Toward Delinking: An Alternative Chinese Path Amid the New Cold War

2020 ◽  
pp. 15-31
Author(s):  
Sit Tsui ◽  
Erebus Wong ◽  
Lau Kin Chi ◽  
Wen Tiejun

During the 1960s, China was effectively excluded from the two major camps: the Soviet camp and the U.S. camp. For about a decade, China was obliged to seek development within its own borders and thereby achieved some extent of delinking: a refusal to succumb to U.S.-eurocentric globalization and an embrace of a people's agenda of development. While foreign relations were later normalized and China once again brought in foreign capital, since being explicitly targeted as the primary rival of the United States, however, the situation may again warrant moves toward delinking and searching for alternatives, with ups and downs along the way.

Author(s):  
Karen Knop

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.


Author(s):  
Rohani Hj Ab Ghani ◽  
Zulhilmi Paidi

The Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation between 1963-1966 was an important event attracting the attention of politicians and scholars alike as the conflict had threatened the long existing relations between the two countries. Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia was due to its refusal to accept the formation of the new federation of Malaysia, founded on 16th September 1963. Sukarno’s confrontational stand on this had broken the long-standing sentiments of regional brotherhood or “saudara serumpun” that had nurtured between the two countries for many years. The conflict also saw the involvement of major powers like the United States (U.S.), Britain, China and Russia in the midst of bipolar power struggle between the communist and the anti-communist as part of the ongoing Cold War. The three years of confrontation witnessed great attempts at peace efforts by U.S. Although U.S. involvement in the conflict was merely as a moderator for both countries it was also fueled by its efforts of containment of communism in the Southeast Asian region. The U.S. viewed that the conflict should be resolved in the context of “Asian solution” as it involved two Asian countries A settlement to the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation was finally achieved through the Bangkok Agreement, signed in August 1966. This paper discusses the role of U.S. in its attempts at finding an amicable settle to the confrontation in the form of “Asian solution.”  


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines how, in the post-Cold War era, the United States' alignment with Taiwan and alliance with Japan again have figured prominently among issues affecting U.S.-China security relations. While they are far from being allies, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are not enemies either, but rather major economic partners who have also cooperated to some degree in addressing an increasing range of international problems. But there are still security tensions between the two sides over issues such as relations across the Taiwan Strait, and both nations practice coercive diplomacy toward the other, sometimes tacitly, sometimes less so. The chapter considers how the legacies of these Cold War alliances—particularly the U.S.–Taiwan relationship and the U.S.–Japan security treaty—have affected U.S.–China relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


2020 ◽  
pp. 165-188
Author(s):  
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres

This chapter describes the efforts by the United States and Eduardo Frei to prevent Salvador Allende from attaining the presidency. The Nixon administration, after choosing not to involve itself in the 1970 presidential race to the extent the Johnson administration had in the 1964 election, reacted with great alacrity to Allende's victory in the popular election. Richard Nixon himself instructed CIA director Richard Helms to conduct covert operations in Chile, behind Ambassador Korry's back. In addition, Chilean politicians, particularly Christian Democrats of the Frei line, tried or at least explored ways of averting an Allende victory and sought for that purpose the support of the U.S. embassy in Santiago. Though many of the documents that tell this part of the story have been available to researchers since at least the early 2000s, only one scholarly work has treated these attempts by Chilean politicians, especially Eduardo Frei, in depth. The tendency of scholars of U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War to assume rather uncritically that the only decisions that mattered were taken in Washington has narrowed the perspectives from which the history of Cold War Chilean politics has been studied and interpreted.


2020 ◽  
pp. 97-117
Author(s):  
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres

This chapter focuses on the role of copper policies in the relations between the United States and Chile during the Frei administration, especially as they relate to the developmental efforts of the Christian Democratic project. During the Frei administration, the political debate on copper policies reached a climax. Since U.S. capitals were among the most significant actors in the story, the discussions around the issue of copper converged with the ideological visions of the United States and the Cold War held by the different Chilean political parties. As the Frei administration tried to introduce the most comprehensive and consistent reform around the structure of the property of the Gran Minería del Cobre, the forces in competition in the arena of Chilean politics stood by their ideological convictions, regarding both copper and the United States, in their opposition or grudging support for the policies proposed by the Christian Democratic government. Moreover, the U.S. government became deeply involved in the matter of copper in Chile, first by pressuring the Chilean government into rolling back a price increase in 1965 and then, mostly through the personal efforts of Ambassador Edward Korry, by mediating in the negotiation between the Frei administration and Anaconda on the nationalization of the U.S. company's largest mine, Chuquicamata, in 1969.


Author(s):  
Iñigo García-Bryce

This chapter explores Haya’s changing relationship with the United States. As an exiled student leader he denounced “Yankee imperialism” and alarmed observers in the U.S. State Department. Yet once he entered Peruvian politics, Haya understood the importance of cultivating U.S.-Latin American relations. While in hiding he maintained relations with U.S. intellectuals and politicians and sought U.S. support for his embattled party. His writings increasingly embraced democracy and he maneuvered to position APRA as an ally in the U.S. fight fascism during the 1930s and 40s, and then communism during the Cold War. The five years he spent in Lima’s Colombian embassy awaiting the resolution of his political asylum case, made him into an international symbol of the democratic fight against dictatorship. He would always remain a critic of U.S. support for dictatorships in Latin America.


Author(s):  
Montse Feu

España Libre’s editors invigorated the periodical’s proletarian counterculture to both fascism and elitism and sustained an ongoing resistance through times of harsh repression in Spain and Cold War political tensions in the United States. In the 1940s editorials focused on alerting readers about the spread of fascism to the Americas and encouraged fundraising for refugees. By the 1950s, the increasing international diplomatic recognition of the Franco dictatorship disquieted members and the editorials published during that decade were heavily focused on denouncing that recognition. However, by the 1960s the periodical concentrated its efforts on supporting the weakened underground labor opposition in Spain and in coordinating efforts with other political forces. In the 1970s, España Libre published homages to exiles for the antifascist resistance they put forth.


Author(s):  
Robert Rakove

For almost a century and a half, successive American governments adopted a general policy of neutrality on the world stage, eschewing involvement in European conflicts and, after the Quasi War with France, alliances with European powers. Neutrality, enshrined as a core principle of American foreign relations by the outgoing President George Washington in 1796, remained such for more than a century. Finally, in the 20th century, the United States emerged as a world power and a belligerent in the two world wars and the Cold War. This article explores the modern conflict between traditional American attitudes toward neutrality and the global agenda embraced by successive U.S. governments, beginning with entry in the First World War. With the United States immersed in these titanic struggles, the traditional U.S. support for neutrality eroded considerably. During the First World War, the United States showed some sympathy for the predicaments of the remaining neutral powers. In the Second World War it applied considerable pressure to those states still trading with Germany. During the Cold War, the United States was sometimes impatient with the choices of states to remain uncommitted in the global struggle, while at times it showed understanding for neutrality and pursued constructive relations with neutral states. The wide varieties of neutrality in each of these conflicts complicated the choices of U.S. policy makers. Americans remained torn between memory of their own long history of neutrality and a capacity to understand its potential value, on one hand, and a predilection to approach conflicts as moral struggles, on the other.


1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Ellis ◽  
Richard Wright

This paper compares characteristics of recent immigrant arrivals in the United States using two measures from the decennial U.S. census: the came-to-stay question and the migration question. We show that a little under 30 percent of immigrants who reported they came to stay between 1985–1990 on the 1990 U.S. Census Public Use Micro Sample were resident in the United States on April 1, 1985. A similar analysis of the 1980 censue reveals that 22 percent of immigrants who reported they came to stay between 1975–1980 lived in the United States on April 1, 1975. Thus among recent arrivals, defined as those who reported they came to stay in the quinquennium preceding the census, a large number were resident in the United States five years before the census date. Furthermore, the proportion of recent arrivals present in the United States five years before the census increased between 1975–1980 and 1985–1990. We show that the profile of recent arrivals is sensitive to their migration status. Generally, in both the 1975–1980 and 1985–1990 cohorts, those resident in the United States five years before the census have significantly less schooling and lower incomes than those who were abroad. Accordingly, we argue that estimates of the skill levels and hourly wages of recent arrivals to the United States vary with the way arrival is measured. Researchers who rely on Public Use samples of the U.S. census for their data should be aware that the year of entry question implies a broader definition of arrival than the migration question. We caution that immigration researchers should consider the idea of arrival more carefully to help distinguish newcomers from the resident foreign born.


2008 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mastanduno

There is striking consistency in the international economic behavior of the United States across the bipolar and unipolar eras. The United States has been simultaneously a system maker and privilege taker, and its ability to play that dual role has required the willing collaboration of foreign partners. U.S. influence over those partners, however, has changed in important ways. During the cold war the United States dominated international economic adjustment struggles. Its ability to prevail in those struggles after the cold war has been significantly compromised. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has opened a greater range of international and domestic economic options for America's supporters. In the unipolar era the United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.


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