Chapter 2 Personal Individuality: Dietrich von Hildebrand in Debate with Harry Frankfurt

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Crosby
Keyword(s):  
Harry Frankfurt

Bullshit, trust, and evidence

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 633-656
Author(s):  
Adrian Briciu
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
The Third ◽  
Main Fault ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Epistemic Standards ◽  
Adequate Evidence

Abstract It has become almost a cliché to say that we live in a post-truth world; that people of all trades speak with an indifference to truth. Speaking with an indifference to how things really are is famously regarded by Harry Frankfurt as the essence of bullshit. This paper aims to contribute to the philosophical and theoretical pragmatics discussion of bullshit. The aim of the paper is to offer a new theoretical analysis of what bullshit is, one that is more encompassing than Frankfurt’s original characterization. I part ways with Frankfurt in two points. Firstly, I propose that we should not analyze bullshit in intentional terms (i.e. as indifference). Secondly, I propose that we should not analyze it in relation to truth. Roughly put, I propose that bullshit is best characterized as speaking with carelessness toward the evidence for one’s conversational contribution. I bring forward, in the third section, a battery of examples that motivate this characterization. Furthermore, I argue that we can analyze speaking with carelessness toward the evidence in Gricean terms as a violation of the second Quality maxim. I argue that the Quality supermaxim, together with its subordinate maxims, demand that the speaker is truthful (contributes only what she believes to be true) and reliable (has adequate evidence for her contribution). The bullshitter’s main fault lies in being an unreliable interlocutor. I further argue that we should interpret what counts as adequate evidence, as stipulated by the second Quality Maxim, in contextualist terms: the subject matter and implicit epistemic standards determine how much evidence one needs in order to have adequate evidence. I contrast this proposed reading with a subjectivist interpretation of what counts as having adequate evidence and show that they give different predictions. Finally, working with a classic distinction, I argue that we should not understand bullshit as a form of deception but rather as a form of misleading speech.

scholarly journals What can we learn about romantic love from Harry Frankfurt’s account of love?

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Natasha Chloe McKeever
Keyword(s):  
Romantic Love ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Essential Nature ◽  
Parental Love ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Ideal

Harry Frankfurt has a comprehensive and, at times, compelling, account of love, which are outlined in several of his works. However, he does not think that romantic love fits the ideal of love as it ‘includes a number of vividly distracting elements, which do not belong to the essential nature of love as a mode of disinterested concern’ (Frankfurt, 2004, p. 43). In this paper, I argue that we can, nonetheless, learn some important things about romantic love from his account. Furthermore, I will suggest, conversely, that there is distinct value in romantic love, which derives from the nature of the relationship on which it is based. Frankfurt tries to take agape and reformulate it so that it can also account for love of particular people. Whilst he succeeds, to some extent, in describing parental love, he fails to accurately describe romantic love and friendship, and, moreover, overlooks what is distinctly valuable about them. Although it was not his intention to describe romantic love, by failing to include features such as reciprocity in his account of love, Frankfurt leaves no room for a kind of love that is important and valuable to many people  

scholarly journals Investigation of Frankfurt's Argument on Moral Responsibility

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Tavakkol Koohi Giglou ◽  
Javad Danesh ◽  
Habib Asadi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Famous Paper ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

The common thought of Christian and Moslem philosophers considers moral responsibility of a person as dependent on his or her ability to choose from several options. However, Harry Frankfurt in his famous paper " alternate possibilities and moral responsibility" challenges freedom condition for moral responsibility with implicit reasons and makes use of several examples to show that it is completely possible for a person to be considered as morally responsible despite failure to access any kind of alternate possible. However, there are two reasons presented by Frankfurt that contrary to his claims show that presence of alternate possibilities or at least imagination for presence of alternatives is the base for responsibility or difficulty of moralactor and if sometimes anactor is regarded as responsible despite absence of alternate possible, this is resulted from his or her "ignorance" of the matter and also the impact of his "intention" in doing action. One of the main defects of theories which deal with moral responsibility conditions is ignoring the intention and purpose of moralactor. This is while ethics domain includes internal actions like intention and will of moral actor as well as apparent actions.

Harry Frankfurt interview

2013 ◽  
pp. 54-62
Author(s):  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Julian Baggini ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Harry Frankfurt

Review: Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt

Mind ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 113 (452) ◽  
pp. 744-747
Author(s):  
N. Arpaly
Keyword(s):  
Harry Frankfurt

scholarly journals Agency without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt's Counterexample Strategy

2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Shabo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
Per Se

Many believe that we are not morally responsible for what we cannot help doing. Call this ‘the Traditional View of Responsible Agency.’ Some forty years ago, Harry Frankfurt (1969) challenged this view, thereby initiating a new stage of the free-will debate. In contrast to the previous stage, in which debate centered on how best to accommodate the Traditional View, contemporary theorists have focused on whether this view should be accepted at all. If the link between moral responsibility and avoidability is severed, an important threat to compatibilism is neutralized.In the wake of Frankfurt's challenge, a tremendous literature has sprung up, with many ingenious responses matched by equally thoughtful extensions of Frankfurt's original argument. Quite recently, an altogether new line of response has been proposed. This new approach, versions of which have been advanced by Maria Alvarez (2009) and Helen Steward (2009), attempts to support the Traditional View indirectly, by appealing to the conditions for action, rather than to the conditions for moral responsibility per se.

Anselm on Eudaemonism and the hierarchical structure of moral choice

2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATHERIN A. ROGERS
Keyword(s):  
Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Hierarchical Analysis ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
God's Will ◽  
First Order ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Anselm Of Canterbury ◽  
The Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Natural Inclination

Because Anselm of Canterbury argues that the morally responsible created agent must have the option to choose between justice and benefit, many scholars conclude that he is a proto-Kantian, pitting duty against self-interest and natural inclination. This is mistaken. Anselm proposes a hierarchical schema, prefiguring that of Harry Frankfurt, in which the inclination for justice constitutes a second-order desire that one's first-order desires for benefits should be moderated to conform to God's will. I defend this interpretation through careful textual analysis, then show that Anselm's hierarchical analysis is not subject to some of the criticisms one might raise against Frankfurt's.

scholarly journals Argumentative Bullshit

2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-308
Author(s):  
José Ángel Gascón
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Harry Frankfurt

Harry Frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. Assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit. Here, I propose the concept of argumentative bullshit and show how a speech acts account of bullshit assertions can be generalised to bullshit arguments. Argumentative bullshit, on this account, would be the production of an argument without a concern for the supporting relation between reasons and claim.

scholarly journals A responsabilidade moral e a possibilidade de agir de outro modo

2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
João Hobuss
Keyword(s):  
Harry Frankfurt

Este artigo discute a questão da responsabilidade moral em Aristóteles e, especialmente, em Harry Frankfurt e Alexandre de Afrodísia, buscando identificar se a mesma é compatível com o determinismo.

scholarly journals Revising the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
Max Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The paper first describes the principle as articulated by A.J. Ayer. Subsequently, the paper examines Frankfurt’s critique and proposed revision of the principle and argues that Frankfurt’s proposal relies on an excessively simplistic account of practical reasoning, which fails to account for the possibility of moral dilemmas. In response, the paper offers a further revision of PAP, which accounts for Frankfurt’s critique, moral dilemmas, and the challenge of causal determinism.

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