scholarly journals The Effects of Voting Costs on the Democratic Process and Public Finances

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Hodler ◽  
Simon Luechinger ◽  
Alois Stutzer
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Knowledge ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Special Interest Groups ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Average Education ◽  
Swiss Cantons ◽  
Welfare Expenditures

Increasing the attractiveness of voting is often seen as a remedy for unequal participation and the influence of special-interest groups on public policy. However, lower voting costs may also bring less informed citizens to the poll, thereby inviting efforts to sway these voters. We substantiate this argument in a probabilistic voting model with campaign contributions. In an empirical analysis for the 26 Swiss cantons, we find that lower voting costs due to postal voting are related to higher turnout, lower average education and political knowledge of participants as well as lower government welfare expenditures and lower business taxation. (JEL D72, H25, H75, I20, I38)

scholarly journals Pharmaceuticals, Political Money, and Public Policy: A Theoretical and Empirical Agenda

2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul D. Jorgensen
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Cost Effectiveness ◽  
Pharmaceutical Industry ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Pharmaceutical Policy ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Policy Problems ◽  
Selective Information ◽  
Powerful Interest

The point, for the 946,326th time is that people get elected to office by currying the favor of powerful interest groups. They don’t get elected for their excellence as political philosophers.Congress has consistently failed to solve some serious problems with the cost, effectiveness, and safety of pharmaceuticals. In part, this failure results from the pharmaceutical industry convincing legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect industry profits. By targeting campaign contributions to influential legislators and by providing them with selective information, the industry manages to displace the public’s voice in developing pharmaceutical policy.

Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur T. Denzau ◽  
Michael C. Munger
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Constrained Maximization ◽  
Committee Assignments ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Supply Price

This paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model. In the model, three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes: organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth, voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes, and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection. A given legislator's supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort, as determined by committee assignments, priority and ability, and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district. Two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model. The prediction of the model is that interest groups will, in general, seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks. Thus, voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented, even though they are not organized.

scholarly journals The Iceberg Theory of Campaign Contributions: Political Threats and Interest Group Behavior

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcos Chamon ◽  
Ethan Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Special Interest ◽  
Group Behavior ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Special Interest Groups ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Standard Models

We present a model where special interest groups condition contributions on the receiving candidate's support and also her opponent's. This allows interest groups to obtain support from contributions as well as from threats of contributing. Out-of-equilibrium contributions help explain the missing money puzzle. Our framework contradicts standard models in predicting that interest groups give to only one side of a race. We also predict that special interest groups will mainly target lopsided winners, whereas general interest groups will contribute mainly to candidates in close races. We verify these predictions in FEC data for US House elections from 1984–1990. (JEL D72)

The Economic Crisis and Retardants of Growth in Greece

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
George S. Atsalakis ◽  
George Baourakis ◽  
Constantin Zopounidis
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Special Interest ◽  
Social Inequalities ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Special Interest Groups ◽  
Policy Makers

The development of special interest groups may alter the structure of incentives and the direction of a society's development. Governments are systematically influenced by special interest groups. The slowdown in the adoption of new technologies, the non-adjustment of the economy, and the focus on the distribution of the “pie” rather than the enlargement of the “pie” due to the activity of the interest groups lead to a certain rigidity in society, a lack of reforms and a lack of competitiveness. Any attempt reform and the society fails because of the strong resistance of these lobbyists until the inevitable occurs for both society and the economy. Awareness of the perverse role of interest groups by more and more people, but mainly by public policy makers, will significantly reduce the losses suffered by society from their activity. This is an expectation of all who espouse a society that will minimize economic and social inequalities. The unveiling of the role of special interest groups and the removal of privileges will transform Greece into both a healthy society and economy.

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