Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the main arguments in the book. It outlines eight problematic commitments that cause fault lines in the foundations of research ethics and that are rejected in subsequent chapters. It then shows how a conception of the common good connects research to the ability of key social institutions to safeguard the basic interests of community members. The resulting view grounds an imperative to promote research of a certain kind, while requiring that those efforts be organized as a voluntary scheme of social cooperation that respects its various contributors’ moral claim to be treated as free and equal. A framework for assessing and managing risk is proposed that can reconcile these goals and it is argued that connecting research to larger requirements of a just social order expands the issues and actors that fall under the purview of the field while providing a more coherent and unified foundation for domestic and international research.

The Common Good and the Egalitarian Research Imperative

This chapter distinguishes two conceptions of the common good and argues that reluctance to embrace a research imperative grounded in the corporate conception of the common good is sound. In contrast, it is argued that the basic or generic interest conception of the common good grounds an imperative with two requirements: to carry out research that produces the information necessary to enable a community’s basic social systems to efficiently and equitably advance the basic interests of its members and to ensure that this activity is organized as a voluntary scheme of social cooperation that respects the moral claim of its constituent members to be treated as free and equal. A central claim of this chapter is that an imperative to improve the capacity of social institutions to secure the interests of community members can be reconciled with fundamental moral respect for the status of the individuals who make such progress possible.

Citizenship and Autonomy

This chapter argues that an adult’s right to citizenship follows from her right to securely pursue her good in the liberal state where she already has a moral right to live permanently. It defends the claim that when people migrate on a permanent basis to a liberal state in adulthood, they develop the legitimate expectation that they are allowed to pursue core projects and relationships that are territorially located and that extend across time. It also defends the claim that when adults start pursuing core projects and relationships, they acquire an autonomy-based moral claim to pursue them reliably into the future, as well as to engage in political actions that bear on how such projects and relationships can be pursued in the future.

Global Climate Change—Who Ought to Pay the Bill?

Global climate change is a significant challenge for current and, particularly, future generations. In the public debate about the fair allocation of associated costs commonly the moral claim that the developed countries should burden the costs is expressed. To support this claim, often four moral arguments, based on the theory of justice, are raised: (i) the polluter pays, (ii) the historical responsibility, (iii) the beneficiary pays, and (iv) the ability to pay. The aim of the paper is to assess whether these principles impose a duty on the developed countries and whether a fair allocation of costs would be achieved.

The Moral Reading of HIV Prevention in the United States: Criminal Law and Tort Law

The United States government has been campaigning to encourage people to take HIV testing and thus get treated. It is puzzling that more than 50% of States have HIV-specific criminal laws that criminalize both exposure and transmission. At the same time, there is an increased tort law to seek financial compensation for unwanted HIV exposure and transmission. While both laws the moral claim of protecting people from HIV infection, this paper is trying to find an answer to the following inquiry: What is the difference of the moral reading between the use of criminal law and tort law in addressing HIV prevention in the United States? This paper uses the traditional descriptive comparison between criminal law and tort law under the American legal system with a nationwide jurisdictional scope. This paper measures the difference using the frame of reference of Ronald Dworkin's law, morality, and interpretation theory. Both criminal law and tort law have been developing similar liability principles regarding HIV exposure and transmission under the United States' common law tradition. For HIV prevention itself, both criminal law and tort law play a marginal role in gaining public health purposes in reversing the HIV epidemic. Criminal law has been scrutinized as not aligned with the purpose of law where misconceptions exist in both substantive dimension and the underlying moral claim. Tort law, on the other hand, suffers an even less moral claim on public health purposes. However, tort law maintains a consistent narrow sense of financial liability.

Two Pessimisms in Mill

Mill defines utilitarianism as the combination of a “theory of life” and a moral claim: only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends, and the promotion of happiness is the sole goal of moral action. So defined, utilitarianism is open to ad hominem pessimistic objection: a “theory of life” which entails the impossibility of happiness fits poorly with a morality centered on its promotion. The first two challenges Mill confronts in Utilitarianism share this pessimistic structure. Interestingly, however, these challenges paint inverted pictures of the best utilitarian life: one suggests this life is satisfying but ignoble, the other that it is noble but unsatisfying. I explain Mill's treatment of both challenges as genuinely pessimistic interpretations of utilitarianism's “theory of life.” Read through the lens of Mill's engagement with pessimism, these challenges point to distinctive conceptions of dignity and satisfaction that play a significant role in Mill's ethics.

The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings

The debate around whether novel beings should be legally recognized as legitimate rights holders is one that has produced a vast amount of commentary. This paper contributes to this discourse by shifting the normative focus of moral rights away from criteria possessed by the novel beings in question, and back toward the criterion upon which we ourselves are able to make legitimate rights claims. It draws heavily on the moral writing of Alan Gewirth’s identification of noumenal agency as the source of all legitimate rights claims. Taking Gewirthian ethical rationalism as providing a universally applicable hypothetical imperative which binds all agents to comply with its requirements, the paper argues that it is at least morally desirable that any legal system should recognize the moral rights claims of all agents as equally legitimate. By extension, it is at least morally desirable that the status of legal personhood should be granted by a legal system to all novel beings who are noumenal agents, insofar as this status is necessary for rights’ legal recognition. Having established the desirability of this extension, the paper closes with an examination of recent cases involving both biological and nonbiological novel beings in order to assess their conformity with the desirable approach outlined above. The paper demonstrates that such recognition is conceptually possible, thus requiring us to move beyond the current anthropocentricity of legal systems and recognize the legitimate moral claim for legal personhood for all novel beings who possess noumenal agency.

UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL TAX COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, A UTOPIAN BEPS ALTERNATIVE

Under the guise of compelling multinational enterprises (MNEs) to pay their fair share of income taxes, the OECD and other multinational agencies have introduced proposals to prevent MNEs from eroding the income tax base of developed economies by continuing to shift income artificially to low or zero tax jurisdictions. Some of the proposals have garnered substantial multinational support, including recent support from the new U.S. presidential administration for a global minimum tax. This Article reviews many of those international proposals. The proposals tend to concentrate the incremental tax revenue from the prevention of base erosion into the treasuries of the developed economies although the minimum tax proposal known as GloBE encourages low tax countries to adopt the minimum rate. The likelihood that and zero tax countries will transition successfully to imposing the minimum tax seems uncertain. Developed economies lack a compelling moral claim to incremental revenue so this Article argues that collecting a fair tax from MNEs and other taxpayers should be a goal that is independent of claims on that revenue. The Article maintains that to prevent tax base erosion, the income tax base and administration must be uniform across national borders and the Article recommends applying uniform rules administered by international taxing agency. The Article explores the convergence of tax rules under such an international taxing agency. Distribution of tax revenue by the international agency should follow contextualized need. In addressing the conundrum of absolute poverty in the undeveloped and developing world vis á vis relative poverty in the developed world, the Article proposes that the taxing agency should distribute all incremental revenue from the uniform tax where the need is greatest to ameliorate absolute poverty and improve living standards without regard to income source. The location of income production, destination of the produced goods and services generating the income, and residence of the income producers should not determine the tax revenue distribution. Rather, the use of contextualized need for distribution determination will enable developed economies to receive sufficient revenue to maintain their existing infrastructures and governmental services. Developed economies should forego new revenue, for which they have not budgeted, in favor of improving worldwide living conditions for all. The proposals for uniform, worldwide taxation and revenue sharing based on contextualized need are admittedly aspirational and utopian but designed to encourage debate on sharing of resources in our increasingly globalized world.

Conditional Consent

There are two distinct ways for someone to place conditions on their morally valid consent. The first is to place conditions on the moral scope of their consent—whereby they waive some moral claim rights but not others. The second is to conditionally token consent—whereby the condition affects whether they waive any moral claim rights at all. Understanding this distinction helps make progress with debates about so-called “conditional consent” to sexual intercourse in English law, and with understanding how individuals place conditions on their morally valid consent in other contexts.

Moral Disagreement and Reason-Giving

According to practical expressivism, moral disagreement is a species of disagreement in attitude whereby agents have moral commitments that advocate incompatible policies of action and reaction. This follows from a unified general account of disagreement as involving mental states that cannot collectively fulfil their constitutive functions, and the practical expressivist hypothesis that the constitutive function of moral attitudes is to advocate and reinforce collective patterns of action and reaction. To reason in favour of a moral claim is to cite a feature of the world to which the related moral attitude is a response, typically in order to alter the attitudes of others. Further, the constraint of ascriptive supervenience and a standing preference for ‘guiding’ over ‘goading’ in moral discussion make sense in light of the practical function that practical expressivism attributes to moral practice. A general pattern for some aspects of moral discourse can be discerned, and this pattern can be applied to the phenomenon of moral avoidability.