CHAPTER 4 Unwinding Bretton Woods The Deutsche Mark Float and the Renewal of Stability Politics

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-106
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-63
Author(s):  
Angel Enrique Chico Frias ◽  
José Luis Vásconez Fuentes
Keyword(s):  

En esta investigación se analizó los fundamentos legales, económicos y filosóficos por los que la Republica “soberana” del Ecuador formo parte de los acuerdos monetarios y económicos firmados en Bretton Woods en 1944, en donde se diseño un orden económico internacional basado en la creación de tres organismos para solucionar conflictos monetarios, comerciales y de desarrollo. Para el desarrollo del presente estudio se utilizó la ley de Okun con el cual se calculó las tasas de desempleo. Además se abordó el posible escenario que podría vivir el país en un caso de no haber aceptado las imposiciones de los organismos multilaterales, las cuales se reflejarían en una tasa de desempleo similar a países desarrollados acompañadas con incrementos en la producción real. Como conclusiones se presentó la idea que el balance mundial pudo  haber sido diferente causando una distribución más equitativa de los recursos encontrándose que el país vive escenarios de desempleo programados.


1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 443-457
Author(s):  
Patrick Guillaumont ◽  
Sylviane Guillaumont-Jeanneney
Keyword(s):  

1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 431-436
Author(s):  
Patrick Mordacq
Keyword(s):  

In the chapter, Haq considers the challenges for global economic management that the nineties may bring. He highlights five distinct trends that have emerged in the international economy in the previous quarter of a century: the globalization of markets, decline in the influence of the US, emerging importance of China and Soviet Union, and narrowing of income gap between rich and poor countries. In the light of these trends, Haq stresses on the need for a new vision for Bretton Woods institutions to serve a greater role in global management in the decade of the nineties.


Author(s):  
Ashoka Mody

This chapter discusses how Gerhard Schröder, leader of Germany's Social Democratic Party, proposed to delay the euro's birth rather than start with members who had not achieved the required fiscal discipline. Campaigning to replace Helmut Kohl as chancellor in March 1998, Schröder observed that some countries would struggle to survive the rigors of the monetary union. However, once Schröder was elected chancellor in October, his hands were tied. In April 1998, the Bundestag had already authorized Germany's shift from the deutsche mark to the euro, Germany had made commitments to its European partners, and preparation for launch of the euro was in full swing. Ultimately, the euro was born uneventfully on January 1, 1999. Schröder continued the narrative of Europe's eventual political awakening; he even called for greater European “political union.” To the contrary, Schröder quickly developed a confrontational relationship with European institutions.


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