3. The United States and the Transatlantic Relationship

Author(s):  
Roberto Dominguez ◽  
Joshua Weissman LaFrance

The history of the European Union (EU) is closely associated with the development of the United States. As the process of European integration has produced institutions and gained a collective international presence, the United States has been a close observer, partner, and often critic of the policies and actions of the EU and its member states. A steady progression of events delineates this path: the Marshall Plan, origins of European integration, the Cold War, the post–Cold War, 9/11 and its effects on the international system, the Great Recession, and the deterioration of global democracy. All throughout, the EU and the United States have both cooperated and collided with one another, in line with the combination of three main factors: (a) the evolution of the EU as an independent, international actor; (b) American strategies for engagement with Europe and then with the EU; and (c) the adaptive capacity and cohesion of the overall transatlantic relationship. The EU–U.S. relationship is significant not only for the influential role of the EU in world affairs but also because, as opposed to China or Russia, the transatlantic area hosts one of the most solid relationships around the world. Crises surely have been, and will be, a frequent aspect of the intense interdependences on both sides of the Atlantic; however, the level of contestation and conflict is relatively low, particularly as compared with other areas that smoothly allow the flow of goods, services, people, and ideas. Taken altogether, then, the transatlantic relationship possesses a strong foundation: it is integral, resilient, and enduring over a history of diplomatic disagreements and conflicts. The primary question remains just how this steady stream and confluence of shared challenges ultimately will fare in face of evolving crises and systemic disruptors. In any case, the answer is determined by the enduring nature, and foreign policy choices, of the primary actors on each side of the Atlantic.


2004 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN

This article analyses the conditions under which a race to the top or California effect is likely to take place. To that end, it examines two cases in which the EU restricted or threatened to restrict imports from the United States and Canada because of differences in regulatory standards. In one case, the European data protection directive, a California effect occurred. In the other case, the EU ban on hormone-treated beef, no California effect occurred. An analysis of these two cases leads to two additions to existing explanations of the California effect. The analysis also has a number of implications for the debate on the race to the bottom thesis.


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Hajnalka Vincze

This article examines the relations between the European Union (EU) and NATO in light of both of the current, deeply unhealthy, state of the transatlantic relationship, and of its ongoing evolution. The first part is devoted to a retrospective outline of the links between European defence and the Atlantic system, which highlights the major constant features of these last sixty years, as well as the rupture points. Then, various issues, from the problem of the division of labour and the definition of the chain of command to coordination on the ground and arms procurement, are evoked as concrete examples where the same fundamental question marks emerge, again and again; all of them revolving around the concept of sovereignty – that of the Europeans vis-à-vis America. It is suggested in the article that current European dependence does not allow but superficial and/or temporary ‘progress’ in EU-NATO relations, just as is the case in the broader Euro-American relationship. As long as Europeans will not assume fully the objective of autonomy (i.e. freedom of decision and action, with all the commitments it would imply), their subjection will continue to generate increasing tensions, since this inherent imbalance is not only detrimental to Europe’s own interests, but it also excludes any reciprocity and prohibits any genuine partnership with the United States.


2021 ◽  
pp. 157-162
Author(s):  
Jussi M. Hanhimäki

This chapter provides a brief overview of the aftermath of the 2020 US elections and how the Biden presidency is likely help reshape the discourse and substance of the transatlantic relationship. The chapter, however, also asserts that the end of the Trump presidency will not mean a sudden return to normality because there will continue to be tensions between the United States and Europe on a number of issues from trade to policy vis-à-vis China. Instead the paradoxical coexistence between cooperation and conflict––between substantial common interests and recurrent disagreements––that has characterized the transatlantic relationship since the end of the Cold War is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Pax transatlantica is likely to thrive for years to come.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Pennisi di Floristella

With the launch of Barack Obama’s strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific, there has been a widening of the United States’ military, economic, and diplomatic presence in the Southeast Asian region. Likewise, it is clear that Southeast Asia is currently a region of relevant interest for both the United States and the European Union (EU). Surprisingly, however, up to the present, a systematic comparison of their approaches in the region has been largely lacking. To fill this void, this article compares US and EU interests, strategies, and main instruments of cooperation in Southeast Asia. Special attention is paid to the main developments that occurred in the United States, from Obama’s announcement of a strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific to Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy, and in the EU, with the release there of the 2012 “Updated East Asia Policy Guidelines.” Examining whether the EU and the United States are moving towards a greater convergence of intent is of crucial importance for identifying opportunities for the further development of the transatlantic relationship in Southeast Asia. This article argues, though, that despite some apparent common traits in the US’s and the EU’s intentions, their strategies and instruments ultimately differ substantially – reflecting divergent paths. This creates crucial impediments to any further development of transatlantic cooperation in Southeast Asia.


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