Cooperative Homo economicus

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daehyun Kim ◽  
Xiaoxi Li
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Constructive Proof ◽  
The Public ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
Time Inconsistent ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

This paper defines a general framework to study infinitely repeated games with time-dependent discounting in which we distinguish and discuss both time-consistent and -inconsistent preferences. To study the long-term properties of repeated games, we introduce an asymptotic condition to characterize the fact that players become more and more patient; that is, the discount factors at all stages uniformly converge to one. Two types of folk theorems are proven without the public randomization assumption: the asymptotic one, that is, the equilibrium payoff set converges to the feasible and individual rational set as players become patient, and the uniform one, that is, any payoff in the feasible and individual rational set is sustained by a single strategy profile that is an approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in all games with sufficiently patient discount factors. We use two methods for the study of asymptotic folk theorem: the self-generating approach and the constructive proof. We present the constructive proof in the perfect-monitoring case and show that it can be extended to time-inconsistent preferences. The self-generating approach applies to the public-monitoring case but may not extend to time-inconsistent preferences because of a nonmonotonicity result.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 329-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingela Alger ◽  
Jörgen W. Weibull
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Evolutionary Models ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Preference Formation ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Local Dispersion ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Evolution Of Preferences

The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo economicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo economicus is favored by evolution only when individuals’ preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed, so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), then evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo economicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, then evolution destabilizes Homo economicus in virtually all games.

Levels and types of breaking the maxims: A neo-Gricean account of humor

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila L. Nemesi
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
The Self ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Cooperative Principle ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Constant Tension

AbstractOn the basis of examples drawn from seven classic Hungarian film comedies, I argue in this article that the place of humor within the Gricean–Leechian model needs to be revisited and extended towards social psychological pragmatics to account for a wider range of humorous material. Scrutinizing the relevant controversial details of Grice’s conceptual framework, my concern is to find a practical way of fitting the various forms of humor into an adequate (and not an idealistic) pragmatic theory. I propose to differentiate between two levels and five types of breaking the maxims, introducing the Self-interest Principle (SiP) supposed to be in constant tension with, and as rational as, Grice’s Cooperative Principle. Politeness and self-presentational phenomena are subsumed under the operation of the SiP which embraces and coordinates the speaker’s own personal and interpersonal purposes.

scholarly journals Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 278-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melis Kartal
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Broad Class ◽  
Time Preferences ◽  
Reputation Games

New relationships are often plagued with uncertainty because one of the players has some private information about her “type.” The reputation literature has shown that equilibria that reveal this private information typically involve breach of trust and conflict. But are these inevitable for equilibrium learning? I analyze self-enforcing relationships where one party is privately informed about her time preferences. I show that there always exist honest reputation equilibria, which fully reveal information and support cooperation without breach or conflict. I compare these to dishonest reputation equilibria from several perspectives. My results are applicable to a broad class of repeated games. (JEL C73, D82, D83, D86, Z13)

Sex Differences in Reward Allocation

1988 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 981-982
Author(s):  
Kerry C. Martin ◽  
Jay Hewitt
Keyword(s):  
Sex Differences ◽  
Work Groups ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
High Productivity ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Reward Allocation

Men and women were presented descriptions of two dyadic work groups. In both groups, one member of the dyad did approximately two-thirds of the work. For one of the groups, subjects were asked to imagine that they were the worker of high productivity while for the other group subjects were asked to imagine that they were impartial observers. Subjects were asked to divide the rewards among the two workers for both groups. Men and women did not differ in allocation of reward when acting as impartial observers. When subjects imagined themselves as the worker of high productivity, men gave themselves a greater share of the reward than did women. It was concluded that the results were consistent with the self-interest explanation of sex differences in allocation of reward.

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