The Conventional Problem with Corporate Sentencing (and One Unconventional Solution)

Author(s):  
W. Robert Thomas

A recent wave of expressive accounts of corporate criminal law operate on the promise that corporate punishment can express a unique form of condemnation not capturable through civil enforcement. Unfortunately, the realities of corporate sentencing have thus far failed to make good on this expressive promise. Viewed in light of existing conventions that imbue meaning into our practices of punishment, corporate sentences rarely impose hard treatment in a manner or degree that these conventions seem to require. Accordingly, standard corporate sanctions turn out to be ill-suited to deliver—and, often, will likely undermine—the stigmatic punch upon which expressive defenses of corporate criminal law depend. A common response to this conventional problem with corporate sentencing has been to propose more, and harsher, corporate punishments. However, this approach overlooks the extent to which corporate punishment derives its stigmatic force from preexisting norms and conventions concerning individual punishment. If trying to improve corporate punishment, then, expressivists might instead seek either to leverage or to dismantle the underlying conventions that give existing sanctions meaning. An example of the former strategy would be to revitalize long-neglected proposals for corporate shaming by adopting a criminal convention currently absent from the corporate space—namely, the pervasive, stigmatic application of epithets like “thief” or “felon.” An example of the latter would be to join criminal justice reformers in targeting conventions that, in recent decades, have enabled increasingly draconian sentencing practices. On this view, dissolving corporate sentencing’s conventional problem may represent a further, incidental benefit of systemic criminal justice reform.

2018 ◽  
pp. 259
Author(s):  
Benjamin Levin

It has become popular to identify a “consensus” on criminal justice reform, but how deep is that consensus, actually? This Article argues that the purported consensus is much more limited than it initially appears. Despite shared reformist vocabulary, the consensus rests on distinct critiques that identify different flaws and justify distinct policy solutions. The underlying disagreements transcend traditional left/right political divides and speak to deeper disputes about the state and the role of criminal law in society. The Article maps two prevailing, but fundamentally distinct, critiques of criminal law: (1) the quantitative approach (what I call the “over” frame); and (2) the qualitative approach (what I call the “mass” frame). The “over” frame grows from a belief that criminal law has an important and legitimate function, but that the law’s operations have exceeded that function. This critique assumes that there are optimal rates of incarceration and criminalization, but the current criminal system is suboptimal in that it has criminalized too much and incarcerated too many. In contrast, the “mass” frame focuses on criminal law as a sociocultural phenomenon. This reformist frame indicates that the issue is not a mere miscalculation; rather, reforms should address how the system marginalizes populations and exacerbates both power imbalances and distributional inequities. To show how these frames differ, this Article applies the “over” and the “mass” critique, in turn, to the maligned phenomena of mass incarceration and overcriminalization. The existing literature on mass incarceration and overcriminalization displays an elision between these two frames. Some scholars and reformers have adopted one frame exclusively, while others use the two interchangeably. No matter how much scholars and critics bemoan the troubles of mass incarceration and overcriminalization, it is hard to believe that they can achieve meaningful reform if they are talking about fundamentally different problems. While many scholars may adopt an “over” frame in an effort to attract a broader range of support or appeal to politicians, “over” policy proposals do not necessarily reach deeper “mass” concerns. Ultimately, this Article argues that a pragmatic turn to the “over” frame may have significant costs in legitimating deeper structural flaws and failing to address distributional issues of race, class, and power at the heart of the “mass” critique.


Author(s):  
Thalia Anthony ◽  
Penny Crofts

This special issue traces multifaceted readings of criminal law reform in the context of developments in Australia, North America and Europe. It addresses a range of criminal law legislative regimes, frameworks and issues confronting criminal law reform including as they relate to family violence, organisational liability for child sexual abuse, drug-driving and Indigenous under-representation on juries. In doing so, the articles variously assess the impacts of past criminal law reforms, current processes of reform, areas in need of future reform and the limitations of reform. It poses a number of challenges: Who does law reform serve? What principles should guide the work of criminal justice reform? What is the role and responsibility of universities in law reform? Who are the natural allies of academics in agitating for reform? Is reform of criminal law enough for progressive social change? Do public inquiries and law reform assist with progressive change or do they have the potential to undermine the struggle for more humane and equitable social responses?


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-267
Author(s):  
Ilya Rudyak

According to empirical desert theory, good utilitarian grounds exist for distributing criminal punishment pursuant to the (retributive) intuitions of the lay community on criminal liability. This theory’s insights, based on original empirical research and informed by social science, have significantly influenced contemporary criminal law theory. Yet, ostensibly, the theory is hampered by serious limitations, which may have obstructed its progress and its potential to guide criminal justice reform. Chief among them: it draws from community intuitions, and community intuitions—as the theory acknowledges—are sometimes immoral. In addition to these “immorality objections,” (commonly illustrated by alluding to the antebellum South and Nazi Germany), critics have alleged, inter alia, that the theory is self-defeating, uses incongruous justifications, and engages in deceptive and exploitative practices. This Article argues that these critiques are misplaced and overstated and that empirical desert theory can be safely relied on in criminal justice—and beyond. Despite the captivating historical illustrations and the intuitive appeal of immorality objections, this Article demonstrates that empirical desert theory is nearly immune to them, by virtue of previously underappreciated features of its scientific methodology. Moreover, empirical desert theory can do even better. This Article presents an innovative proposal to reconceptualize empirical desert theory by incorporating into its scientific methodology a minimalistic normative commitment to equality and non-discrimination. It provides theoretical support and specific parameters for this reconceptualization, which imbues the theory with qualities capable of further safeguarding it from immorality objections. Furthermore, the Article explores ten additional criticisms of the theory, seriatim, and demonstrates that the proposed reconceptualization substantially strengthens the theory’s ability to overcome them. In its conclusion, the Article outlines two future paths for the theory’s application beyond criminal law, discussing the possibility to “export” its insights to international humanitarian law and its potential to reframe the interaction between criminal law theory and philosophy.


Author(s):  
Veljko Ikanović

This paper discusses the measure of the safety of compulsory psychiatric treatment and care in a health institution from the new Criminal Code of Republika Srpska. Here, in fact, it is about “returning” to the law of an old measure that previously existed in domestic criminal legislation until its 2003 reform. Considering that a new one has been abandoned in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the harmonization of criminal justice reform, the procedure against irregular perpetrators of criminal offenses and the introduced security measures that other legislation in the country does not know, we expect this to raise the attention of legal science, jurisprudence and certain international factors under the influence of which the measure was removed from the criminal legislation. With this work, we want to draw the attention of the scientific and professional public to the need for traditional, scientifically based and proven solutions to be quickly and uncritically abandoned, so that after a certain period of time, “after-mindedness,” it was understood that it was wrong and counterproductive.


Author(s):  
Chelsea Barabas

This chapter discusses contemporary debates regarding the use of artificial intelligence as a vehicle for criminal justice reform. It closely examines two general approaches to what has been widely branded as “algorithmic fairness” in criminal law: the development of formal fairness criteria and accuracy measures that illustrate the trade-offs of different algorithmic interventions; and the development of “best practices” and managerialist standards for maintaining a baseline of accuracy, transparency, and validity in these systems. Attempts to render AI-branded tools more accurate by addressing narrow notions of bias miss the deeper methodological and epistemological issues regarding the fairness of these tools. The key question is whether predictive tools reflect and reinforce punitive practices that drive disparate outcomes, and how data regimes interact with the penal ideology to naturalize these practices. The chapter then calls for a radically different understanding of the role and function of the carceral state, as a starting place for re-imagining the role of “AI” as a transformative force in the criminal legal system.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096466392110208
Author(s):  
Riikka Kotanen

In the context of home, violence remains more accepted when committed against children than adults. Normalisation of parental violence has been documented in attitudinal surveys, professional practices, and legal regulation. For example, in many countries violent disciplining of children is the only legal form of interpersonal violence. This study explores the societal invisibility and normalisation of parental violence as a crime by analysing legislation and control policies regulating the division of labour and involvement between social welfare and criminal justice authorities. An empirical case study from Finland, where all forms of parental violence were legally prohibited in 1983, is used to elucidate the divergence between (criminal) law and control policies. The analysis demonstrates how normalisation operates at the policy-level where, within the same system of control that criminalised these acts, structural hindrances are built to prevent criminal justice interventions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document