scholarly journals Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

Abstract Human rights law does not appear to enjoy as high a level of compliance as the laws of war, yet is institutionalized to a greater degree. This Article argues that the reason for this difference is related to the strategic structure of international law. The laws of war are governed by a regime of reciprocity, which can produce selfenforcing patterns of behavior, whereas the human rights regime attempts to produce public goods and is thus subject to collective action problems. The more elaborate human rights institutions are designed to overcome these problems but fall prey to second-order collective action problems. The simple laws of war institutions have been successful because they can exploit the logic of reciprocity. The Article also suggests that limits on military reprisals are in tension with self-enforcement of the laws of war. The U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda is discussed.

2019 ◽  
pp. 305-318
Author(s):  
Andrew Clapham

Human rights are said to be ill-adapted to times of armed conflict or for dealing with exceptional terrorist threats. Are human rights limited by the applicability of other branches of international law including the laws of war? Are there limits to the work human rights can usefully do in situations of threatened violence when their strict application is said to put lives at risk? This chapter tackles some of the contemporary arguments surrounding the limitations of human rights law in the face of the competing demands of winning the war and killing terrorists. It focuses on killings and detention inside and outside armed conflict. It also asks whether there are limits to the obligations we can impose on armed groups.


2019 ◽  
pp. 297-304
Author(s):  
Knut Traisbach

This chapter is a comment on a reflection by Frédéric Mégret on the limits of the laws of war. It proposes a jurisprudence of limits that focuses less on absolute ideals but on the compromising and enabling space ‘in-between’ these absolutes. Relying on Hannah Arendt’s views on different conceptions of humanity, the comment critically engages with a thinking in terms of inherent opposing interests and oscillations between them. A conception of limits as reproducing inherent absolutes is disabling and passive. Instead, limits can be understood as facilitating a space that enables us to judge and to act, also through compromise. International humanitarian law and international human rights law, perhaps more than other areas of international law, depend on preserving and actively seeking this politically relevant space.


ICL Journal ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-118
Author(s):  
Laura-Stella Enonchong

Abstract This article discusses the idea of international human rights law as ‘constitutional law’. It applies the French concept of Le contrôle de conventionnalité des lois, to demonstrate the constitutional potentials of international human rights law in the domestic sphere. In most monist constitutional systems based on the French civilian model, international law takes precedence over acts of parliament and other domestic legislation. Due in part to that hierarchy, conventionnalité permits the courts to review domestic law for compatibility with international law. From that perspective, international human rights norms can be said to have assumed a ‘para-constitutional’ function. Using two case studies from francophone Africa, this article argues that conventionnalité has the potential to play a significant role in the domestic implementation of international human rights and ultimately contributing to a more comprehensive domestic human rights regime.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL E. NEWELL

Abstract:The laws of war and international human rights law (IHRL) overlap, often with competing obligations. When two or more areas of the law overlap, political agents attempt to address these areas of ambiguity with interstitial rules. However, a lack of consensus on interstitial rules can destabilise the law, leading to increased contestation of legal norms and principles. Such is the case for international law in counterterrorism. Prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks (9/11), international agreements and US domestic practices placed counterterrorism within the framework of law enforcement. After 9/11, the Bush Administration replaced law enforcement with armed conflict and the laws of war as the dominant paradigm for counterterrorism, but this decision, among other legal justifications in the War on Terror, has been contested by the international legal community. As IHRL still applies in law enforcement operations, international law in counterterrorism now sits within a contested overlap of IHRL and the laws of war. The contestation of US policies in the War on Terror, including the use of drone strikes in particular, is a product of this unresolved overlap and the lack of clear interstitial rules. Lacking these rules, US counterterrorism policies risk undermining the rule of law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-422
Author(s):  
Joshua Castellino

AbstractIt is easy to detect a sense of achievement with the extent to which the human rights regime has progressed 60 years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The relative international successes suggest a bright outlook for the future of the human rights regime. However, an important lacuna remains in the attention that ought to be paid to minorities, indigenous peoples and others in vulnerable situations, including in some instances, women. This paper argues that despite the creation of sophisticated systems of international human rights law, the regimes for the protection of minority rights were stronger before the United Nations (UN) era. In support of this argument it seeks to assess regimes that existed at three different times, attempting to extrapolate and analyse the snapshots presented by these through the lens of evolving human rights law.


Author(s):  
Steven Wheatley

International Human Rights Law has emerged as an academic subject in its own right, separate from, but still related to, International Law. This book explains the distinctive nature of the new discipline by examining the influence of the moral concept of human rights on general international law. Rather than make use of moral philosophy or political theory, the work explains the term ‘human rights’ by examining its usage in international law practice, on the understanding that words are given meaning through their use. Relying on complexity theory to make sense of the legal practice in the United Nations, the core human rights treaties, and customary international law, The Idea of International Human Rights Law shows how a moral concept of human rights emerged, and then influenced the international law doctrine and practice on human rights, a fact that explains the fragmentation of international law and the special nature of International Human Rights Law.


Author(s):  
John Linarelli ◽  
Margot E Salomon ◽  
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah

This chapter recaps the main themes of the volume, ie that the international law of the global economy is in a state of disorder. Claims about the justice, fairness, or benefits of the current state of international law as it relates to the global economy are fanciful. A more credible picture emerges when one considers who is protected, against what, and those relations that are valued and those that are not. Moreover, these claims above all require a suspension of a reflective attitude about what international law actually says and does. When it comes to international economic law, power is masked behind a veil of neutrality when it certainly is not neutral in the interests it protects and offends. As for international human rights law, it overlooks the ways in which it props up extreme capitalism foreclosing the possibility of transformative structural change to neoliberal capitalism. In its most radical areas, human rights norms have been blocked from making demands on the design of the global economy precisely because of their transformative potential. Among the central critiques of international law presented in this book is that international law must be justifiable to those who are subject to it.


2021 ◽  
pp. 092405192110169
Author(s):  
Matthieu Niederhauser

The implementation of international human rights law in federal States is an underexplored process. Subnational entities regularly enjoy a degree of sovereignty, which raises questions such as whether they implement obligations of international law and how the federal level may ensure that implementation takes place at the subnational level. This article aims to answer these questions, using the implementation of the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Convention) in Switzerland as a case study. To implement the Convention at the cantonal level, federal actors decided to use networks of civil servants in charge of domestic violence issues, who act as governmental human rights focal points (GHRFPs). This article is based on original empirical data, on 25 interviews with State officials who participate in this implementation. The findings show how complex GHRFPs networks work in practice to implement the Convention and highlight the role played by numerous non-legal State actors in this process. As a result, the article argues that international human rights law implementation becomes more diversified both within and across federal States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-102
Author(s):  
Anton Strezhnev ◽  
Judith G. Kelley ◽  
Beth A. Simmons

AbstractThe international community often seeks to promote political reforms in recalcitrant states. Recently, some scholars have argued that, rather than helping, international law and advocacy create new problems because they have negative spillovers that increase rights violations. We review three mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some researchers assert that governments sometimes “counteract” international human rights pressures by strategically substituting violations in adjacent areas that are either not targeted or are harder to monitor. However, most such research shows only that both outcomes correlate with an intervention—the targeted positively and the spillover negatively. The burden of proof, however, should be as rigorous as those for studies of first-order policy consequences. We show that these correlations by themselves are insufficient to demonstrate counteraction outside of the narrow case where the intervention is assumed to have no direct effect on the spillover, a situation akin to having a valid instrumental variable design. We revisit two prominent findings and show that the evidence for the counteraction claim is weak in both cases. The article contributes methodologically to the study of negative spillovers in general by proposing mediation and sensitivity analysis within an instrumental variables framework for assessing such arguments. It revisits important prior findings that claim negative consequences to human rights law and/or advocacy, and raises critical normative questions regarding how we empirically evaluate hypotheses about causal mechanisms.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document