Crown and Foreign acts of State Before British Courts

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom undertook in Rahmatullah v. Ministry of Defence and Belhaj v. Straw to demarcate the relationship between the judiciary and the executive with respect to Crown and foreign act of state. This chapter aims to unpack Rahmatullah and Belhaj for the reader and further to use these decisions to enquire into the constitutional underpinnings of the British act of state doctrines—particularly as they pertain to the separation of powers. The chapter concludes that there exists a general uncertainty regarding the scope of the doctrines, and a lack of jurisprudential development with respect to their constitutional underpinnings. But it is undeniable that progress, however minor, has been made in these decisions. The scene has been set in Rahmatullah and Belhaj for further developments—even if litigants will still need to refer to the earlier case law in order to get the full picture.

U.S. War Powers and the Potential Benefits of Comparativism

This chapter describes U.S. law governing the use of military force, and it considers the potential value of comparative study of how different countries regulate the issue. As the chapter notes, there is significant uncertainty and debate in the United States over the distribution of authority concerning the use of force—in particular, over whether and to what extent military actions must be authorized by Congress. Because courts in the modern era have generally declined to review the legality of military actions, disputes over this issue have had to be resolved, as a practical matter, through the political process. For those who believe that it is important to have legislative involvement in decisions to use force, the political process has not proven to be satisfactory: presidents have often used military force without obtaining congressional approval, and Congress generally has done little to resist such presidential unilateralism. The United States is not the only country to struggle with regulating the domestic authority to use military force. This issue of foreign relations law is common to constitutional democracies, and nations vary substantially in how they have addressed it. Comparative study of such approaches should be of inherent interest to scholars and students, including those trying to better understand the U.S. approach. Whether and to what extent such study should also inform the interpretation or revision of U.S. law presents a more complicated set of questions that are affected in part by one’s legal methodology and how the comparative materials are being invoked.

International Agreements and U.S. Foreign Relations Law

Over its constitutional history, the United States has developed multiple ways of joining, implementing, and terminating treaties and other international commitments. This chapter provides an overview of the law governing these pathways and considers the extent to which comparative law has influenced them or could do so in the future. Focusing in particular on the making of international commitments, the chapter describes how, over time, the United States came to develop alternatives to the process set out in the U.S. Constitution’s Treaty Clause, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. These alternatives arose partly from reasons of administrative efficiency and partly from presidential interest in making important international commitments in situations where two-thirds of the Senate would be unobtainable. These alternatives have had the effect of considerably increasing the president’s constitutional power to make international commitments. Nonetheless, considerable constraints remain on presidential power in this context, with some of these constraints stemming from constitutional law and others from statutory, administrative, and international law. With respect to comparative law, the chapter observes that U.S. practice historically has been largely but not entirely self-contained. Looking ahead, comparative practice is unlikely to affect U.S. constitutional law with respect to international agreements, but it might hold insights for legislative or administrative reforms.

International Law in Chinese Courts

This chapter adds a Chinese perspective to the comparative study of how national courts treat international law. The chapter finds that the application of international law in Chinese courts is influenced by several major factors, including China’s ambivalence toward international law, the role that the judiciary plays in China’s national governance, and the professional competence of Chinese judges. In particular, the failure of China’s Constitution to specify the status of international law makes secondary laws less likely to embrace international law: many secondary laws do not mention international law at all; only a modest number of secondary laws automatically incorporate international law. This also means that Chinese judges are discouraged from invoking international law in adjudicating disputes. However, in line with and in support of China’s economic opening policy since the late 1970s, Chinese judges regularly apply those treaties that deal with commercial relations between private actors. A major development is that, as China rises as a great power, Chinese courts have begun to prudently become more involved in foreign relations by applying international law.

Foreign Relations Law

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.

State Engagement with Treaties

This chapter explores the interaction between domestic and international law in relation to the state’s engagement with treaties. Treaty engagements are important mechanisms through which states conduct their foreign relations. The domestic allocation of responsibility for the making and unmaking of treaties is therefore a significant question of the constitutional separation of powers in the realm of foreign relations law. Treaties are also international legal instruments, facilitating the development of international law and international institutions. The domestic and international law of treaties therefore both concurrently regulate the state’s power to join and leave treaties. This chapter examines the relationship between these two bodies of law in this regard, setting out developments in domestic jurisdictions establishing constitutional limits on the executive’s power to enter and exit treaties, and addresses the possible impact of these constitutional developments in the international law of treaties.

Engagement and Disengagement with International Institutions

This chapter analyzes engagement and disengagement with international institutions from the perspective of U.K. law. The first part of the chapter considers the relevant legal rules that pertain to engagement by the United Kingdom in international institutions. It is divided into three sections. The first section is directed toward dualism as understood in U.K. constitutional law, whereby an international treaty cannot take effect in national law unless it has been transformed or adopted into domestic law, thereby preventing the executive from undertaking obligations without the imprimatur of the U.K. legislature. The second section explains the U.K. constitutional rules designed to prevent the executive from ratifying an international treaty, and hence committing the United Kingdom at the international level, before Parliament has had the opportunity to consider the treaty. This area is interesting, since it reveals a shift from practice, to a convention, and then to a statutory obligation. The third part investigates the limits of dualism, connoting in this respect that the doctrinal rules explicated here apply to formal treaties, but do not cover all global regulatory rules, which can impact, de jure or de facto, on the United Kingdom. The focus in the second section of the chapter shifts to the constitutional constraints that limit the national applicability of a treaty regime that the United Kingdom has ratified. Parliament may impose constraints on delegation, which condition the legal reception in U.K. law of changes made by an international organization. There are, in addition, constitutional constraints fashioned by the courts, which can affect the acceptance of rules or decisions made by an international organization, to which the United Kingdom is a party, within the U.K. legal order, more especially where U.K. courts feel that such a rule of decision can impact adversely on U.K. constitutional identity. These judicially created constraints can be interpretive or substantive. The final part of the chapter is concerned with disengagement from international institutions. The relevant legal precepts are, to a certain degree, symmetrical with those that govern initial engagement. The basic starting point is that the executive, acting pursuant to prerogative power, negotiates withdrawal or disengagement from an international organization, and Parliament then enacts or repeals the requisite legislation to make this a legal reality in national law. Matters can, however, be more complex, as exemplified by the litigation concerning the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union.

Foreign Affairs Federalism in the European Union

The European Union was born as an international organization. The 1957 Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, although the European Court of Justice was eager to emphasize that the Union constitutes “a new legal order” of international law. With time, this new legal order has indeed evolved into a true “federation of States.” Yet how would the foreign affairs powers of this new supranational entity be divided? Would the European Union gradually replace the member states, or would it preserve their distinct and diverse foreign affairs voices? In the past sixty years, the Union has indeed significantly sharpened its foreign affairs powers. While still based on the idea that it has no plenary power, the Union’s external competences have expanded dramatically, and today it is hard to identify a nucleus of exclusive foreign affairs powers reserved for the member states. And in contrast to a classic international law perspective, the Union’s member states only enjoy limited treaty-making powers under European law. Their foreign affairs powers are limited by the exclusive powers of the Union, and they may be preempted through European legislation. There are, however, moments when both the Union and its states enjoy overlapping foreign affairs powers. For these situations, the Union legal order has devised a number of cooperative mechanisms to safeguard a degree of “unity” in the external actions of the Union. Mixed agreements constitute an international mechanism that brings the Union and the member states to the same negotiating table. The second constitutional device is internal to the Union legal order: the duty of cooperation.

International Treaties and The German Constitution

This chapter deals with the making, status, and interpretation of international treaties under the German Constitution. It describes the interrelationship of the different institutions in treaty-making and shows how a comparatively old provision of the German Basic Law has been adapted slowly to new circumstances over the past decades. Thus, even though foreign affairs has remained a domain of the executive, several developments have contributed to an enhanced role of Parliament over time. These developments are partly due to the role of special sectors of law such as EU law and the law governing the use of force and partly due to changes in constitutional practice. As for the status of treaties in German law, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed a stance according to which treaties generally share the rank of the legal act that implements them into domestic law. A notable exception is the European Convention of Human Rights, which has assumed a quasi-constitutional rank by means of consistent interpretation. Some reference is made to other continental systems to assess how far different constitutions bring about certain features; various systems appear similar in many respects at first sight, whereas features in which they differ may be a source of inspiration for future constitutional practice.

Treaty Self-Execution as “Foreign” Foreign Relations Law

This chapter considers how a state’s approach to foreign relations problems may have an external origin, or what we call “foreign” foreign relations law (FFRL). Using the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties as a case study, we find close parallels between manifestations of this distinction in various states and how it evolved in the United States, where the distinction was first articulated. The chapter explores whether these parallels reflect the distinction’s transplantation from one legal system to another or the organic development of similar doctrines to address similar problems within the states involved. The chapter then addresses the utility of differentiating the exogenous/endogenous origins of particular foreign relations doctrines. We argue that consideration of a doctrine’s exogenous origins raises questions that can deepen and develop the nascent field of comparative foreign relations law. Why do states accept (or reject) FFRL? How does FFRL enter a state’s system? Who is doing the transporting? What happens to FFRL in its new site(s)—i.e., how static or dynamic does the concept prove in different settings? Further research on such questions may, in turn, set the table for more normative questions such as when states should seek (or resist) the importation of foreign relations law.