Note intorno alia teoria delle scelte pubbliche

1984 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-44
Author(s):  
Salvo Creaco

Abstract Public Choice can be defined as the application of microeconomics to the analysis of public decision-making. According to this approach, the microeconomic theory is not considered any more as restricted to the field of price theory, and its role is extended from the private market to the political one.By taking both voters and politicians as endogenous variables, the Public Choice school fills a basic gap of the traditional approach to the study of public policy. The application of this new methodology made it possible to identify, abreast of the well known "market failure*, the eventual "government failure*, due to the inadequacy of public intervention in economy.

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne O Krueger

By the 1970s and early 1980s, governments in most developing countries were mired down in economic policies that were manifestly unworkable. Whether market failures had been present or not, most knowledgeable observers concluded that there had been colossal government failures. In many countries, there could be little question but that government failure significantly outweighed market failure. This essay focuses on insights relating directly to government behavior affecting economic activity and economic growth in developing countries. It briefly examines each of the following questions: 1) What is “the government”? 2) What is the comparative advantage of government? 3) What are the dynamics of government intervention? 4) Can a positive theory of political behavior be formulated that will help explain when and how alternative policies will evolve in the political arena?


1991 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Le Grand

This article outlines a theory of government failure that parallels the more well-established theory of market failure. It builds on the work of the public choice school concerning the behaviour of governments under the assumption that all relevant agents pursue their selfinterest. It examines the theoretical consequences for efficiency and equity of three kinds of government activity: provision, subsidy and regulation. The conclusion is reached that all three may create inefficiency and inequity, but that the form and magnitude of the failure will differ with the type of activity; hence it is important that the three are distinguished. It is also emphasised that the extent of government failure in each case (and whether it is greater or smaller than the corresponding areas of market failure) is ultimately an empirical question, not a theoretical one.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Furniss

The public choice-property rights perspective is an important intellectual movement aimed at refurbishing and broadening the scope of classical microeconomic reasoning. This paper assesses the political implications of the “school”–its ability both to generate significant political insights and hypotheses and to use political arguments and findings to buttress the assumptions of microeconomic theory.I conclude that, in the main, neither effort realizes its goal. What we do find revealed by a study of the political implications of the perspective is a well-developed, if generally unacknowledged, normative position, a position that deflects attention from the major sources of power in society and thus complicates the articulation of prescriptions or recommendation statements.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (Special Edition) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Hammer

Whether to provide services by the public or the private sector has been at the center of debates within governments and those in the international aid industry for decades. Unfortunately, this debate has often been cast in terms of absolutes with the private sector either as savior or demon. Casting the issue in this light simply can’t be correct. It cannot be the case that either is appropriate for every service and with every government regardless of its capability to the exclusion of the other. In every case, policy makers need to ask “how can the government improve the well-being of citizens with the constraints and tools at hand?” Those constraints include the ability to implement and monitor policy. This paper outlines how limitations of the market can be matched to appropriate interventions by government as it actually performs, not as it is hoped to perform. This matching will, by necessity, vary with country circumstance. While pure public goods must be provided by government regardless of its weaknesses and pure private goods should generally be left to the market, most serious policies operate in between. The balance of the limitations of the sectors needs careful analysis. The welfare costs of private market failure are rarely measured and the difficulties of implementing different policies are rarely discussed let alone quantified. Policies that are sensitive to deviations from perfect implementation should be avoided in preference to those that are more robust to circumstances. Further, every policy will generate interest groups that will constrain future decisions through political pressure.


Author(s):  
Nick Von Tunzelmann

This chapter looks at the comparative systems approach to understanding the way in which different institutional regimes affect the governance of technological development. It focuses on four institutional constraints: market failure, government failure, corporate failure, and network failure. Each has the potential to impede or disconnect the linkage between the production of technology and the use or adoption of technology.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document