cognitive-capacity-limits-putamen-preSMA-processed-data

UQ eSpace ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly Garner
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-94
Author(s):  
Kyle Perkins ◽  
Xuan Jiang

In this position paper, we advocate that advancements made in other disciplinary areas such as neurolinguistics should be included into contemporary reading comprehension courses and programs.  We present findings from neurobiology of reading that suggest explanation of certain reading behaviors: (1) the differences between reading disability and typically developing readers; (2) an inverted U-shaped function that reflects the fact that learning to read is associated with increased activation (the rising part of the inverted U) and activation decreases are associated with familiarity, experience, and expertise (the falling part of the inverted U); (3) and, the identification of reading networks.  As potential pedagogical implications of neuroimaging studies to reading, a list of sentence structures is proposed as an example to further relate reading comprehension to cognitive capacity limits. 


Daedalus ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 144 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl K. Miller ◽  
Timothy J. Buschman

Why can your brain store a lifetime of experiences but process only a few thoughts at once? In this article we discuss “cognitive capacity” (the number of items that can be held “in mind” simultaneously) and suggest that the limit is inherent to processing based on oscillatory brain rhythms, or “brain waves,” which may regulate neural communication. Neurons that “hum” together temporarily “wire” together, allowing the brain to form and re-form networks on the fly, which may explain a hallmark of intelligence and cognition: mental flexibility. But this comes at a cost; only a small number of thoughts can fit into each wave. This explains why you should never talk on a mobile phone when driving.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.G. Garner ◽  
M.I. Garrido ◽  
P.E. Dux

AbstractHumans show striking limitations in information processing when multitasking, yet can modify these limits with practice. Such limitations have been linked to a frontal-parietal network, but recent models of decision-making implicate a striatal-cortical network. We adjudicated these accounts by investigating the circuitry underpinning multitasking in 100 individuals and the plasticity caused by practice. We observed that multitasking costs, and their practice induced remediation, are best explained by modulations in information transfer between the striatum and the cortical areas that represent stimulus-response mappings. Specifically, our results support the view that multitasking stems at least in part from taxation in information sharing between the putamen and pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). Moreover, we propose that modulations to information transfer between these two regions leads to practice-induced improvements in multitasking.Significance statementHumans show striking limitations in information processing when multitasking, yet can modify these limits with practice. Such limitations have been linked to a frontal-parietal network, but recent models of decision-making implicate a striatal-cortical network. We adjudicated these accounts by investigating the circuitry underpinning multitasking in 100 individuals and the plasticity caused by practice. Our results support the view that multitasking stems at least in part from taxation in information sharing between the putamen and pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). We therefore show that models of cognitive capacity limits must consider how subcortical and cortical structures interface to produce cognitive behaviours, and we propose a novel neurophysiological substrate of multitasking limitations.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M Frankland ◽  
Taylor Webb ◽  
Jonathan D. Cohen

In one of the most influential articles in cognitive science, George Miller (1956) describes his “persecution” by similarities in three cognitive capacity-limits: the number of items that can be held in short-term memory, the number of stimuli that can be ordinally ranked, and the number of items in a visual display that can be quickly and accurately reported. Although Miller wondered whether these limits owe to a common source, he ultimately concluded that the likeness was coincidental. Here, we challenge that conclusion. Cognitive systems face a tradeoff between maximizing the number of possibilities they can represent (maximizing entropy), and precisely fitting the data observed thus far (minimizing energy). Equipping a cognitive system with an inductive bias to maximize entropy on different timescales enables one of the hallmarks of cognitive function— efficient generalization— but leads to the limits in information processing that haunted Miller.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Borness ◽  
Judith Proudfoot ◽  
Susan Miller ◽  
Michael Valenzuela

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