Recht, Eigentum und Effizienz

ORDO ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Schmidtchen
Keyword(s):  

ZusammenfassungDieser Beitrag prüft (1) Hayeks Behauptung, daß abstrakte Verhaltensregeln und Eigentum die einzige Lösung für das Problem darstellen, individuelle Freiheit mit konfliktfreiem Handeln zu versöhnen. Er zeigt (2), daß der von Hayek vorgeschlagene Test der Verträglichkeit auf das überkommene Rechtssystem als Leitlinie für Richterrecht dem Prinzip der Ordnungskonformität entspricht, das auf W. Röpke zurückgeht. Der Beitrag interpretiert (3) Hayeks „Recht der Freiheit“ im Lichte des Coase-Theorems und begründet, warum Effizienz das einzige funktionsfähige Kriterium für die Spezifikation und personelle Zuteilung von Property rights darstellt. Es wird (4) gezeigt, daß Hayek trotz seiner Bewunderung der schöpferischen Kräfte spontaner Ordnungen der Gesetzgebung eine korrigierende Rolle zubilligt. Der Beitrag diskutiert abschließend Hayeks Interpretation der Rule of Law.

2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 515-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen Biglaiser ◽  
Joseph L. Staats

AbstractMuch scholarship in the political economy literature has investigated the influence of the democratic advantage on sovereign bond ratings by credit rating agencies (CRAs). Missing from earlier work, however, is inquiry into the effects on bond ratings of factors that lower political risk, such as adherence to the rule of law, the presence of a strong and independent judicial system, and protection of property rights. Using panel data for up to thirty-six developing countries from 1996 to 2006, we find that rule of law, strong and independent courts, and protection of property rights have significant positive effects on bond ratings. Policymakers wanting to obtain higher bond ratings and increased revenue from bond sales would do well to heed the message contained in these findings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosolino A. Candela

AbstractHow did the evolution of the rule of law become stunted in Sicily during the 19th century? The work of economist Yoram Barzel, particularly his property-rights approach to understanding the political economy of state formation, is uniquely suited to understanding the failure of Italy's unification process to secure the rule of law in Sicily during the 19th century. This failure can be explained by a lack of a credible commitment to the rule of law in the state formation process. I argue that this lack of credible commitment manifested itself in the abolition of previously existing parliamentary institutions as an independent collective action mechanism, as well as prior constitutional agreements that existed in the Kingdom of Sicily. The resulting uncertainty over the security and legal definition of property rights over land raised the transaction costs of competing for resources through productive specialization and market exchange. In turn, it reduced the relative costs of competition for land ownership and the use of enforcement through other means, such as rent seeking or organized crime.


Legal Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. Austin

This paper offers a new framework for thinking about the relationship between the common law of property and the rule of law. The standard way of framing this relationship is within the terms of the form/substance debate within the literature on the rule of law: Does the rule of law include only formal and procedural aspects or does it also encompass and support substantive rights such as private property rights and civil liberties? By focusing on the nature of common-law reasoning, I wish to question the form/substance dichotomy that frames this debate and to show that the formal aspects of the rule of law are in fact principles widely adopted within the practice of common-law reasoning and as such play a large role in shaping the substantive content of common-law property rights. Understanding this has implications beyond the relationship between property law and the rule of law.


2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislav Markus

How do property rights become secure? How does rule of law take hold in an economy? The author uses an original survey of 516 firms in Russia and Ukraine, as well as interview-based case studies, to reexamine these fundamental issues of political economy. Most states in the developing world lack the requisite time horizons and institutional capacity to make the credible commitments emphasized in the literature. In this context, the author argues that firms can enforce their property rights without resort to mafias by forming alliances with stakeholders such as foreign actors, community residents, and labor. These stakeholders can impose costs on the potential aggressors through diverse political strategies, allowing firms to defend their property rights not only from private predators but also from the state. The article evaluates this “bottomup” theory of secure property rights against existing state-based theorizing.


2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (4II) ◽  
pp. 1301-1321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilton L. Root ◽  
Karen May

For several decades, development policy specialists and donor agencies have championed investment in the judicial systems of developing countries to promote economic growth and, eventually, democracy. The assumption of a causal link among these three phenomena motivates donors’ investments in the physical and human capacity of the legal system. Some reforms are narrowly focused—better enforcement of property rights and contract law—conducive to enhanced trade and investment. Although these narrow reform programs imply that political liberalisation is an ultimate objective, studies are unable to substantiate causality between the rule of law, economic growth and democracy [Carothers (2003)]. Autocratic regimes may establish courts to protect the property rights of regime insiders and to expropriate the rights of outsiders. In our view a rule of law will have emerged only once the state has achieved legitimacy in the hearts and minds of citizens. The idea that better rule of law would generate economic growth, which would in turn build constituencies for democratic reforms will be questioned in this paper. An alternative view will be suggested, most notably the alignment of national identity with the institutions of the state is critical to establishing a rule of law.


FIAT JUSTISIA ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dani Amran Hakim

Law business competition in the country Indonesia know the exceptions  to assert that a the rule of law expressed does not apply for those kind certain agents or behavior particular activity. Law competition business environment in general grant an exemption on the basis of agreement , for example agreement intellectual property rights (IPR). IPR is incentives and reason was given the right monopolizes and protection because IPR need resources and time in an effort to get it, based on article 50 alphabet b Law on Business Competition. An exemption based on article 50 alphabet b Law on Business Competition the elaborated competition supervisory commission by issuing commission rules business competition supervisory Law Number 2 of 2009 on Exceptions The Application of the Law Number 5 of 1999 on Prohibition of Monopoly and Unfair Business Competition of a Pertaining to Intellectual Property Rights Scope arrangement based on Commission Rules Business Competition Supervisory Number 2 of 2009 is: (1) the license agreement that is in scope patent, the right brand, copyright, the right industrial design, the right design the layout integrated circuit and the right trade. (2) Trademark and brand services. (3) the design layout integrated circuit. Keywords: Exeptions, Intellectal Property Rights, Business Competition Law


2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Vedder

The scholarly literature suggests high or increased tax burdens tend to reduce economic growth, lowering incomes. Some argue, however, that low taxes and high economic growth can have adverse income distribution consequences or can lead to utility-reducing under-consumption of needed public goods. Evidence is presented questioning those assertions. People seek happiness by moving, and tend to migrate to low tax areas. Moreover, there is little evidence that governmental expansion leads to truly greater equality. Appropriately measured, income equality is actually far greater than typically claimed. Moreover, income data suggest that the international equalization of incomes and global reduction of poverty largely reflect private sector activity, namely market forces working where the rule of law and strong protection of property rights prevails.


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