scholarly journals The Comparative History and Theory of Corporate Criminal Liability

Author(s):  
Markus D. Dubber

An exercise in comparative legal history and legal theory, this article challenges the radical distinction that traditionally has been drawn between corporate criminal liability in German and Anglo-American law. In the familiar account, corporate criminal liability in the common law and the civil law passed each other like ships in the night, sometime around the turn of the nineteenth century: the common law had no corporate criminal liability before 1800, and the civil law had no corporate criminal liability after 1800. Closer inspection, however, reveals that corporate criminal liability was widely accepted in both common law and civil law countries at least since the Middle Ages, and that rejection of corporate criminal liability was complete neither in England before 1800 nor in Germany after 1800.

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 392-408
Author(s):  
Miriam Gur-Arye

The book Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Anglo-German Dialogues is the first volume of an Anglo-German project which aims ‘to explore the foundational principles and concepts that underpin the different domestic systems and local rules’. It offers comparative perspectives on German and Anglo-American criminal law and criminal justice as ‘examples of the civil law and the common law worlds’. The comparisons ‘dig beneath the superficial similarities or differences between legal rules to identify and compare the underlying concepts, values, principles, and structures of thought’. The review essay focuses on the topics of omissions, preparatory offences, and participation in crime, all of which extend the typical criminal liability. It presents the comparative German and Anglo-American perspectives discussed in the book with regard to each topic and adds the perspective of Israeli criminal law. It points out the features common to all these topics as an extension of criminal liability and discusses the underlying considerations that justify the criminalisation of omissions, preparatory offences, and participation in crime. In evaluating whether extending criminal liability in these contexts is justified, the review essay suggests reliance on two main notions: that of ‘control over the commission of the offence’ and that of ‘liberty (or personal freedom)’.


Author(s):  
Nepyivoda Vasyl ◽  
Nepyivoda Ivanna

The Anglo-American law have a considerable amount of accomplishments, which have become a worldwide asset. In terms of globalization and interaction, to use these achievements would be beneficial for further development of Ukrainian legal system. However, the very philosophy and reasoning behind the precedent-based common law is different from that in the civil law tradition of which the Ukrainian law is a part. This paper is intended to contribute to the examination how the mechanism of Anglo-American law operates in view of the expediency to introduce some of its elements into the Ukrainian jurisdiction. The initial part devoted to the emergence of, and formation of, the common law. It is noted that in the case of common law the influence of Roman law should not be denied. Relying mostly on praetorium ius experience, it has manifested itself in other directions and forms compare to civil law system. Therefore, the both, common law and civil law, despite their differences have been formed on the common ground – the Roman legal tradition. Taking into consideration that throughout their history they exchanged fruitful ideas, there is no irreconcilable, "genetic" incompatibility between them. Thus, it would allow to successfully implant certain common law elements, first of all precedent as a source of law, in the body of Ukrainian law, a part of civil law system. The paper notes that issues of common law mechanism have never been a priority for scholarly research in Ukraine as in a country of civil law tradition. The inertial influence of the Soviet law has also contributed to this situation. According to the communist ideology and the positivist visions on which the Soviet law was based, the precedent has not been considered as an acceptable legal instrument. In order to clarify how the mechanism works, the paper provides an overview of precedent and stare decisis doctrine as key components of common law. While a principle of stare decisis binding courts to follow legal precedents in cases with similar circumstances is in the core of Anglo-American law, in civil law systems precedent is not considered as binding. This discussion is followed by an analysis of judicial lawmaking. The paper specifies that in the common law systems, courts are not absolutely bound by precedents. In terms of radical changes in political, social or legal areas, they are entitled to re-examine and apply the law differently without legislative intervention, to adapt it to new circumstances. Thus, the Anglo-American legal tradition provides much broader scope for judicial lawmaking than Romano-German law. However, there is no consensus on the range to which it should be extended and to which extent it should rely on precedent. Within the framework of this controversial issue judicial activism and judicial restraint, two opposite philosophies of making a ruling in common law, are addressed. In order to examine the multifaceted nature of correlation between stare decisis principle and judicial lawmaking, the latest experience of the Supreme Court of the United States' on overruling precedents is considered. The paper summarizes that, most likely, mixed legal system associated with Nordic countries should be set as the reference point for the movement of Ukraine in this area. Such approach would provide rather broad scope for the operation of the common law elements, while safeguarding its omissions such as unjustified judicial activism.


JURIST ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 19-24
Author(s):  
Sergey V. Myshyakov ◽  

This article deals with the common law institutions on the grounds for challenging transactions made to the detriment of creditor’s property interests, and the relevant legal provisions and presumptions located in Chapter III.1 of the Russian law on insolvency (bankruptcy), a comparative legal analysis of the object and grounds of the challenge, the subjects of the challenge, the composition for proving the fact of fraudulent transfer of the debtor’s property and the preferred satisfaction of the creditor’s claims is carried out.


1936 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 414-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Arthur Steiner

Even in the most highly formalized systems of jurisprudence the rules and practices of the law cannot be entirely separated from the fundamental conceptions of law underlying them. The legal systems of France, The Netherlands and Germany have not been formalized to so great an extent that there is neither occasion nor opportunity for the application of the law to be conditioned by concepts derived from juridical theory. Duguit and Geny, Krabbe, and Kohler and Stammler, in their various works, have made this quite clear. In Anglo-American law the fictions so abundantly found are often no more than concrete formulations of abstract fundamental concepts which judges have thought to be valid and consistent with policy and which they could not conveniently introduce into the law in any other way. That fundamental conceptions of the law may affect its development more than their logical consistency warrants has been amply illustrated in the common law, equity, and American constitutional law. What is true of well-developed systems of jurisprudence is no less true of international law. Fundamental conceptions have probably had a greater influence here, since theologic and scholastic philosophies explain many of the rules of modern practice, and the rules of current practice owe their very existence, in large measure, to the reconciliaation of the philosophical concepts of the State, sovereignty and independence with the conception of a community of nations and a rule of law.


Author(s):  
Noga Morag-Levine

This chapter explores the work and influence of Roscoe Pound who offered sociological jurisprudence in response to transatlantic-inspired threats to the future of the common law. At issue was the rise of social science as an alternative, civil-law-affiliated, administrative paradigm that simultaneously threatened the academic interests of the law schools, the professional concerns of the bar, and the core constitutional principles of judicial supremacy. Within this context, Pound selectively drew on European social legal theory with the goal of saving the common law from itself. The project consisted of two primary proposals for reform, one focused on the universities, the other on the courts. Through the injection of social-scientific content into legal pedagogy and research, sociological jurisprudence forged a socio-legal paradigm that together with lowering the barriers separating law from society also ensured that law would continue to exist as a distinct field of inquiry in the universities and beyond. Where the courts were concerned, sociological jurisprudence answered pressures for radical curtailment of judicial review with a narrow, formalist, construction of the deficiency at the core of the Lochner Court’s reasoning. It was a problem definition that successfully served to deflect direct attacks on judicial supremacy. Largely hidden going forward has been the extent to which the constitutional battle lines of the early twentieth century were drawn between rival, common law- and civil-law-based paradigms of administrative governance.


Author(s):  
Amanda L. Tyler

The Introduction provides an overview of the history of the writ of habeas corpus and an overview of the book, which tells the story of what is sometimes known as “the Great Writ” as it has unfolded in Anglo-American law. The primary jurisdictions explored are Great Britain and the United States, yet many aspects of this story will ring familiar to those in other countries with a robust habeas tradition. The book chronicles the longstanding role of the common law writ of habeas corpus as a vehicle for reviewing detentions for conformity with underlying law, as well as the profound influence of the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 on Anglo-American law. The Introduction highlights how the writ has at times failed to live up to its glorification by Blackstone and others, while noting that at other times it has proven invaluable to protection of liberty, including as a vehicle for freeing slaves and persons confined solely based on a King’s whim.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-183
Author(s):  
Heidi M. Hurd ◽  
Michael S. Moore

Abstract:This essay undertakes two tasks: first, to describe the differing mens rea requirements for accomplice liability of both Anglo-American common law and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code; and second, to recommend how the mens rea requirements of both of these two sources of criminal law in America should be amended so as to satisfy the goals of clarity and consistency and so as to more closely conform the criminal law to the requirements of moral blameworthiness. Three "pure models" of the mens rea requirements for complicity are distinguished, based on the three theories of liability conventionally distinguished in the general part of Anglo-American criminal law. One of these, the vicarious responsibility model, is put aside initially because of both its descriptive inaccuracy and its normative undesirability. The analysis proceeds using the other two models: that of the mens rea requirements for principal liability for completed crimes, and that of the mens rea requirements for attempt liability. Both the common law and the Model Penal Code are seen as complicated admixtures of these two models, the common law being too narrow in the scope of its threatened liability and the Model Penal Code being both too broad and too opaque in its demands for accomplice liability. The normative recommendation of the paper is to adopt the model for the mens rea of complicity that treats it as a form of principal liability, recognizing that the overbreadth of liability resulting from adoption of that model would have to be redressed by adopting a "shopkeeper's privilege" as an affirmative defense separate from any mens rea requirement.


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