Haben meine Gründe etwas mit mir zu tun? – Bernard Williams’ Erwiderung auf John McDowell –

2021 ◽  
pp. 178-196
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper is concerned with a disagreement between Bernard Williams and John McDowell. It starts by asking what form a dispositional account of value should take. A no-priority view could hold that value is a disposition to elicit a certain response, and the response is to the object as disposed to elicit just that response. But a different no-priority view could talk of meriting a response and responding in the way merited. The response is explained as an instance of things being as they rationally ought to be. The paper debates the merits of such a view, and then turns to ask how much truth there is in the common claim that McDowell is an intuitionist.


1999 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 106-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger J. Sullivan

One of the more striking developments in contemporary philosophic discussions about morality has been the rise of anti-theory — the rejection of moral theories as ‘unnecessary, undesirable, and/or impossible’. Among those associated with this view have been Bernard Williams, John McDowell, Edmund Pincoffs and James Wallace.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark P. Jenkins
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernier

Virtually all schools of Buddhism do not accept a permanent, substantial self, and see everything as non-self (anatta). In the first part of this article I recall some arguments traditionally given in support of this perspective. Descartes’ cogito argument contradicts this, by suggesting that we know infallibly that the self, understood as a substantial enduring entity, does exist. The German aphorist Lichtenberg has suggested that all Descartes could claim to have established was the impersonal ‘There is thinking’ (Es denkt), which would support the perspective of non-self. Bernard Williams has argued that Lichtenberg’s impersonal version of the cogito is conceptually incoherent, which would entail that the Buddhist perspective of non-self is also incoherent. I propose to defend the coherence of the Buddhist perspective of non-self against Williams’s argument.


Starting in about 2004 John McDowell and I have engaged in a debate. There have been a number of public exchanges, and quite a few more private ones. In my view, some progress has been made (though the debate continues). Others may disagree (the ‘law of diminishing fleas’). I, at any rate, think I have learned from him. Guy Longworth does us both the honour of comparing our debate to one a half century earlier between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. Honours apart, I think he has pointed to an illuminating connection between what I have long thought the main issue and another. If I had been asked what question McDowell and I had been (most centrally) debating, I would have said: it is the question how enjoying an experience of perceiving (e.g., of seeing) can make judging one thing or another intelligibly rational (that last term lifted from McDowell). I have a story to tell which is, in one key respect, sparser than his. To telegraph, he thinks such experience must have (representational) content. I think, not just that it needn’t, but that if it did, we would be cut off from ...


Keyword(s):  

Hansen is certainly right that the aim of my ‘Travis examples’ is, not to explain anything, but rather to point to a phenomenon. Or perhaps I would not now say so much as that. Over the course of my career I have been very deeply influenced by John McDowell. The main lesson I have taken from him is that the most important ‘result’ in philosophy—one of its most important tasks—is showing (to borrow a bit of McDowellian terminology) how it is ...


Author(s):  
Simon Kirchin

This chapter introduces the distinction between thin and thick concepts and then performs a number of functions. First, two major accounts of thick concepts—separationism and nonseparationism—are introduced and, in doing so, a novel account of evaluation is indicated. Second, each chapter is outlined as is the general methodology, followed, third, by a brief history of the discussion of thick concepts, referencing Philippa Foot, Hilary Putnam, Gilbert Ryle, and Bernard Williams among others. Fourth, a number of relevant contrasts are introduced, such as the fact–value distinction and the difference between concepts, properties, and terms. Lastly, some interesting and relevant questions are raised that, unfortunately, have to be left aside.


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.


1999 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace

AbstractThis paper explores the question whether utilitarianism is compatible with the autonomy of the moral agent. The paper begins by considering Bernard Williams' famous complaint that utilitarianism cannot do justice to the personal projects and commitments constitutive of character. Recent work (by Peter Railton among others) has established that a utilitarian agent need not be free of such personal projects and commitments, and could even affirm them morally at the level of second"order reflection. But a different and more subtle problem confronts this approach: the use of utilitarian principles to justify the cultivation of personal projects and attachments undermines the autonomy to support this objection, according to which autonomy is a matter of acting in a way one can reflectively endorse.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110184
Author(s):  
Ben Cross

In this article, I aim to bring apocalypticism and radical realism into conversation, with a view to their mutual interest in prefigurative politics. On one hand, radical realists may worry that an apocalyptic approach to prefigurative politics may be marred by wishful thinking. On the other hand, radical realists can (and sometimes do) acknowledge that wishful thinking is sometimes desirable. I argue that an apocalyptic approach to prefigurative politics suggests one way of guarding against the dangers of wishful thinking, while allowing space for its potential benefits; prefigurativists have reason to pay at least some attention to what Bernard Williams calls ‘The First Political Question’. I will argue for this claim with reference to the case of Omar Aziz, a Syrian activist who played a pivotal role in the construction of local councils in the aftermath of the 2011 protests.


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