction works well, but market power could be a real concern.

Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (7) ◽  
pp. 1451-1469
Author(s):  
Georgios Birmpas ◽  
Evangelos Markakis ◽  
Orestis Telelis ◽  
Artem Tsikiridis
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Price Auction

scholarly journals UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS BASED ON MULTIPLE ROUNDS LINEAR BIDDING AND ITS EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congjun RAO ◽  
Yong ZHAO ◽  
Yang CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Local Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Continuous Linear ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Divisible Goods

In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information. Concretely, two key problems, i.e. the bidders’ asymptotic strategic behaviours and forming process and composition of equilibrium points are explored. The conclusion is drawn that different bidders’ bidding order and different starting points of initial bidding would not cause different local equilibrium points, and if the equilibrium points exist, then the equilibrium point is unique.

Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 1271-1300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Morales-Camargo ◽  
Orly Sade ◽  
Charles Schnitzlein ◽  
Jaime F. Zender
Keyword(s):  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions ◽  
Average Revenue ◽  
Auction Formats ◽  
Discriminatory Auctions

AbstractAn experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document