scholarly journals Perfect or Bounded Rationality?

2004 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Güth
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Classical Economics ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
New Synthesis ◽  
Experimental Game Theory ◽  
Reward Allocation

AbstractSimple game experiments of the reward allocation, dictator and ultimatum type are used to demonstrate that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. We explore in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or at least the nucleus of a general theory of ‘games and boundedly rational economic behavior’ with enhanced explanatory power.

Differences, games, and pluralism

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 688-689
Author(s):  
Roger A. McCain
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

While concurring that the evidence from individual differences supports a Meliorist view in the rationality debate, this commentary suggests that (1) the evidence does not clearly support a two-systems interpretation against an interpretation in terms of idiosyncratic differences in mental models, and that (2), especially where interactional processing is concerned, evidence from experimental game theory should also be considered.

Experimental Game Theory and Behavior Genetics

2009 ◽  
Vol 1167 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Cesarini ◽  
Christopher T. Dawes ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
Paul Lichtenstein ◽  
Björn Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavior Genetics ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Experimental Game Theory ◽  
And Behavior

Book Reviews

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-658
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Scientific Approach ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

Sanjit Dhami of Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, University of Leicester reviews “Handbook of Experimental Game Theory” edited by C. M. Capra, Rachel T. A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon, and Tanya S. Rosenblat. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Sixteen papers explore the study of game-theoretic propositions from a scientific approach, covering methodological innovations in the measurement of strategic behavior and static and dynamic games of both complete and incomplete information.”

Handbook of Experimental Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Capra ◽  
Tanya Rosenblat ◽  
Rachel Croson ◽  
Mary Rigdon
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

Experiments on Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Relationships

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent P. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Experimental Work ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Human Relationships ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
The World ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

This review discusses selected work in experimental game theory. My goals are to further the dialogue between theorists and empiricists that has driven progress in economics and game theory and to guide future experimental work. I focus on experiments whose lessons are relevant to establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation in human relationships, the role of communication in doing so, and the underlying cognition. These are questions of central importance, where both the gap between theory and experience and the role of experiments in closing it seem large. Humans appear to be unique in their ability to use language to manipulate and communicate mental models of the world and of other people, vital skills in relationships. Continuing the dialogue between theorists and empiricists should help to explain why it matters for cooperation that we can communicate, and why and how it matters whether we communicate via natural language or abstract signals.

Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354
Author(s):  
Jacob Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
The State ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

AbstractHobbes believed that the state of nature would be a war of all against all. Locke denied this, but acknowledged that in the absence of government, peace is insecure. In this paper, I analyse both accounts of the state of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality.

scholarly journals Introduction to the Handbook of Experimental Game Theory

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
C. Mónica Capra ◽  
Rachel T.A. Croson ◽  
Mary L. Rigdon ◽  
Tanya S. Rosenblat
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Experimental Game Theory
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