Social Learning and Dynamic Pricing of Durable Goods

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 851-865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bing Jing
2020 ◽  
pp. 135481661989695 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuting Chen ◽  
Rong Zhang ◽  
Bin Liu

The rise of the sharing economy has changed the traditional way of providing service to consumers. Airbnb is the most successful peer-to-peer model in the hospitality industry. This article investigates how to conduct strategic dynamic pricing in a competitive market by considering market conditions, quality, and risk sensitivity. Our research yields three main conclusions. First, we observe that the higher the risk level suppliers face, the more profit they will get; the lower the risk level consumers face, the more utilities they obtain. Second, we find that fixed pricing may be optimal or near-optimal for the platform when market size is small, the accommodation quality is better, and consumers’ reliability is low. Otherwise, a flexible pricing strategy is optimal. Finally, we extend the research into dynamic pricing decision in presence of Bayesian social learning and propose that the less-perfect accommodation requires social learning more urgently. In tourism peak period, social learning has less positive impact when the Airbnb accommodation is much perfect. These conclusions provide useful guidance on how the Airbnb and hotel can take advantage of the competitive market.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 919-939 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiangos Papanastasiou ◽  
Nicos Savva

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric C. Jackson ◽  
Ram Narasimhan

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">There is some question as to whether or not consumers use price as an indicator of product quality. In the case of non-durable goods there is some evidence that consumers do equate higher price products with higher quality products. These products are those that the consumer must experience personally before making a judgment on the product quality. In the case of durable goods there is less empirical evidence to support the price-quality connection. This paper develops a dynamic game model to investigate the price-quality connection in the presence of competition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Specifically, the paper investigates whether or not the optimal pricing strategy in the case of a durable good, where consumers may collect quality information about the product as units diffuse into the market, should be a high quality-high price strategy or a high quality-low price strategy. This question is examined by means of a dynamic game model, which is an extension of the Narasimhan-Ghosh-Mendez (NGM) quality diffusion model. The paper explicitly incorporates competition into the NGM model. Price trajectories for two competing firms are derived so that profits are maximized for the two competitors. It is shown that the price trajectory for the firm using quality as a strategic lever is shown to be lower than that of the firm that was not using a quality strategy. This result strongly suggests that a firm pursuing a quality strategy should couple this strategy with a lower price than its competition and should not couple high prices with high quality in an effort to signal the product&rsquo;s superior quality to consumers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span></span></span></p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaud Gruber

Abstract The debate on cumulative technological culture (CTC) is dominated by social-learning discussions, at the expense of other cognitive processes, leading to flawed circular arguments. I welcome the authors' approach to decouple CTC from social-learning processes without minimizing their impact. Yet, this model will only be informative to understand the evolution of CTC if tested in other cultural species.


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