Friendship and Antagonism

This paper is particularly concerned with the economic aspects of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s Mongolian exile. His presence there eclipsed the authority of Mongolia’s highest incarnation, the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, and offerings formerly given to the Mongolian leader were gifted to the Tibetan leader. Tibetans accompanying their leader also became an important economic presence in Mongolia, and in the final part of the paper the author discusses the implications of this Tibetan presence after 1913, when Mongolia and Tibet afforded each other mutual diplomatic recognition amidst claims to independence. The revitalization of the interchange between Tibet and Mongolia resulted not only in friendship, but also in antagonism.

Solomon Islands tension reflects regional importance

Significance After rioting in the capital, Honiara, late last month Sogavare sought Australian assistance under a bilateral security accord and Canberra dispatched a small force of police and troops to help stabilise the situation. The riots are linked to Sogavare’s decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2019; Beijing has condemned the Australian response. Impacts The Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea will remain the chief focus of regional rivalries between China and the West. Australia will step up efforts to shut Beijing out of sensitive telecoms services in the region. China’s shift from aid to concessionary loans for infrastructure projects will deepen political concerns over indebtedness.

The Propaganda Battle

This chapter continues with an account of the diplomatic and propaganda battle fought from Therisso, with Venizelos as leader, chief planner, speaker and writer. Through Klearchos Markantonakis he contacted the Greek prime minister Deliyiannis, trying without success to persuade the Greek government to view the insurgency more sympathetically. He wrote letters to supporters in Crete conveying a 'line to take'. The insurgency was boosted when the veteran Sfakianakis declared his support. Inconclusive talks near Therisso with the French Colonel Lubanski amounted to a form of diplomatic recognition. The prince's efforts to nip the insurgency in the bud, e.g. by arresting the leaders, failed. Gradually the powers, led by the British consul general Howard, moved towards negotiation, blocking the prince's efforts to persuade them to suppress the insurgency by force. Howard's efforts to find a way to restore normality were helped by information brought from the rebel camp by Times correspondent James Bourchier. Meanwhile visits by sympathetic Athens journalists helped to spread Venizelos's message to Greeks on the mainland.

Diplomacy

The saga of the British loans (not resolved until the 1880s, long after Alamán’s death) is dealt with in this chapter. As minister he was much involved with negotiating the exit of Spanish armed forces from San Juan de Ulúa and the diplomatic recognition of Mexico’s independence by the British foreign minister, George Canning.

Continuous recognition: A latent variable approach to measuring international sovereignty of self-determination movements

How do self-determination groups move toward diplomatic recognition? Although recognition is the dominant activity used to understand international sovereignty, it is perhaps the most costly decision states make towards these groups. Third parties have many substantial interactions with aspiring states, building their sovereignty by other important means. I argue that our understanding of international sovereignty can be improved by conceptualizing it as a dynamic, continuous process, reflected in foreign policy decisions short of the legal recognition. I create a Bayesian latent variable model of international sovereignty, using bilateral data on diplomatic exchange, IGO voting, sanctions, military aid, and intervention in separatist conflicts. Complementing prior work on international sovereignty, my measure provides support for important theoretical expectations previously explored using only recognition as a measure of sovereignty. I find that diplomatic recognition, extant violence, separatist victory, and sour third-party–incumbent relations positively impact latent sovereignty of separatists, while concern for precedent negatively impacts it.

Taiwanese Public Perceptions of Diplomatic Recognition: an Experimental Analysis

What explains public support for Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition efforts? A sizable literature addresses the role of China and ‘dollar diplomacy’ in influencing countries to recognise Taiwan, yet little research addresses how these factors potentially influence Taiwanese public perceptions of efforts to maintain formal diplomatic recognition. Through four waves of an experimental survey design, we find that Taiwanese are more supportive of efforts when framed in terms of responding to China but support decreases when efforts are framed as potentially leading to increased demands for international aid from diplomatic partners.

España Libre and Its Editors

España Libre’s editors invigorated the periodical’s proletarian counterculture to both fascism and elitism and sustained an ongoing resistance through times of harsh repression in Spain and Cold War political tensions in the United States. In the 1940s editorials focused on alerting readers about the spread of fascism to the Americas and encouraged fundraising for refugees. By the 1950s, the increasing international diplomatic recognition of the Franco dictatorship disquieted members and the editorials published during that decade were heavily focused on denouncing that recognition. However, by the 1960s the periodical concentrated its efforts on supporting the weakened underground labor opposition in Spain and in coordinating efforts with other political forces. In the 1970s, España Libre published homages to exiles for the antifascist resistance they put forth.

Chinese Foreign Aid to Fiji: Threat or Opportunity

China’s political, economic and cultural influence is steadily rising in Fiji and the Pacific region as a whole. The Sino–Fiji cooperation deepened at multiple levels after the Fijian military assumed power through a coup d’état and removed the civilian government from power in late 2006. This ‘undemocratic behaviour’ infuriated the two regional powers—Australia and New Zealand who then applied sanctions on Fiji, particularly the military brass, and encouraged their counterparts as well as multilateral aid organisations to ‘punish’ Fiji’s military ‘regime’. The military government in order to derail the impact of sanctions from its traditional donors adopted the ‘Look North Policy’, which was opening cooperation with China and attracting Chinese investment in Fiji. China welcomed the friendship gesture and furnished Fiji with financial assistance. This Chinese friendship was also due to Taiwanese involvement in the region, which was providing aid for diplomatic recognition and support at the UN. The ‘microstates’ hold about 7 per cent of UN votes. Both China and Taiwan need their votes at multilateral organisations and given that these microstates are mostly aid-dependent economies, initiated an era of Chequebook diplomacy, which is basically money for diplomatic recognition in the case of Taiwan or acceptance of One China Policy in the case of China. The microstates have time and again switched between China and Taiwan and played one against the other to get more aid money out of their diplomatic rivalry. The Sino–Taiwan aid competition in the Pacific forced US to make a strong comeback and ensure that China under the pretext of denying Taiwan space in the region actually spies on the US activities in the region. As a result, the US and its regional allies have significantly increased their foreign aid to the island nations in order to coax them to diminish their level of financial dependence on China. So far, they have not been successful enough and China’s aid package has gone far beyond the level US is giving. Today, China is the second largest donor to the region and largest financier to Fiji. Fiji has become the ace in this game as it is the regional hub of the Pacific Island states. Bearing the current high level of aid competition between traditional and emerging donors in mind, it is too early to judge whether Chinese aid will cause more harm to Fiji than benefit or vice versa. It also entirely depends on the Fijian government as to how much it relies on Chinese aid and how clean Chinese are with their soft loans. China has been blamed for not being clear and specific about the terms and conditions of its concessional loans. This vagueness and secrecy that is associated with Chinese aid been a cause for concern, especially among traditional donors.

PERSAINGAN PENGARUH DI PASIFIK SELATAN: PENGALIHAN DUKUNGAN DIPLOMATIK KEPULAUAN SOLOMON DARI TAIWAN KE TIONGKOK

The Solomon Islands shifted their diplomatic support from Taiwan to China in September 2019 after 36 years of diplomatic relations, which was followed by Kiribati, leaving Taiwan with only four South Pacific countries that still formally recognize it. China and Taiwan have long been the main actors in the competition for influence in the South Pacific, which is mainly due to the capacity of the Pacific islands to provide diplomatic recognition, where the pressure exerted by China on Taiwan has intensified since the election of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. This journal discusses the motives of the Solomon Islands to turn to China, using the bandwagoning theory by Randall L. Schweller with the argument that the Solomon Islands bandwagons the wave of the future, a decision taken because the ally is considered to represent the future. The method used in this journal is a qualitative method that aims to describe and analyze a phenomenon systematically, which will explain the motive behind the Solomon Islands decision to shift its diplomatic support supported by theory and secondary data. This journal will first elaborate on China and Taiwan's rivalry in the South Pacific and continue with the Solomon Islands' motives to shift their diplomatic support from China to Taiwan. Keywords: Solomon Islands, China, Taiwan, bandwagoning Abstrak Kepulauan Solomon mengalihkan dukungan diplomatiknya dari Taiwan ke Tiongkok pada September 2019 setelah 36 tahun memiliki hubungan diplomatik, yang diikuti oleh Kiribati, meninggalkan Taiwan dengan sisa empat negara Pasifik Selatan yang masih mengakuinya secara internasional. Tiongkok dan Taiwan telah lama menjadi aktor utama dalam persaingan pengaruh di Pasifik Selatan, yang disebabkan terutama oleh kapasitas Kepulauan Pasifik untuk memberikan pengakuan diplomatik, di mana tekanan yang diberikan oleh Tiongkok terhadap Taiwan semakin intensif sejak terpilihnya Presiden Taiwan Tsai Ing-wen pada tahun 2016. Jurnal ini membahas tentang motif Kepulauan Solomon berpindah haluan ke Tiongkok, dengan menggunakan teori bandwagoning yang dicetuskan oleh Randall L. Schweller dengan argumen bahwa Kepulauan Solomon melakukan bandwagoning wave of the future, yang dilakukan karena pihak sekutu dianggap merepresentasikan masa depan. Metode yang digunakan dalam jurnal ini adalah metode kualitatif yang bertujuan menggambarkan dan menganalisa suatu fenomena secara sistematis. Metode ini akan menjelaskan motif di balik keputusan Kepulauan Solomon mengalihkan dukungan diplomatiknya didukung dengan teori dan data sekunder. Adapun dalam pembabakan jurnal ini, akan dijabarkan rivalitas Tiongkok dan Taiwan di Pasifik Selatan dan dilanjutkan dengan motif di balik keputusan Kepulauan Solomon mengalihkan dukungan diplomatiknya dari Tiongkok ke Taiwan. Kata kunci: Kepulauan Solomon, Tiongkok, Taiwan, bandwagoning