Book Review: The Law of Defamation and the Internet, the Judicial Application of Human Rights Law. National, Regional and International Jurisprudence, from Nuremberg to the Hague. The Future of International Criminal Justice, International Law from Below. Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Reading Humanitarian Intervention. Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law, Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Decisions and Dilemmas: Working with Mental Health Law, Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law

2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-379
Author(s):  
Andrew Charlesworth ◽  
Rachel Murray ◽  
Peter Bartlett ◽  
Nicholas Tsagourias ◽  
Nicholas Tsagourias
1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck ◽  
Nigel S. Rodley

In the Bangladesh crisis, two important objectives of international law appeared to be in conflict: that of peace and that of justice. The former objective is set out in the rules of the U.N. Charter against the use of force by states except in self-defense against an armed attack. The second is found in the provisions of the Charter and in various resolutions, declarations, and covenants pertaining to fundamental human rights and self determination.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

AbstractThe ongoing Syrian civil war calls for a re-evaluation of using force to protect human rights. This article does not rake over the much-debated issue of whether a right of humanitarian intervention exists as lex lata. Instead, it addresses the little reviewed normative issue of whether the right should exist in international law to support and reflect a pluralistic understanding of sovereignty. Despite advancements in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, this wider fabric of international law preserves Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. It denies any right of humanitarian intervention.


Author(s):  
Nigel S. Rodley

This chapter examines whether so-called humanitarian intervention is a lawful exception to the international law prohibiting use of force when rescuing populations from widespread grave human rights violations, without UN Security Council authorization under Chapter VII. It considers what type or level of human rights violation or abuse justifies ‘humanitarian intervention’ if it were permitted, with reference to the R2P categories of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It discusses the UN Charter provisions and state practice on the prohibition on use of force, and criteria used to determine the legality of action deemed humanitarian intervention. The chapter describes tests that an intervention would have to pass and would be applicable to mitigate culpability, including gravity of the situation, political neutrality, the circumstances of the Security Council’s inability to act, and principles of necessity and proportionality. It argues that there is no humanitarian exception to the prohibition of the use of force in international law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (04) ◽  
pp. 943-976
Author(s):  
Cóman Kenny ◽  
Yvonne McDermott

AbstractDoes international law govern how States and armed groups treat their own forces? Do serious violations of the laws of war and human rights law that would otherwise constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity fall squarely outside the scope of international criminal law when committed against fellow members of the same armed forces? Orthodoxy considered that such forces were protected only under relevant domestic criminal law and/or human rights law. However, landmark decisions issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) suggest that crimes committed against members of the same armed forces are not automatically excluded from the scope of international criminal law. This article argues that, while there are some anomalies and gaps in the reasoning of both courts, there is a common overarching approach under which crimes by a member of an armed group against a person from the same forces can be prosecuted under international law. Starting from an assessment of the specific situation of the victim, this article conducts an in-depth analysis of the concepts of ‘hors de combat’ and ‘allegiance’ for war crimes and that of the ‘lawful target’ for crimes against humanity, providing an interpretative framework for the future prosecution of such crimes.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solomon E. Salako

<p>The forcible protection of nationals abroad (a rescue mission) and humanitarian intervention (intervention of one state or a group of states in a territorial state where there is a threat or actual loss of life, forced migration or gross violation of human rights and which, at times, involves government replacement or nation building) are different doctrines which, in functional terms, overlap.</p><p>Since 1945, the <em>ius ad bellum</em> (the rules of international law governing the legality of the use of force) are stated in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, some states and an increasing number of scholars have attempted to discard the prohibition of the use of force and to create new exceptions such as preventive war, pro-democratic intervention and unilateral intervention.</p>The objects of this article are: (i) to assess critically the attempt to drive a horse and a coach through the provisions of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter; (ii) to show that a legal regime laid down by the UN Charter which is founded on a genuine <em>ius contra bellum </em>(law against war) remains unaffected; (iii) to show that the transmogrification of ‘political sovereignty’ to ‘popular sovereignty’ and the use of human rights as justifications for humanitarian intervention can be construed as a subterfuge; and (iv) to analyse the economic, political and strategic reasons for humanitarian intervention and to show how stretching international law to justify a ‘right’ is simply replaced by ‘might’.


Author(s):  
Nigel S. Rodley

Reluctant for its first two decades to consider states’ human rights performance, the UN gradually developed an extensive network of machinery to examine human rights violations in some states and categories of violation in all states. Action was limited to investigation and condemnation. The overwhelming majority of states and commentators rejected the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ that had had some currency until the UN Charter’s proscription of the use of force by states. It took the UN sixty years to accept that the Security Council could and should take necessary coercive measures, including armed force, to confront the most extreme forms of human rights violation or atrocity such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In doing so, it sanctified a new doctrine and codified its scope. Political and material realities seem to require sober expectations about the UN’s actual ability to protect populations from these atrocities.


Laws ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Joseph Rikhof ◽  
Ashley Geerts

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) defines ‘persecution’ based on five enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, and political opinion. This list of protected groups has not changed in the nearly 70 years since its inception, although the political and social context that gave rise to the Refugee Convention has changed. This article examines how ‘membership in a particular social group’ (“MPSG”) has been interpreted, then surveys international human rights law, transnational criminal law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law instruments to determine whether MPSG can encompass the broader protections afforded under other international law regimes. It concludes that the enumerated grounds are largely consistent with other instruments and protects, or at least has the potential to protect, many of the other categories through MPSG. However, as this ground is subject to domestic judicial interpretation and various analytical approaches taken in different countries, protection could be enhanced by amending the Refugee Convention to explicitly include additional protected groups from these other areas of international law, specifically international human rights law and international criminal law.


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