The moral attitude problem and the expression relation

The metaphysical layer of what can be called philosophical Christology in Kant’s treatise on religion reflects his idea of the embodiment of the archetype of moral perfection. Kant raises the problem of the ontology of the ideal in the shape of the question about the conditions that make actual experience possible: the ideal of holiness resides in reason, i. e. in the human being, but the dominance of radical evil over the human will puts it out of human reach either in thought or in practice. For rational thought it is more natural to imagine the practical reality of the archetype as the embodiment of the authentic man proceeding from God. Using the Gospel narrative about Jesus, Kant interprets the human nature of the archetype in the light of his general notions about the properties of this nature. It is widely believed that Kant’s ethical theology eliminates the divine nature of the archetype by stating that an entirely holy will cannot be a moral example for the infirm human will. Kant however says, merely as a critical philosopher, that there are not enough rational grounds for thinking divine nature. Rational philosophy can think the archetype of perfection only as its pure and whole moral attitude through all the maxims and acts. Philosophy would transcend its boundaries if it claimed more and expected recognition of the prototypical theology of the ideal as the content of church faith. But it is not by chance that Kant sets forth the philosophical theory of the archetype as the content of faith in the subjunctive mood. According to Kant, the preaching of the divine character of the archetype as extra-philosophical supplement of the paradoxes and symbols of philosophical theology is only possible on condition that this statutory preaching does not obstruct the overall aspiration toward the actualisation of the pure moral attitude. If these conditions are observed the philosopher and the biblical theologian remain each with their theologies and within their rights.

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Why Does a Social Worker Act in a Fanatic, Cynical, or Composed Manner? On the Relationship Between Spirituality and the Moral Attitude towards What Cannot Be Changed

Caritas et Veritas ◽

10.32725/cetv.2017.015 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

pp. 136-147

Author(s):

Vojtěch Šimek

Keyword(s):

Social Worker ◽

Moral Attitude ◽

The Relationship

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In Search of Humanity: Human Dignity as a Basic Moral Attitude

10.1163/9789004494510_010 ◽

2001 ◽

pp. 53-65

Keyword(s):

Human Dignity ◽

Moral Attitude

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Beyond Respect and Beneficence

Respect ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198824930.003.0008 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 157-170

Author(s):

Thomas E. Hill

Keyword(s):

Moral Philosophy ◽

Personal Relationships ◽

Kantian Ethics ◽

Distinctive Features ◽

Moral Attitude ◽

Moral Attitudes ◽

Recent Tendency

Thomas E. Hill, Jr. breaks with two conventional approaches in moral philosophy. Hill eschews the recent tendency to focus either on duties or on virtues, and instead emphasizes the importance of moral attitudes. And Hill specifically steps outside the usual framework of Kantian ethics by developing and defending the importance of a moral attitude besides respect and beneficence, namely the attitude of appreciation. To appreciate something is to recognize and respond appropriately to its value as something worth attending to, observing, admiring, cherishing, or the like, for its own sake. The attitude of appreciation is especially important in personal relationships, although it includes recognizing and responding positively to the distinctive features possessed by many sorts of things, not just persons.

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Moral Disagreement and Reason-Giving

Practical Expressivism ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0004 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 82-105

Author(s):

Neil Sinclair

Keyword(s):

General Pattern ◽

Mental States ◽

Moral Disagreement ◽

Moral Discourse ◽

Moral Claim ◽

Moral Practice ◽

Constitutive Function ◽

Moral Attitude ◽

The World ◽

Moral Attitudes

According to practical expressivism, moral disagreement is a species of disagreement in attitude whereby agents have moral commitments that advocate incompatible policies of action and reaction. This follows from a unified general account of disagreement as involving mental states that cannot collectively fulfil their constitutive functions, and the practical expressivist hypothesis that the constitutive function of moral attitudes is to advocate and reinforce collective patterns of action and reaction. To reason in favour of a moral claim is to cite a feature of the world to which the related moral attitude is a response, typically in order to alter the attitudes of others. Further, the constraint of ascriptive supervenience and a standing preference for ‘guiding’ over ‘goading’ in moral discussion make sense in light of the practical function that practical expressivism attributes to moral practice. A general pattern for some aspects of moral discourse can be discerned, and this pattern can be applied to the phenomenon of moral avoidability.

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Compassion for Living Creatures in Indian Law Courts

Religions ◽

10.3390/rel10060383 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (6) ◽

pp. 383

Author(s):

Gilles Tarabout

Keyword(s):

Legal Rights ◽

Legal Practice ◽

Stray Dogs ◽

Animal Sacrifice ◽

Moral Attitude ◽

Mahatma Gandhi ◽

Law Courts ◽

Indian Law ◽

The Right ◽

The Buddha

The Constitution of India through an amendment of 1976 prescribes a Fundamental Duty ‘to have compassion for living creatures’. The use of this notion in actual legal practice, gathered from various judgments, provides a glimpse of the current debates in India that address the relationships between humans and animals. Judgments explicitly mentioning ‘compassion’ cover diverse issues, concerning stray dogs, trespassing cattle, birds in cages, bull races, cart-horses, animal sacrifice, etc. They often juxtapose a discourse on compassion as an emotional and moral attitude, and a discourse about legal rights, essentially the right not to suffer unnecessary pain at the hands of humans (according to formulae that bear the imprint of British utilitarianism). In these judgments, various religious founding figures such as the Buddha, Mahavira, etc., are paid due tribute, perhaps not so much in reference to their religion, but rather as historical icons—on the same footing as Mahatma Gandhi—of an idealized intrinsic Indian compassion.

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Chapter Six: THE MORAL ATTITUDE

The Moral Philosophy of Josiah Royce ◽

10.4159/harvard.9780674333000.c9 ◽

1965 ◽

pp. 133-159

Keyword(s):

Moral Attitude

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The Puzzle of Moral Memory

Journal of Moral Philosophy ◽

10.1163/17455243-20192914 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 17 (2) ◽

pp. 202-228

Author(s):

Robert Cowan

Keyword(s):

Capital Punishment ◽

Moral Attitude ◽

First Order ◽

As If

A largely overlooked and puzzling feature of morality is Moral Memory: apparent cases of directly memorising, remembering, and forgetting first-order moral propositions seem odd. To illustrate: consider someone apparently memorising that capital punishment is wrong, or acting as if they are remembering that euthanasia is permissible, or reporting that they have forgotten that torture is wrong. I here clarify Moral Memory and identify desiderata of good explanations. I then proceed to amend the only extant account, Bugeja’s (2016) Non-Cognitivist explanation, but show that it isn’t superior to a similar Cognitivist-friendly view, and that both explanations face a counterexample. Following this, I consider and reject a series of alternative Cognitivist-friendly explanations, suggesting that a Practicality-Character explanation that appeals to the connection between the practicality of moral attitude and character is superior. However, I conclude that support for this explanation should remain conditional and tentative.

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