Resolving Self-Determination Conflicts: The Emerging Practice of Complex Power Sharing

Abstract In comparative works on nationalism, Latin America is usually portrayed as a world region that is devoid of nationalist and separatist movements, while in Europe nationalist movements seeking greater self-determination or separate statehood can be easily observed. This article takes a different perspective. Applying the concept of territorial autonomy movements, it pursues a cross-regional comparison of Santa Cruz in Bolivia, Guayas in Ecuador, and Catalonia in Spain to show that movements strikingly similar with regards to their core claims, diagnostic frames, and tactics do in fact exist across the Iberian world. The chapter then draws on social movement theory to account for the recent intensification of territorial autonomy mobilizations in these cases. We argue that in all three substate units (1) threats of political exclusion emanating from contestations over established power-sharing arrangements triggered territorial grievances; (2) the formation of dense associational networks and new alliances with subnational party and state representatives enhanced the organizational resources of territorial challengers; and (3) broader protest cycles, and their concern with direct democracy and/or multicultural group rights, provided territorial challengers with new framing strategies to justify their demands.

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Building Bridges in Divided Societies: Sustaining Democratic Transition Through Complex Power-Sharing in Lebanon and Iraq

Federal Governance ◽

10.24908/fg.v15i2.13203 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 15 (2) ◽

pp. 18-32

Author(s):

Petros Petrikkos

Keyword(s):

Hybrid Model ◽

Democratic Transition ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Divided Societies ◽

Complex Power ◽

Fragile Environment

This paper looks at how divided societies like Lebanon and Iraq currently incorporate very fragile models of governance. The recommendations in this study attempt to introduce a hybrid model that considers integration and consociationalism as effective tools to electoral management in both countries, in light of the recent elections taking place in May 2018, and the continuities presented to this day. In assessing the effectiveness of consociationalism as a power-sharing framework, this paper does not attempt to depart from the already-established model of governance. Rather, the analysis presents elements that would hopefully improve power-sharing and governance in the two divided societies of Lebanon and Iraq. Elements as such may bring forth a steadier process that aids democratic transition in divided societies. Sectarianism is heavily embedded in both the Lebanese and Iraqi communities. Ignoring the conflicting issues that rise with each successive election only promotes a fragile environment that deeply divides, instead of uniting societies.

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Reputation, concessions, and territorial civil war

Journal of Peace Research ◽

10.1177/0022343318767499 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 55 (5) ◽

pp. 671-686 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Nils-Christian Bormann ◽

Burcu Savun

Keyword(s):

Ethnic Groups ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Empirical Studies ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Self Determination ◽

Territorial Disputes ◽

Territorial Conflicts ◽

Different Types ◽

Future Demands ◽

Reputation Building

Barbara Walter’s application of reputation theory to self-determination movements has advanced our understanding of why many separatist movements result in armed conflict. Walter has shown that governments of multi-ethnic societies often respond to territorial disputes with violence to deter similar future demands by other ethnic groups. When governments grant territorial accommodation to one ethnic group, they encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. However, a number of recent empirical studies casts doubt on the validity of Walter’s argument. We address recent challenges to the efficacy of reputation building in the context of territorial conflicts by delineating the precise scope conditions of reputation theory. First, we argue that only concessions granted after fighting should trigger additional conflict onsets. Second, the demonstration effects should particularly apply to groups with grievances against the state. We then test the observable implications of our conditional argument for political power-sharing concessions. Using a global sample of ethnic groups in 120 states between 1946 and 2013, we find support for our arguments. Our theoretical framework enables us to identify the conditions under which different types of governmental concessions are likely to trigger future conflicts, and thus has important implications for conflict resolution.

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