Shared Manufacturing in A Differentiated Duopoly with Capacity Constraints

This study sets up a differentiated duopoly model considering capacity constraints and shared manufacturing, investigates the equilibrium results, examines the effects of product differentiation and capacity constraints in three scenarios, and compares the equilibrium outcomes in three cases under Cournot and Stackelberg competition. We find that capacity constraints affect the relationships among product differentiation, equilibrium results, and the market share of enterprises. Shared manufacturing impacts the degree of excess capacity, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare; however, it may sometimes play a negative role in alleviating excess capacity. Moreover, Cournot competition is a better choice for enterprises with capacity constraints compared to Stackelberg competition.

Social Responsibility Decision-Making of Universities in Stackelberg Competition

This paper establishes a Stackelberg competition model of two universities considering social responsibility (SR) and market sensitivity (MS) and examines the equilibrium results of four different scenarios: only the leader implements SR; only the follower implements SR; both the leader and the follower implement SR; neither the leader nor the follower implements SR. Then, a comparative analysis is carried out on the influence of MS and SR level. The results show that the influence of MS depends on SR implementation instead of competitive position. If MS is sufficiently high, two universities have the motive to implement more SR; under different competition scenarios, universities make different SR decisions, but the leader and the government make the same decisions on the optimal SR level. Therefore, the government could encourage the leader to take SR first.

A Stackelberg-population competition model via variational inequalities and fixed points

In this paper, we introduce and study a new Stackelberg-population competition model which captures the desired features of both population games and Stackelberg competition model within the same framework. We obtain some characterization results for the Stackelberg-population equilibrium response set and the Stackelberg-population equilibrium leader set by using the variational inequality technique and Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. We also show an existence theorem of Nash equilibrium for Stackelbergpopulation competition model under some mild conditions. Finally, we give an example to illustrate our main results.

Competitive Behavior of Developers' Development Scale in the Assembled Construction Market: An Analysis Based on Game Theory

The paper constructs the oligopoly models of assembled building developers based on Cournot model and Stackelberg model of development scale competition. Based on the comparison of the profit of the regional assembled building market, which is obvious in product homogeneity and multi oligopoly, a game analysis is carried out for the development pattern of assembled building developers. On the basis of the above models, we get the equilibrium solution of developers' Cournot competition and the sub game refining Nash equilibrium solution of the developers' Stackelberg competition respectively. Based on the different N values, we compare the development scale, the development income and the market price of the two competitive modes. Combining with the above game equilibrium, this paper makes a concrete analysis of the actual situation of the competition of assembled building developers in China.