Passive Cross-Holding in a Stackelberg Oligopoly
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Abstract We show that bilateral cross-holding can be profitable for firms with symmetric technologies in a Stackelberg oligopoly. Furthermore, if firms involved in cross-holding obtain a strategic advantage to be the leaders (i.e. Stackelberg leadership through cross-holding), such cross-holding will improve both consumer surplus and social welfare. We also discuss robustness of our main results with respect to convex costs and product differentiation.
2012 ◽
Vol 10
(4)
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pp. 71-84
2022 ◽
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2018 ◽
Vol 18
(2)
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2011 ◽
Vol 39
(4)
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pp. 533-556
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2017 ◽
Vol 63
(No. 12)
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pp. 539-547
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