Foreign Policy Attitudes of the Black Talented Tenth

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-290
Author(s):  
Antwain Leach ◽  
Sajid Hussain

Do Talented Tenth and non–Talented Tenth Blacks support moral and socially conscious US foreign policies to the same degree? Utilizing a 2010 national sample from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, we find statistical evidence that members of the Talented Tenth are more likely than other Blacks to support America’s role to combat global hunger and to provide economic aid to assist needy countries in developing their economies. An examination of the foreign policy attitudes of the Black Talented Tenth is an important undertaking because it provides insight into what our expectations should be for rising African Americans as more of them enter into its ranks. Should we expect the next generation of African Americans to be more conscientious as they increasingly assume the mantles of leadership and responsibility? The results in this article lay bare the enormous work the present generation of Black educators must undertake to ensure the next generation are ready to do so. By observing the internationalist attitudes of the present Talented Tenth, especially as those attitudes relate to creating a more just, equitable, and harmonious world, it is possible to find ways to critically engage and help the next generation to provide the type of leadership necessary to make a positive difference.

Author(s):  
James L. Guth

Although there has been much speculation about the way that religion shapes American attitudes on foreign policy, there are few empirical analyses of that influence. This paper draws on a large national sample of the public in 2008 to classify religious groups on Eugene Wittkopf’s (1990) classic dimensions of foreign policy attitudes, militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism. We find rather different religious constituencies for each dimension and demonstrate the influence of ethnoreligious and theological factors on both. Combining the two dimensions, we show that American religious groups occupy different locations in Wittkopf’s hardliner, internationalist, accommodationist, and isolationist camps.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110413
Author(s):  
Kathleen E. Powers ◽  
Joshua D. Kertzer ◽  
Deborah J. Brooks ◽  
Stephen G. Brooks

How do concerns about fairness shape foreign policy preferences? In this article, we show that fairness has two faces—one concerning equity, the other concerning equality—and that taking both into account can shed light on the structure of important foreign policy debates. Fielding an original survey on a national sample of Americans, we show that different types of Americans think about fairness in different ways, and that these fairness concerns shape foreign policy preferences: individuals who emphasize equity are far more sensitive to concerns about burden sharing, are far less likely to support US involvement abroad when other countries aren’t paying their fair share, and often support systematically different foreign policies than individuals who emphasize equality. As long as IR scholars focus only on the equality dimension of fairness, we miss much about how fairness concerns matter in world politics.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. e0245322
Author(s):  
Monica Răileanu Szeles

This paper aims to examine the correlates of foreign policy attitudes in Moldova by a multilevel analysis, and to also reveal some characteristics of the Moldova’s difficult geopolitical and economic context, such as the ethnical conflicts and poverty. A set of four foreign policy attitudes are explained upon individual- and regional level socio-economic and demographic correlates, of which poverty is the main focus, being represented here by several objective, subjective, uni- and multidimensional indicators. An indicator of deprivation is derived from a group of poverty indicators by the method Item Response Theory. Deprivation, subjective poverty, ethnicity and the Russian media influence are found to be associated with negative attitudes toward all foreign policies, while satisfaction with economic conditions in the country and a positive attitude toward refugees are both associated with positive attitudes toward all foreign policies.


Author(s):  
A. Kupatadze ◽  
T. Zeitzoff

AbstractWe investigate how emotions, threat perceptions and past violence influence foreign policy attitudes via a survey experiment in Georgia. Using a stratified sample across areas with differential exposure to the conflict and the presence of internally displaced persons, we randomly assign respondents to receive emotional primes about Russian aggression in the region. We find that exposure to violence, as well as simply being primed about past Russian aggression, both increase the perceived threat from Russia, and to a lesser extent anger towards Russia. Individuals who receive the primes are more supportive of a hardline foreign policy. In contrast, we find that exposure to violence does not have a direct effect on foreign policy attitudes, but increases hardline attitudes indirectly, through increased anger and threat. Taken together our results provide evidence that reminders of past violence have different effects than direct exposure to violence on foreign policy attitudes.


1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew H. Ziegler

Previous studies of Western European foreign policy attitudes rely almost exclusively on single-item measures, such as support for defence spending, support for the new missiles in Europe, opinions on NATO, and so on. This article, using a multi-country data set, aggregates several survey items and explores the manner in which Europeans structure their attitudes towards one aspect of foreign policy: Atlantic co-operation. A factor analysis uncovers two underlying conceptual dimensions: military and non-military co-operation. These dimensions provide the axes to construct a four-fold typology of viewpoints, consisting of Atlanticists, Military Allies, Dovish Partners and Isolationists. Respondents are classified within this typology, and the European-wide and cross-national distributions of opinion are presented. The highest support for Atlantic co-operation is found among the West Germans, and the lowest is found among the French.


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