Directors' remuneration, expropriation and firm performance in Malaysia: evidence from non-executive directors' service duration within the remuneration committee

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Chee Yoong Liew ◽  
Young Kyung Ko ◽  
Bee Lian Song ◽  
Saraniah Thechina Murthy
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Tsung-Che Wu ◽  
Ming-hsiang Huang

The relation between firm performance and shareholding is a critical issue in corporate governance. In this paper, we examine if significant associations exist between firm performance and (1) directors’ shareholdings or (2) directors’ family shareholdings among Taiwanese listed firms. After addressing for possible endogeneity and controlling for firm specific variables, we find a positive association between executive director’s shareholding and firm performance. Consistent with incentive effect in agency theory, this result indicates that executive directors have incentive to maximize firms’ value. Also, we find that executive directors’ family shareholding is positively related to firm performance, which implies that executive directors may be motivated by their family members to improve firm value. The results also imply that the majority-minority agency problem can be mitigated when director’s family welfare is at stake. In addition, we divide research sample into subsets to accommodate the effect of mandatory independent director regulation in Taiwan since 2007.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 150-159
Author(s):  
Zyad Marashdeh ◽  
Mohammad W. Alomari ◽  
Mahmoud Mohmad Aleqab ◽  
Rateb Mohammad Alqatamin

The study aims to examine the impact of board characteristics on firm performance of non-financial institutions in Jordan. The study employs the random effects regression model to analyze the panel data of 77 non-financial institutions of the industrial and services sector over the period 2008–2019. Firm performance is measured by return on assets ROA. While board characteristics were explained by board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure, non-executive directors (NEDs), and a number of board meetings. Firm age and firm size were added to our model as control variables. Our results reveal that board size, CEO tenure, non-executive directors (NEDs), firm age, and firm size have a positive significant impact on firm performance, whereas the CEO duality and a number of board meetings have a negative significant impact on firm performance. This paper will contribute to the ongoing debate on the relationship between the board characteristics and firm performance. Therefore, the current study extends previous literature by providing empirical evidence about the relationship between board characteristics and a firm performance. Particularly in developing countries, there is relatively a little researched area. Jordanian firms are needed to consider the significance of the board characteristics especially, for the non-financial institutions that can help them in designing the board strategies to enhance their performance. Therefore, Jordanian data will offer new empirical evidence in an emerging market, which will provide a better understanding of the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Wang ◽  
Kaleemullah Abbasi ◽  
Bola Babajide ◽  
Kemi C. Yekini

Purpose This study aims to examine the extent to which board characteristics and ownership structure affect firm performance with specific focus on providing new empirical insights following the revised corporate governance (CG) code 2012. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX)-100 index for the years 2011-2014. Firm performance is measured by accounting-based performance indicators (ROA and ROE) and market-based performance indicators (Tobin’s Q and MTB). This study uses multivariate regression techniques including fixed effects model and two-stage least squares (2SLS). Findings The findings show that board diversity increases over the two periods (pre-2012 and post-2012), whereas there are cases that companies have not fully complied with the revised CG code 2012 in terms of board independence. In addition, the multiple regression results show that firm performance is negatively and significantly associated with institutional ownership. Nevertheless, the results show that board size, board independent, board diversity and board meetings do not have significant impact on firm performance. The findings are fairly consistent and robust across two periods (pre-2012 and post 2012) and a number of econometric models that sufficiently address the potential endogeneity problems. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first empirical study which investigates the impact of the compliance and implementation of 2012 CG code on firm performance in Pakistan. This study is different from the most prior studies in that they use independent non-executive directors rather than conventional non-executive directors to measure board independence.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 109
Author(s):  
Susy Muchtar ◽  
Elsa Darari

<p><span><em>The purpose of this research is to determine the effect of corporate governance on the firm </em><span><em>performance of companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange.The sample examined in </em><span><em>this research consist of 40 manufacturing companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) </em><span><em>from 2008 to 2012 using purpose sampling as its sample selection techniques. Independent </em><span><em>variables from this research are board structure, board committees, board meetings, board </em><span><em>size, executive directors and independent non-executive directors. Dependent variables are </em><span><em>return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The analysis method use are the classical </em><span><em>assumption test, multiple regression, and the t test. the result of the t test showed, board </em><span><em>structure has no effect on corporate performance as measured by return on assets (ROA), </em><span><em>but a negative effect on company performance as measured by return on equity (ROE),</em><br /><span><em>board committees positive effect on the firm performance, board meetings had no influence </em><span><em>on the performance of the company, board size has a positive effect on the firm performance, </em><span><em>executive directors do not have an influence on the company’s performance as measured by </em><span><em>return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), independent non-executive directors </em><span><em>have a negative effect on corporate performance as measured by return on assets (ROA), </em><span><em>but does not affect the company’s performance as measured by return on equity (ROE).</em><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><p><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><span><strong><em>Keywords</em></strong><span><strong>: </strong><span><strong><em>Corporate governance, firm performance, board structure, board committee, </em></strong><span><strong><em>board meeting, board size, executive directors, independent non executive </em></strong><span><em><strong>directors, return on asset, return on equity</strong>.</em></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br /></span></span></span></p>


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