The Tragedy of the Uncommons

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Brown ◽  
Brianna Cardiff-Hicks

Abstract We develop and discuss a new institutional concept, “the tragedy of the uncommons,” to describe the inefficient use of resources that are both non-substitutable and transitory. This situation is not captured by the tragedy of the commons/anti-commons literature or other theories. We highlight the crucial and under-appreciated assumptions about value over time of the tragedy of the commons and anticommons. We also introduce the concepts of “under” and “over-ownership” to the bundle of rights theory of property clarifying weaknesses in the literature to help better understand how institutions can yield efficient resource preservation.

2020 ◽  
pp. 2040005
Author(s):  
SCOTT BARRETT

This paper begins with a tribute to William Nordhaus, focusing on the two questions that have motivated his life’s work. The first is by how much carbon dioxide emissions should be reduced over time. The second is how to reach and enforce an agreement among sovereign nations to limit carbon dioxide emissions. Nordhaus was awarded the Nobel Prize for his efforts to answer the first question. I argue here that the answer to this question has been solved to a satisfactory extent, not only by economists, but by diplomats, and that the greatest need now is to answer the second question. I also present a simple model that extends previous research into this second question, a model in which countries choose both whether to abate and whether to adapt. Like all previous research on this topic, including Nordhaus’s own, the model doesn’t provide a neat solution, only another perspective on one of the most vexing questions in all of human history: how to prevent a tragedy of the commons of global proportions and with profound and possibly catastrophic consequences.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Hardisty ◽  
Howard Kunreuther ◽  
David H. Krantz ◽  
Poonam Arora

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaime G. Lopez ◽  
Mohamed S. Donia ◽  
Ned S. Wingreen

AbstractPlasmids are autonomous genetic elements that can be exchanged between microorganisms via horizontal gene transfer (HGT). Despite the central role they play in antibiotic resistance and modern biotechnology, our understanding of plasmids’ natural ecology is limited. Recent experiments have shown that plasmids can spread even when they are a burden to the cell, suggesting that natural plasmids may exist as parasites. Here, we use mathematical modeling to explore the ecology of such parasitic plasmids. We first develop models of single plasmids and find that a plasmid’s population dynamics and optimal infection strategy are strongly determined by the plasmid’s HGT mechanism. We then analyze models of co-infecting plasmids and show that parasitic plasmids are prone to a “tragedy of the commons” in which runaway plasmid invasion severely reduces host fitness. We propose that this tragedy of the commons is averted by selection between competing populations and demonstrate this effect in a metapopulation model. We derive predicted distributions of unique plasmid types in genomes—comparison to the distribution of plasmids in a collection of 17,725 genomes supports a model of parasitic plasmids with positive plasmid–plasmid interactions that ameliorate plasmid fitness costs or promote the invasion of new plasmids.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 635-663
Author(s):  
Karin Mickelson

Abstract This contribution to the symposium on the economic exploitation of the commons focuses on the question of whether and to what extent the principle of the common heritage of mankind (CHM) imposes environmental limits on economic exploitation of the global commons. Focusing on the need to go beyond a unidimensional assessment of the principle, it considers how CHM was originally envisaged, the form it took in the deep seabed regime, in particular, how its role in that regime has developed over time and how it has been utilized as a basis for advocacy. It concludes with an assessment of CHM’s limitations and strategic advantages.


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