Fundamental Conceptions of International Law in the Jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice

1936 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 414-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Arthur Steiner

Even in the most highly formalized systems of jurisprudence the rules and practices of the law cannot be entirely separated from the fundamental conceptions of law underlying them. The legal systems of France, The Netherlands and Germany have not been formalized to so great an extent that there is neither occasion nor opportunity for the application of the law to be conditioned by concepts derived from juridical theory. Duguit and Geny, Krabbe, and Kohler and Stammler, in their various works, have made this quite clear. In Anglo-American law the fictions so abundantly found are often no more than concrete formulations of abstract fundamental concepts which judges have thought to be valid and consistent with policy and which they could not conveniently introduce into the law in any other way. That fundamental conceptions of the law may affect its development more than their logical consistency warrants has been amply illustrated in the common law, equity, and American constitutional law. What is true of well-developed systems of jurisprudence is no less true of international law. Fundamental conceptions have probably had a greater influence here, since theologic and scholastic philosophies explain many of the rules of modern practice, and the rules of current practice owe their very existence, in large measure, to the reconciliaation of the philosophical concepts of the State, sovereignty and independence with the conception of a community of nations and a rule of law.

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-185
Author(s):  
Edyta Sokalska

The reception of common law in the United States was stimulated by a very popular and influential treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone, published in the late 18th century. The work of Blackstone strengthened the continued reception of the common law from the American colonies into the constituent states. Because of the large measure of sovereignty of the states, common law had not exactly developed in the same way in every state. Despite the fact that a single common law was originally exported from England to America, a great variety of factors had led to the development of different common law rules in different states. Albert W. Alschuler from University of Chicago Law School is one of the contemporary American professors of law. The part of his works can be assumed as academic historical-legal narrations, especially those concerning Blackstone: Rediscovering Blackstone and Sir William Blackstone and the Shaping of American Law. Alschuler argues that Blackstone’s Commentaries inspired the evolution of American and British law. He introduces not only the profile of William Blackstone, but also examines to which extent the concepts of Blackstone have become the basis for the development of the American legal thought.


Author(s):  
Nepyivoda Vasyl ◽  
Nepyivoda Ivanna

The Anglo-American law have a considerable amount of accomplishments, which have become a worldwide asset. In terms of globalization and interaction, to use these achievements would be beneficial for further development of Ukrainian legal system. However, the very philosophy and reasoning behind the precedent-based common law is different from that in the civil law tradition of which the Ukrainian law is a part. This paper is intended to contribute to the examination how the mechanism of Anglo-American law operates in view of the expediency to introduce some of its elements into the Ukrainian jurisdiction. The initial part devoted to the emergence of, and formation of, the common law. It is noted that in the case of common law the influence of Roman law should not be denied. Relying mostly on praetorium ius experience, it has manifested itself in other directions and forms compare to civil law system. Therefore, the both, common law and civil law, despite their differences have been formed on the common ground – the Roman legal tradition. Taking into consideration that throughout their history they exchanged fruitful ideas, there is no irreconcilable, "genetic" incompatibility between them. Thus, it would allow to successfully implant certain common law elements, first of all precedent as a source of law, in the body of Ukrainian law, a part of civil law system. The paper notes that issues of common law mechanism have never been a priority for scholarly research in Ukraine as in a country of civil law tradition. The inertial influence of the Soviet law has also contributed to this situation. According to the communist ideology and the positivist visions on which the Soviet law was based, the precedent has not been considered as an acceptable legal instrument. In order to clarify how the mechanism works, the paper provides an overview of precedent and stare decisis doctrine as key components of common law. While a principle of stare decisis binding courts to follow legal precedents in cases with similar circumstances is in the core of Anglo-American law, in civil law systems precedent is not considered as binding. This discussion is followed by an analysis of judicial lawmaking. The paper specifies that in the common law systems, courts are not absolutely bound by precedents. In terms of radical changes in political, social or legal areas, they are entitled to re-examine and apply the law differently without legislative intervention, to adapt it to new circumstances. Thus, the Anglo-American legal tradition provides much broader scope for judicial lawmaking than Romano-German law. However, there is no consensus on the range to which it should be extended and to which extent it should rely on precedent. Within the framework of this controversial issue judicial activism and judicial restraint, two opposite philosophies of making a ruling in common law, are addressed. In order to examine the multifaceted nature of correlation between stare decisis principle and judicial lawmaking, the latest experience of the Supreme Court of the United States' on overruling precedents is considered. The paper summarizes that, most likely, mixed legal system associated with Nordic countries should be set as the reference point for the movement of Ukraine in this area. Such approach would provide rather broad scope for the operation of the common law elements, while safeguarding its omissions such as unjustified judicial activism.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin

In recent litigation before U.S. federal courts, the government has argued that military commissions have jurisdiction to prosecute offenses against the "common law of war," which the government defines as a body of domestic offenses, such as inchoate conspiracy, that violate the American law of war. This Article challenges that definition by arguing that stray references to the term "common law of war"in historical materials meant something completely different. By examining the Lieber Code, the writings of early natural law theorists, and early American judicial decisions, this Article concludes that the "common law of war" referred to a branch of the law of nations that applied during internal armed conflicts, such as civil wars with non-state actors. This body of law was called "common," not because it was extended or elaborated by the common law method of judge-applied law, but rather because it was "common" to all mankind by virtue of natural law, and thus even applied to internal actors, such as rebel forces, who were not otherwise bound by international law as formal states were. By recapturing this lost definition of the common law of war, this Article casts some doubt on the U.S. government's position that military commissions have jurisdiction not only over international offenses, but also domestic violations of the law of war.Published: Jens David Ohlin, "The Common Law of War," 58 William & Mary Law Review (2016)


Author(s):  
Amanda L. Tyler

The Introduction provides an overview of the history of the writ of habeas corpus and an overview of the book, which tells the story of what is sometimes known as “the Great Writ” as it has unfolded in Anglo-American law. The primary jurisdictions explored are Great Britain and the United States, yet many aspects of this story will ring familiar to those in other countries with a robust habeas tradition. The book chronicles the longstanding role of the common law writ of habeas corpus as a vehicle for reviewing detentions for conformity with underlying law, as well as the profound influence of the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 on Anglo-American law. The Introduction highlights how the writ has at times failed to live up to its glorification by Blackstone and others, while noting that at other times it has proven invaluable to protection of liberty, including as a vehicle for freeing slaves and persons confined solely based on a King’s whim.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry J. Bourguignon

In an article published in this Journal in 1932, Professor Edwin Dickinson pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the first thirty years of its existence, dealt with 82 cases which raised questions of international law. The Court and counsel before it repeatedly cited the familiar writers on the law of nations: Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Vattel. As Dickinson pointed out, “It is an ancient doctrine of the Anglo-American common law that the law of nations is incorporated in and in some sense forms part of the national law.” Largely through decisions based on the principles expressed by the classical writers, the law of nations was early incorporated as part of the law of the United States.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qianlan Wu

The rule of law as a globally recognised concept is multi-faceted (Chesterman, 2008). In the common-law tradition, it is conceived through a formal and substantive framework. In essence, it centres on the supremacy of the law over the arbitrary exercise of power and the formal legality of the law (Tamanaha, 2004, p. 115; Cotterrell, 1992, p. 157). The rule-of-law concept has been criticised as being of unique European origin, where plural social organisation and universal natural law constitute its two preconditions (Unger, 1977, pp. 80–110). It has, however, been advocated around the world as one essential principle leading to modernity, where the legitimacy of the law based on the formal and substantive rule of law serves as a strong symbol for a modern society (Deflem, 1996, p. 5).


1933 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. C. Gutterridge

The theory of the abuse of rights is one which has been rejected by our law, with the result that the ancient brocard ‘dura lex sed lex’ finds its most vivid illustration in the present-day decisions of the Anglo-American Courts. The absolutist view of rights which is a feature of the Common Law was summed up by Lord Macnaghten in trenchant language when he said in Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles that although Mr. Pickles's conduct in wilfully depriving his fellow townsmen of part of their water supply might be ‘shocking to a moral philosopher’ there was nothing in the law of England which could stop him from being as ‘churlish, selfish and grasping’ as it was possible for a man to be. In other words our law has not hesitated to place the seal of its approval upon a theory of the extent of individual rights which can only be described as the consecration of the spirit of unrestricted egoism.


2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Hulsebosch

One of the great, unrecognized ironies in Anglo-American constitutional history is that Sir Edward Coke, the seventeenth-century mythologist of the “ancient constitution” and the English jurist most celebrated in early America, did not believe that subjects enjoyed the common law and many related rights of Englishmen while overseas. “The common law,” Coke declared in Parliament in 1628, “meddles with nothing that is done beyond the seas.” The ancient constitution was an English constitution and, though non-English subjects of the English king could enjoy its liberties and privileges while in England, it did not apply to anyone outside that realm. The jurisprudence that gave intellectual shape to colonial resistance before, and to notions of the rule of law after, the American Revolution was not intended by its primary author to benefit Americans. Whether or not the ancient constitution existed time out of mind, it did not extend to land out of sight.


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