“Outside Lobbying” over the Airwaves: A Randomized Field Experiment on Televised Issue Ads

We present the first field experiment on how organized interest groups’ television ads affect issue opinions. We randomized 31,404 voters to three weeks of interest group ads about either immigration or transgender nondiscrimination. We then randomly assigned voters to receive ostensibly unrelated surveys either while the ads aired, one day after they stopped, or three days afterwards. Voters recalled the ads, but three ads had a minimal influence on public opinion, whereas a fourth’s effects decayed within one day. However, voters remembered a fact from one ad. Our results suggest issue ads can affect public opinion but that not every ad persuades and that persuasive effects decay. Despite the vast sums spent on television ads, our results are the first field experiment on their persuasive power on issues, shedding light on the mechanisms underpinning—and limits on—both televised persuasion and interest group influence.

Getting Cozy, or How the European Commission Produces Legitimacy in the EU

International organizations increasingly resort to strategies of legitimation in order to justify their authority and policies. This article explores one such strategy of the European Commission that targets organized interest groups with the aim to build a legitimating constituency. The members of this constituency not only contribute expertise to a policy, but also benefit from that policy and, therefore, participate in the development and confirmation of a claim to the policy's legitimacy that is put forward by EU officials. As a consequence, the agents seeking legitimacy and the addressees granting it become closely associated and “get cozy” with each other. EU officials address their claim to legitimacy to a community of co-opted elites who are likely to confirm this claim and in whose own interests it is to do so. The result is legitimation as a collaborative activity with preordained outcomes. Taking the case of the European Commission's research and innovation policy, and building in part on an ethnographic practitioner's account, the article provides an original insight into how this legitimation strategy works in everyday EU policymaking.

Interest Groups and Order in Global Economic Relations

Scholars of international relations have long pointed to organized interest groups as prime movers in the creation of order and disorder in global economic relations. This review introduces interest groups, illustrating the many types—representing producers, workers, consumers, issues, ideologies, and identities—that are examined in current scholarship. The costs, benefits, and challenges of collective organization are highlighted. It also provides a synthetic overview of four stylized varieties of interest group explanations for international order, focusing on: preferences and group size; organization and parties; domestic political institutions; and international institutions and organizations. Each of these factors shaping interest group influence has been treated as fixed in some accounts and as an endogenous outcome of interest group activity in others. Interest group-centered explanations for global order remain a vital and variegated approach within International Political Economy (IPE).

Europeizacja zorganizowanych grup interesu w wybranych państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej

In democratic countries, advocacy organizations and other organized interest groups play an important role in the process of creating public policies and as a consequence, they influence the final shape of the implemented development models. The inclusive decision-making process enables interest groups to fulfill a variety of functions. Interest groups are very important legitimation channel, they provide expert knowledge, and also they are major channel through which citizens can express their opinions to the decision-makers. Through their activities, advocacy organizations may influence specific policies as well as the overall direction of the evolution of the development model. This paper describes and explains the Europeanization process and its pressure on interest groups in Central and Easter Europe, also answering the question to what extent the Europeanization process enables interest groups to access the political process at the state level. Article relies on data from a large-scale survey of organised interests operating in four CEE countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Czech Republic) in three policy sectors i.e. health care, higher education and energy policy. Based on the collected data, a linear regression analysis was performed.

The Politics of Marriage Equality: Confrontational Interest Groups and Nonconfrontational Officeholders

The passage of marriage equality in Rhode Island offers insight into the role of organized groups and politicians in policymaking. Despite a Democratic legislature and popular support, marriage equality was initially defeated in 2011, in part due to concentrated opposition from the Catholic Church and the reluctance of Democratic officeholders to confront members of the same party on the issue. In the following primary elections, small interest groups in Rhode Island, with the help of national interest groups, helped raise the salience of marriage equality by campaigning against opponents, resulting in the release of a marriage equality bill from the Senate Judiciary Committee and its subsequent passage in a floor vote. One organized interest was responsible for blocking marriage equality in the legislature’s most significant bottleneck and different organized interests were responsible for enabling passage. The passage of marriage equality in Rhode Island shows that interest groups can enable as well as obstruct majority opinion.

How Much Can the U.S. Congress Resist Political Money? A Quantitative Assessment

The extent to which governments can resist pressures from organized interest groups, and especially from finance, is a perennial source of controversy. This paper tackles this classic question by analyzing votes in the U.S. House of Representatives on measures to weaken the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill in the years following its passage. To control as many factors as possible that could influence floor voting by individual legislators, the analysis focuses on representatives who originally cast votes in favor of the bill but then subsequently voted to dismantle key provisions of it. This design rules out from the start most factors normally advanced by skeptics to explain vote shifts, since these are the same representatives, belonging to the same political party, representing substantially the same districts. Our panel analysis, which also controls for spatial influences, highlights the importance of time-varying factors, especially political money, in moving representatives to shift their positions on amendments such as the “swaps push out” provision. Our results suggest that the links between campaign contributions from the financial sector and switches to a pro-bank vote were direct and substantial: For every $100,000 that Democratic representatives received from finance, the odds they would break with their party’s majority support for the Dodd-Frank legislation increased by 13.9 percent. Democratic representatives who voted in favor of finance often received $200,000–$300,000 from that sector, which raised the odds of switching by 25–40 percent.

How to Get There

The lesson of the past one hundred years is that as the United States gets richer, we are willing to spend more in order to safeguard against loss and enhance fairness. Advances in social policy come only intermittently, but they do come. And when they come, they usually last. The expansion of public insurance that has occurred over the past century is what we should expect for the future. I consider an array of potential obstacles, including Americans’ dislike of big government, Democrats’ centrism, Democrats’ electoral struggles, the shift to the right in the balance of organized interest group strength, the structure of America’s political system, racial and ethnic diversity, slowing economic growth, and more. None of these is likely to derail America’s slow but steady movement toward an expanded government role in improving economic security, enhancing opportunity, and ensuring decent and rising living standards for all.