scholarly journals International Factor Mobility, Production Cost Components, and Wage Inequality

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 503-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiancai Pi ◽  
Yu Zhou

Abstract The present paper establishes a two-sector monopolistic competition model to investigate how international factor mobility influences the skilled–unskilled wage inequality when the monopolistically competitive sector producing final goods is characterized by various types of production cost functions. We discuss three types of production cost functions of the monopolistically competitive sector. Different types of production cost functions have different production factor components of variable and fixed costs. We find that differences in production cost components of the monopolistically competitive sector matter for the impacts of international factor mobility on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality.

2008 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 080422064932191-??? ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Beladi ◽  
Sarbajit Chaudhuri ◽  
Shigemi Yabuuchi

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Mukminah ◽  
Rita Purwasih

This study aims to determine and compare the profitability of different types of broiler chicken farms (open and cloused houses) in Subang Regency. This study involved 9 farmers consisting of 5 farmers with closed house and 4 farmers with open house who partnered with PT. Surya Unggas Mandiri (PT. SUM). Production costs taken are 2 production periods from May-August 2018. Data are analyzed using economic analysis and descriptive methods. The results showed that the production cost per period per 1000 birds closed house was higher (Rp. 27.656.768,-) compared to open house (Rp. 24.975.671,-). The revenue per period per 1000 birds of closed house is higher (Rp. 30.606.931,-) compared to open house (Rp. 25.788.618,-). The profit of farmers who use closed house is higher (Rp. 2.621/period/bird) than open house (Rp.417,-). The profitability in close house s is 9.48% and is very feasible to develop


Author(s):  
Avinash Dixit

If formal institutions of contract governance are absent or ineffective, traders try to substitute relational governance based on norms and sanctions. However, these alternatives need good information and communication concerning members’ actions; that works well only in relatively small communities. If there are fixed costs, the market has too few firms for perfect competition. The optimum must be a second best, balancing the effectiveness of contract governance and dead-weight loss of monopoly. This chapter explores this idea using a spatial model with monopolistic competition. It is found that relational governance constrains the size of firms and can cause inefficiently excessive entry, beyond the excess that already occurs in a spatial model without governance problems. Effects of alternative methods of improving governance to ameliorate this inefficiency are explored.


2019 ◽  
pp. 13-18
Author(s):  
Nadiia HRYSHCHUK

The article investigates financial stability as a qualitative characteristic of functioning of agricultural enterprises in modern conditions, the analysis of indicators of financial stability of the enterprise and determination of its type, as well as the effectiveness of forecasting the financial stability of agricultural enterprises. A number of measures is proposed, which is to reduce the cost of production (cost-saving strategy), which will allow agribusinesses to increase competitiveness in the market due to the introduction of new technology, technologies, more rational the use of both material and labor resources, reducing the proportion of fixed costs in the cost of production, in proportion to the increase in profits and competitive development of agricultural enterprises. The basic condition for ensuring the financial stability of the company is the formation of sufficient amounts of funds that enable them to fully fulfill their obligations to the budget, pay employees, creditors, suppliers.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document