Four puzzling paragraphs: Frege on ‘≡’ and ‘=’

Semiotica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
María de Ponte ◽  
Kepa Korta ◽  
John Perry
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Conceptual Content

Abstract In §8 of his Begriffsschrift (1879), Gottlob Frege discusses issues related to identity. Frege begins his most famous essay, “On Sense and Denotation” (1892), published 13 years later, by criticizing the view advocated in §8. He returns to these issues in the concluding paragraph. Controversies continue over these important passages. We offer an interpretation and discuss some alternatives. We defend that in the Begriffsschrift, Frege does not hold that identity is a relation between signs. §8 of the Begriffsschrift is motivated by the conflict between two different criteria for sameness of conceptual content of sentences. To resolve that conflict, Frege introduces ‘≡’ in §8 and, thus, circumstances with names as constituents. To the same end, in “On Sense and Denotation,” Frege introduces senses and Thoughts and abandons both ‘≡’ and circumstances. He solves what we call the Co-instantiation problem, and disregards, but does not solve, the Name problem.

scholarly journals Considerações acerca dos critérios de Identidade Intensional e Extensional na Conceitografia de Frege/Considerations on extensional and intensional identity criteria in Frege’s Begriffsschrift

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (10) ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Eduardo Antônio Pitt
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Conceptual Content ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Identity Criterion ◽  
Semantic Value ◽  
Hybrid Characterization ◽  
Content Semantic

Neste artigo daremos principal atenção aos dois critérios de identidade de conteúdo conceitual que estão presentes nos §§ 3 e 8 da Conceitografia de Gottlob Frege. Nosso propósito é analisar as características destes critérios da notação conceitual de Frege porque pretendemos delimitar a discussão em torno dos problemas relacionados às noções de identidade intensional e extensional. Dessa forma, pretendemos: (i) analisar os critérios de identidade de conteúdo conceitual presentes nos §§ 3 e 8 da Conceitografia com o objetivo de mostrar que Frege apresentou uma caracterização híbrida da noção de conteúdo conceitual (valor semântico) e (ii) fazer considerações a respeito de relações que podemos estabelecer entre os critérios intensionais e extensionais de Frege e Richard Kirkham presentes no livro Teorias da Verdade: Uma Introdução Crítica. Com tais comparações pretendemos averiguar: (iii) se o critério de identidade do § 8 da Conceitografia é idêntico ao critério extensional de equivalência material de Kirkham e (iv) se o critério de identidade do § 3 da Conceitografia é mais forte, mais fraco ou idêntico aos critérios intensionais de equivalência essencial e de equivalência de sinonímia de Kirkham.Abstract: In this paper we will give primary attention to two identity criteria of conceptual content that are present in §§ 3 and 8 of Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift. Our purpose is to analyze the characteristics of these criteria of conceptual notation of Frege because we want to delimit the discussion around problems related to the notions of intensional and extensional identity. Thus, we intend to: (i) analyze the identity criteria of conceptual content present in §§ 3 and 8 of Begriffsschrift aiming to show that Frege introduced a hybrid characterization of the notion of conceptual content (semantic value) and (ii) make considerations about the relationships that we establish between intensional and extensional criteria of Frege and Richard Kirkham present in the book Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. With such comparisons we intend to investigate: (iii) if the identity criterion of § 8 of Begriffsschrift is identical to the extensional criterion of material equivalence in Kirkham and (iv) if the identity criterion of § 3 of Begriffsschrift is stronger, weaker or identical to intensional criteria of essential equivalence and of synonyms equivalence of Kirkham. Key words: Identity, Intensional Criterion, Extensional Criterion.

Derrida and Frege

Paragraph ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-195
Author(s):  
Marian Hobson
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

Derrida, for reasons which he never made clear publicly, published his mémoire for the diplôme d'études supérieures only in 1990, some thirty-five years after it had been written. Had it been published much earlier, some of the dispiritingly ill-informed remarks about his work might have been avoided. The mémoire, entitled The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy, reveals that he is, when required, perfectly able to write a standard thesis in straightforward French. And that, in particular, he is aware of the work of the great logician Gottlob Frege in its relation to Husserl.

Gottlob Frege, One More Time1

Hypatia ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 156-173
Author(s):  
CLAUDE IMBERT
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

Gottlob Frege

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Wille
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

Meaning

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Healey
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Theory ◽  
Physical Object ◽  
Quantum Fields ◽  
Conceptual Content ◽  
Classical Physics ◽  
Physical Context

Novel quantum concepts acquire content not by representing new beables but through material-inferential relations between claims about them and other claims. Acceptance of quantum theory modifies other concepts in accordance with a pragmatist inferentialist account of how claims acquire content. Quantum theory itself introduces no new beables, but accepting it affects the content of claims about classical magnitudes and other beables unknown to classical physics: the content of a magnitude claim about a physical object is a function of its physical context in a way that eludes standard pragmatics but may be modeled by decoherence. Leggett’s proposed test of macro-realism illustrates this mutation of conceptual content. Quantum fields are not beables but assumables of a quantum theory we use to make claims about particles and non-quantum fields whose denotational content may also be certified by models of decoherence.

scholarly journals Frege and Wittgenstein: The Limits of the Analytic Style

Elements ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Sheridan
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Scientific Language ◽  
German Mathematician ◽  
Broad Application ◽  
Analytic Tradition

The analytic tradition in philosophy stems from the work of German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege. Bertrand Russell brough Frege's program to render language-particularly scientific language-in formal logical terms to the forefront of philosophy in the early twentieth century. The quest to clarify language and parse out genuine philosophical problems remains a cornerstone of analytic philosophy, but investigative programs involving the broad application of formal symbolic logic to language have largely been abandoned due to the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work. This article identifies the key philosophical moves that must be performed successfully in order for Frege's "conceptual notation" and other similar systems to adequately capture syntax and semantics. These moves ultimately fail as a result of the nature of linguistic meaning. The shift away from formal logical analysis of language and the emergence of the current analytic style becomes clearer when this failure is examined critically.

Idee und Wahrheit

2020 ◽  
pp. 12-43
Author(s):  
Jan Müller
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

Jan Müller liest Walter Benjamins sprachtheoretische Schriften als Teil eines zusammenhängenden Problemaufrisses. Er setzt bei der von Benjamin als notwendig unterstellten Idee eines gelingenden Sachbezugs der Sprache an. Dieser müsse einerseits von der Sache selbst her bemessen, andererseits müsse seine wesentlich sprachliche Vermitteltheit mitgedacht werden. Benjamin löse die Spannung zwischen beiden nicht auf, sondern halte sie »als zu einer materialistischen Idee von Sprache dazugehörend« fest. Müller bestimmt in diesem Rahmen zentrale Begriffe Benjamins – wie Darstellung, Idee, Wahrheit und nicht zuletzt den der Sprache selbst – neu und stellt, wo die Sache es erfordert, überraschende Verbindungen zu Zeitgenossen – wie Gottlob Frege – her.

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