scholarly journals A Dynamic Pricing Game Investigating The Interaction Of Price And Quality On Sales Response

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric C. Jackson ◽  
Ram Narasimhan

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">There is some question as to whether or not consumers use price as an indicator of product quality. In the case of non-durable goods there is some evidence that consumers do equate higher price products with higher quality products. These products are those that the consumer must experience personally before making a judgment on the product quality. In the case of durable goods there is less empirical evidence to support the price-quality connection. This paper develops a dynamic game model to investigate the price-quality connection in the presence of competition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Specifically, the paper investigates whether or not the optimal pricing strategy in the case of a durable good, where consumers may collect quality information about the product as units diffuse into the market, should be a high quality-high price strategy or a high quality-low price strategy. This question is examined by means of a dynamic game model, which is an extension of the Narasimhan-Ghosh-Mendez (NGM) quality diffusion model. The paper explicitly incorporates competition into the NGM model. Price trajectories for two competing firms are derived so that profits are maximized for the two competitors. It is shown that the price trajectory for the firm using quality as a strategic lever is shown to be lower than that of the firm that was not using a quality strategy. This result strongly suggests that a firm pursuing a quality strategy should couple this strategy with a lower price than its competition and should not couple high prices with high quality in an effort to signal the product&rsquo;s superior quality to consumers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span></span></span></p>

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 768-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rabih Salhab ◽  
Roland P. Malhame ◽  
Jerome Le Ny

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandr A. Tarasyev ◽  
Gavriil A. Agarkov ◽  
Tatyana V. Tarasyeva ◽  
Jeenat B. Jabbar

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (20) ◽  
pp. 5708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunxian Hou ◽  
Pengfei Chen

After the policy of separating ownership rights, contract rights, and management rights to rural land, some Chinese farmers entrusted their land to agricultural social service providers. However, at present in land trusteeships, short-term behaviors exist, which are not good for the sustainable utilization of land. This article uses a dynamic game model to analyze the economic reasons for short-term behavior and to explore possible mechanisms. The study’s results showed that fluctuations in trusteeship prices encouraged farmers to sign low-price, long-term contracts or high-price, short-term contracts that allowed agricultural social service providers choose short-term behaviors. A variable-price system may avoid short-term contracts as a result of fluctuations in trusteeship prices, allowing both sides to build a long-term stable partnership, encouraging long-term investment in land. To ensure the sustainable utilization of land, it is suggested that both sides adopt a variable price system.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjie Bi ◽  
Yinghui Sun ◽  
Haiying Liu ◽  
Xiaohong Chen

Existing dynamic pricing models which take consumers’ learning behavior into account generally assume that consumers learn on the basis of reinforcement learning and belief-based learning. Nevertheless, abundant empirical evidence of behavior game indicates that consumers’ learning is normally described as a process of mixed learning. Particularly, for experience goods, a consumer’s purchase decision is not only based on his previous purchase behavior (adaptive learning), but also affected by that of other consumers (sophisticated learning). With the assumption that consumers are both adaptive and sophisticated learners, we study a dynamic pricing model dealing with repeated decision problems in a duopoly market. Specifically, we build a dynamic game model based on sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning model (SEWA) and analyze the existence of the equilibrium. Finally, we show the characteristics and differences of the steady-state solutions between models considering adaptive consumers and models considering sophistical consumers by numerical results.


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