scholarly journals Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model

2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dustin H. Tingley
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Sequential Games

Policy bargaining and militarized conflict

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-678 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Bils ◽  
William Spaniel
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Information Uncertainty ◽  
Major Purpose ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Spatial Policy ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War

Studies of bargaining and war generally focus on two sources of incomplete information: uncertainty over the probability of victory and uncertainty over the costs of fighting. We introduce uncertainty over preferences of a spatial policy and argue for its relevance in crisis bargaining. Under these conditions, standard results from the bargaining model of war break down: peace can be Pareto inefficient and it may be impossible to avoid war. We then extend the model to allow for cheap talk pre-play communication. Whereas incentives to misrepresent normally render cheap talk irrelevant, here communication can cause peace and ensure that agreements are efficient. Moreover, peace can become more likely as (1) the variance in the proposer’s belief about its opponent’s type increases and (2) the costs of war decrease. Our results indicate that one major purpose of diplomacy is simply to communicate preferences and that such communications can be credible.

Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study

1996 ◽  
Vol 106 (436) ◽  
pp. 593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Guth ◽  
Steffen Huck ◽  
Peter Ockenfels
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining

Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Esarey ◽  
Bumba Mukherjee ◽  
Will H. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Statistical Treatment ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Characteristics ◽  
Information Games

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

Slow to Learn

2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 774-796 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Spaniel ◽  
Peter Bils
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
The Other ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Convergence Results

If peace fails due to incomplete information and incentives to misrepresent power or resolve, war is supposed to serve as a learning process and allows parties to reach a mutually preferable bargain. We explore crisis bargaining under a third type of uncertainty: the extent to which one side wishes to conquer the other. With incomplete information and take-it-or-leave-it negotiations, this type of uncertainty is isomorphic to incomplete information about the probability of victory. However, with incomplete information and bargaining while fighting, standard convergence results fail: types fail to fully separate because there is no differential cost for delay. Wars correspondingly last longer while benefiting no one. These results help explain empirical differences between territorial versus nonterritorial conflicts and interstate versus intrastate wars.

An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Brookins ◽  
Dmitry Ryvkin
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Incomplete Information
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