Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354
Author(s):  
Jacob Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
The State ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

AbstractHobbes believed that the state of nature would be a war of all against all. Locke denied this, but acknowledged that in the absence of government, peace is insecure. In this paper, I analyse both accounts of the state of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality.

Hobbes's State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUN CHUNG
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.

Differences, games, and pluralism

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 688-689
Author(s):  
Roger A. McCain
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

While concurring that the evidence from individual differences supports a Meliorist view in the rationality debate, this commentary suggests that (1) the evidence does not clearly support a two-systems interpretation against an interpretation in terms of idiosyncratic differences in mental models, and that (2), especially where interactional processing is concerned, evidence from experimental game theory should also be considered.

scholarly journals Perfect or Bounded Rationality?

2004 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Güth
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Classical Economics ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
New Synthesis ◽  
Experimental Game Theory ◽  
Reward Allocation

AbstractSimple game experiments of the reward allocation, dictator and ultimatum type are used to demonstrate that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. We explore in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or at least the nucleus of a general theory of ‘games and boundedly rational economic behavior’ with enhanced explanatory power.

Experimental Game Theory and Behavior Genetics

2009 ◽  
Vol 1167 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Cesarini ◽  
Christopher T. Dawes ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
Paul Lichtenstein ◽  
Björn Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavior Genetics ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Experimental Game Theory ◽  
And Behavior

Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game

Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
The Third ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Third Law

In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish the Foole, and even exclude her from the cooperative framework or take her life, if she defects once society is established, which is best expressed in the language of game theory by a grim strategy. That is, compared to existing game-theoretic interpretations of Hobbes, I argue that the sovereign plays a grim strategy with the citizens once society is established, and not the individuals with one another in the state of nature.

Book Reviews

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-658
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Scientific Approach ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

Sanjit Dhami of Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, University of Leicester reviews “Handbook of Experimental Game Theory” edited by C. M. Capra, Rachel T. A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon, and Tanya S. Rosenblat. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Sixteen papers explore the study of game-theoretic propositions from a scientific approach, covering methodological innovations in the measurement of strategic behavior and static and dynamic games of both complete and incomplete information.”

Handbook of Experimental Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Capra ◽  
Tanya Rosenblat ◽  
Rachel Croson ◽  
Mary Rigdon
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Experimental Game Theory
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