Russell, Frege, and the "Meaning" of the Theory of Descriptions (or): Did Russell Know His Frege?

1982 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-423
Author(s):  
R. K Perkins
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Descriptions

Why the Theory of Descriptions?

1996 ◽  
Vol 46 (183) ◽  
pp. 158
Author(s):  
Gideon Makin
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Descriptions

Bertrand Russell. My mental development. A reprint of IX 82(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 1–20; also third edition, Tudor Publishing Company, New York 1951, pp. 1-20; also paper-bound reprint of the third edition, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 1-20. - Hans Reichenbach. Bertrand Russell's logic. A reprint of IX 76(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 21–54; also ibid. 1951, pp. 21-54; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 21-54. - Morris Weitz. Analysis and the unity of Russell's philosophy. A reprint of IX 77(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 55–121; also ibid. 1951, pp. 55-121; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 55-121. - Kurt Göde. Russell's mathematical logic. A reprint of XI 75. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 123–153; also ibid. 1951, pp. 123-153; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 123-153. - James Feibleman. A reply to Bertrand Russell's introduction to the second edition of The principles of mathematics. A reprint of IX 77(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 155–174; also ibid. 1951, pp. 155-174; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 155-174. - G.E. Moore. Russell's “theory of descriptions.” A reprint of IX 78(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 175–225; also ibid. 1951, pp. 175-225; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 175-225. - Max Black. Russell's philosophy of language. A reprint of IX 78(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 227–255; also ibid. 1951, pp. 227-255; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 227-255. - Philip P. Wiener. Method in Russell's work on Leibniz. A reprint of IX 82(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 257–276; also ibid. 1951, pp. 257-276; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 257-276. - Ernest Nagel. Russell's philosophy of science. A reprint of IX 79. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 317–349; also ibid. 1951, pp. 317-349; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 317-349. - Andrew Paul Ushenko. Russell's critique of empiricism. A reprint of IX 80. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 385–417; also ibid. 1951, pp. 385-417; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 385-417.

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-496
Author(s):  
Ann S. Ferebee
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Mental Development ◽  
Publishing Company ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Hans Reichenbach ◽  
The Third ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions

The Problem of False Belief and the Failure of the Theory of Descriptions

Theoria ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-80
Author(s):  
Max Rosenkrantz
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions

A Strawsonian Objection to Russess's Theory of Descriptions

Analysis ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 209-212
Author(s):  
M. Ramachandran
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Descriptions

2. How can we speak of what does not exist?

2017 ◽  
pp. 24-42
Author(s):  
Michael Beaney
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
History Of ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions

Statements that purportedly refer to something that does not exist, whether fictional or not, have been especially problematic in the history of philosophy. ‘How can we speak of what does not exist?’ suggests that in order to understand existential statements, we need to recall Frege’s claim that number statements are assertions about concepts. Existential statements are really just a type of number statement. When we make an existential claim, we are not attributing a first-level concept to an object, but a second-level concept to a first-level concept. The work of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) is also discussed along with the Russell Paradox and his Theory of Descriptions.

The Predicate of Existence

2019 ◽  
pp. 14-37
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau
Keyword(s):  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Order Property ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Existential Quantifier ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
David Kaplan ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions ◽  
Nathan Salmon

Kant famously declared that existence is not a (real) predicate. This famous dictum has been seen as echoed in the doctrine of the founders of modern logic, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, that existence isn’t a first-order property possessed by individuals, but rather a second-order property expressed by the existential quantifier. Russell in 1905 combined this doctrine with his new theory of descriptions and declared the paradox of nonexistence to be resolved without resorting to his earlier distinction between existence and being. In recent years, however, logicians and philosophers like Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, and Nathan Salmon have argued that there is no defensible reason to deny that existence is a property of individuals. Kant’s dictum has also been re-evaluated, the result being that the paradox of nonexistence has not, after all, disappeared. Yet it’s not clear how exactly Kripke et al. propose to resolve the paradox.

The Theory of Descriptions: Russell and the Philosophy of Language

2012 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 820-821
Author(s):  
Stewart Candlish
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions
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