scholarly journals Law and the Making of Slavery in Colonial Virginia

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashton Wesley Welch

Some authorities from the antebellum period to the present have located the source of the American law of slavery in continental civil law codes and hence in Roman slave law. They have been unable or unwilling to connect the brutal system of institutionalized racial slavery that emerged in Virginia and elsewhere in the American slave kingdom with what they have perceived as an open, freedom-favoring Anglo-American legal system and have thus sought an explanation of its legal underpinnings in other jurisdictical standards. Both the absence of chattel slavery in English law and the common law's claimed bias in favor of liberty have often been cited as reasons why it is impossible that English law could be the source of such an abomination.

Author(s):  
Nepyivoda Vasyl ◽  
Nepyivoda Ivanna

The Anglo-American law have a considerable amount of accomplishments, which have become a worldwide asset. In terms of globalization and interaction, to use these achievements would be beneficial for further development of Ukrainian legal system. However, the very philosophy and reasoning behind the precedent-based common law is different from that in the civil law tradition of which the Ukrainian law is a part. This paper is intended to contribute to the examination how the mechanism of Anglo-American law operates in view of the expediency to introduce some of its elements into the Ukrainian jurisdiction. The initial part devoted to the emergence of, and formation of, the common law. It is noted that in the case of common law the influence of Roman law should not be denied. Relying mostly on praetorium ius experience, it has manifested itself in other directions and forms compare to civil law system. Therefore, the both, common law and civil law, despite their differences have been formed on the common ground – the Roman legal tradition. Taking into consideration that throughout their history they exchanged fruitful ideas, there is no irreconcilable, "genetic" incompatibility between them. Thus, it would allow to successfully implant certain common law elements, first of all precedent as a source of law, in the body of Ukrainian law, a part of civil law system. The paper notes that issues of common law mechanism have never been a priority for scholarly research in Ukraine as in a country of civil law tradition. The inertial influence of the Soviet law has also contributed to this situation. According to the communist ideology and the positivist visions on which the Soviet law was based, the precedent has not been considered as an acceptable legal instrument. In order to clarify how the mechanism works, the paper provides an overview of precedent and stare decisis doctrine as key components of common law. While a principle of stare decisis binding courts to follow legal precedents in cases with similar circumstances is in the core of Anglo-American law, in civil law systems precedent is not considered as binding. This discussion is followed by an analysis of judicial lawmaking. The paper specifies that in the common law systems, courts are not absolutely bound by precedents. In terms of radical changes in political, social or legal areas, they are entitled to re-examine and apply the law differently without legislative intervention, to adapt it to new circumstances. Thus, the Anglo-American legal tradition provides much broader scope for judicial lawmaking than Romano-German law. However, there is no consensus on the range to which it should be extended and to which extent it should rely on precedent. Within the framework of this controversial issue judicial activism and judicial restraint, two opposite philosophies of making a ruling in common law, are addressed. In order to examine the multifaceted nature of correlation between stare decisis principle and judicial lawmaking, the latest experience of the Supreme Court of the United States' on overruling precedents is considered. The paper summarizes that, most likely, mixed legal system associated with Nordic countries should be set as the reference point for the movement of Ukraine in this area. Such approach would provide rather broad scope for the operation of the common law elements, while safeguarding its omissions such as unjustified judicial activism.


Author(s):  
Markus D. Dubber

An exercise in comparative legal history and legal theory, this article challenges the radical distinction that traditionally has been drawn between corporate criminal liability in German and Anglo-American law. In the familiar account, corporate criminal liability in the common law and the civil law passed each other like ships in the night, sometime around the turn of the nineteenth century: the common law had no corporate criminal liability before 1800, and the civil law had no corporate criminal liability after 1800. Closer inspection, however, reveals that corporate criminal liability was widely accepted in both common law and civil law countries at least since the Middle Ages, and that rejection of corporate criminal liability was complete neither in England before 1800 nor in Germany after 1800.


JURIST ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 19-24
Author(s):  
Sergey V. Myshyakov ◽  

This article deals with the common law institutions on the grounds for challenging transactions made to the detriment of creditor’s property interests, and the relevant legal provisions and presumptions located in Chapter III.1 of the Russian law on insolvency (bankruptcy), a comparative legal analysis of the object and grounds of the challenge, the subjects of the challenge, the composition for proving the fact of fraudulent transfer of the debtor’s property and the preferred satisfaction of the creditor’s claims is carried out.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-181
Author(s):  
Lukáš Nikodym ◽  
Tomáš Nikodym ◽  
Tereza Pušová

Abstract The study deals with Huerta de Soto’s thesis about the “mistaken doctrine of common law”, which is based on the equalization of depositum irregulare and mutuum contracts. He concluded that equalization of these contracts resulted in the creation of business cycles. According to this study, Huerta de Soto made a mistake when considering contracts inspired by the continental law based on Roman law. The study shows that mutuum was even in Roman law an ancient contract that was not codified, and that Huerta de Soto’s interpretation of this contract in the Anglo-American legal system is based more on civil law, not on common law as he stated in his work. Finally, the problem of common law did not lie in the equalization of the mentioned contracts, but rather in the absence of depositum irregulare contracts applied to monetary questions.


1996 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-74
Author(s):  
Alan Meisel

AbstractIn the 20 years that have passed since the Karen Quinlan case exposed a simmering clinical issue to the light of day — more precisely, to the press and to judicial process — a consensus has developed in American law about how end-of-life decisionmaking should occur. To be sure, there are dissenting voices from this consensus, but they are often (though not always) about minor issues. By illustrating how this consensus has evolved, this paper explores how law is made in the American legal system and the roles that different legal and extra-legal institutions play in lawmaking.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 392-408
Author(s):  
Miriam Gur-Arye

The book Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Anglo-German Dialogues is the first volume of an Anglo-German project which aims ‘to explore the foundational principles and concepts that underpin the different domestic systems and local rules’. It offers comparative perspectives on German and Anglo-American criminal law and criminal justice as ‘examples of the civil law and the common law worlds’. The comparisons ‘dig beneath the superficial similarities or differences between legal rules to identify and compare the underlying concepts, values, principles, and structures of thought’. The review essay focuses on the topics of omissions, preparatory offences, and participation in crime, all of which extend the typical criminal liability. It presents the comparative German and Anglo-American perspectives discussed in the book with regard to each topic and adds the perspective of Israeli criminal law. It points out the features common to all these topics as an extension of criminal liability and discusses the underlying considerations that justify the criminalisation of omissions, preparatory offences, and participation in crime. In evaluating whether extending criminal liability in these contexts is justified, the review essay suggests reliance on two main notions: that of ‘control over the commission of the offence’ and that of ‘liberty (or personal freedom)’.


1969 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
Sebastian Poulter

Whereas the reception and operation of English law in West and East Africa have been the subject of much study over the last few years, the introduction and application of Roman-Dutch law in Southern Africa (apart from South Africa itself) have received scant treatment.1 This article deals only with the position in Lesotho and attempts to show the extent to which Lesotho's legal system is tied to that of the Republic of South Africa, and thus strengthens the geographical and economic bonds which link the two countries.


1936 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 414-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Arthur Steiner

Even in the most highly formalized systems of jurisprudence the rules and practices of the law cannot be entirely separated from the fundamental conceptions of law underlying them. The legal systems of France, The Netherlands and Germany have not been formalized to so great an extent that there is neither occasion nor opportunity for the application of the law to be conditioned by concepts derived from juridical theory. Duguit and Geny, Krabbe, and Kohler and Stammler, in their various works, have made this quite clear. In Anglo-American law the fictions so abundantly found are often no more than concrete formulations of abstract fundamental concepts which judges have thought to be valid and consistent with policy and which they could not conveniently introduce into the law in any other way. That fundamental conceptions of the law may affect its development more than their logical consistency warrants has been amply illustrated in the common law, equity, and American constitutional law. What is true of well-developed systems of jurisprudence is no less true of international law. Fundamental conceptions have probably had a greater influence here, since theologic and scholastic philosophies explain many of the rules of modern practice, and the rules of current practice owe their very existence, in large measure, to the reconciliaation of the philosophical concepts of the State, sovereignty and independence with the conception of a community of nations and a rule of law.


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