4. Fazit zu Kapitel II: „Das Ende des Bretton Woods-Systems“

2021 ◽  
pp. 125-126
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-63
Author(s):  
Angel Enrique Chico Frias ◽  
José Luis Vásconez Fuentes
Keyword(s):  

En esta investigación se analizó los fundamentos legales, económicos y filosóficos por los que la Republica “soberana” del Ecuador formo parte de los acuerdos monetarios y económicos firmados en Bretton Woods en 1944, en donde se diseño un orden económico internacional basado en la creación de tres organismos para solucionar conflictos monetarios, comerciales y de desarrollo. Para el desarrollo del presente estudio se utilizó la ley de Okun con el cual se calculó las tasas de desempleo. Además se abordó el posible escenario que podría vivir el país en un caso de no haber aceptado las imposiciones de los organismos multilaterales, las cuales se reflejarían en una tasa de desempleo similar a países desarrollados acompañadas con incrementos en la producción real. Como conclusiones se presentó la idea que el balance mundial pudo  haber sido diferente causando una distribución más equitativa de los recursos encontrándose que el país vive escenarios de desempleo programados.


1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 443-457
Author(s):  
Patrick Guillaumont ◽  
Sylviane Guillaumont-Jeanneney
Keyword(s):  

1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 431-436
Author(s):  
Patrick Mordacq
Keyword(s):  

In the chapter, Haq considers the challenges for global economic management that the nineties may bring. He highlights five distinct trends that have emerged in the international economy in the previous quarter of a century: the globalization of markets, decline in the influence of the US, emerging importance of China and Soviet Union, and narrowing of income gap between rich and poor countries. In the light of these trends, Haq stresses on the need for a new vision for Bretton Woods institutions to serve a greater role in global management in the decade of the nineties.


Author(s):  
Tyler Pratt

Abstract Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.


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