scholarly journals Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 278-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melis Kartal
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Broad Class ◽  
Time Preferences ◽  
Reputation Games

New relationships are often plagued with uncertainty because one of the players has some private information about her “type.” The reputation literature has shown that equilibria that reveal this private information typically involve breach of trust and conflict. But are these inevitable for equilibrium learning? I analyze self-enforcing relationships where one party is privately informed about her time preferences. I show that there always exist honest reputation equilibria, which fully reveal information and support cooperation without breach or conflict. I compare these to dishonest reputation equilibria from several perspectives. My results are applicable to a broad class of repeated games. (JEL C73, D82, D83, D86, Z13)

Do Targets Benefit From Auctions? The Role of Private Information

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Anilowski Cain ◽  
Antonio J. Macias ◽  
Juan Manuel Sanchez
Keyword(s):  
Private Information

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF TIME PREFERENCES IN THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFER OF SMOKING

2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (12) ◽  
pp. 1493-1501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Brown ◽  
Marjon Pol
Keyword(s):  
Time Preferences ◽  
Intergenerational Transfer

scholarly journals The role of commitment in repeated games

Optimization ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 541-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio García-Jurado ◽  
Julio González-Díaz
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games

Cooperative Homo economicus

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.

scholarly journals Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 316-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis S. Signorino
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Broad Class ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
Discrete Choice Models ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Sources Of Uncertainty ◽  
Special Cases

Social scientists are often confronted with theories in which one or more actors make choices over a discrete set of options. In this article, I generalize a broad class of statistical discrete choice models, with both well-known and new nonstrategic and strategic special cases. I demonstrate how to derive statistical models from theoretical discrete choice models and, in doing so, I address the statistical implications of three sources of uncertainty: agent error, private information about payoffs, and regressor error. For strategic and some nonstrategic choice models, the three types of uncertainty produce different statistical models. In these cases, misspecifying the type of uncertainty leads to biased and inconsistent estimates, and to incorrect inferences based on estimated probabilities.

scholarly journals Children and Online Privacy Protection: Empowerment from Cognitive Defense Strategies

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Craig Andrews ◽  
Kristen L. Walker ◽  
Jeremy Kees
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Parental Influence ◽  
Online Privacy ◽  
State Agencies ◽  
Educational Video ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Education Campaigns ◽  
Defense Research ◽  
Limit Access

At present, very little is known about what might encourage children and teens to limit access to their private information online and to restrict what they share on social media and video sites. Federal and state agencies face challenges encouraging companies to help children, teens, and parents protect their information online. The authors extend previous cognitive defense research by examining (1) effects beyond advertising as applied to information privacy online; (2) not only children’s/teens’ beliefs and knowledge, but also their online privacy decisions; (3) multiple age categories; (4) multiple cognitive defense strategies (educational video, quiz with feedback, or absence of a strategy); and (5) children’s/teens’ motivation to restrict what they share online. Key results indicate significant effects of the quiz and educational video over the absence of a strategy in enhancing favorable online safety beliefs and in restricting online sharing. Findings also demonstrate the role of perceived parental influence and for agencies to offer privacy education campaigns to help empower children to protect their privacy. Implications for policy and privacy research are discussed.

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