Ideology, Institutions, Power, and Militarized Disputes

This chapter examines if and how intergovernmental organization (IGO) memberships shape participation in militarized interstate disputes. Theorists have argued that IGOs solve informational problems, socialize states, or constitute democratic communities that prevent a resort to violence. The distributive ideological approach suggests that IGOs institutionalize ideologically cohesive coalitions that ameliorate conflicts with insiders but can exacerbate conflict with outsiders. The effect of IGOs on militarized disputes should be present only if the distributional stakes have global ideological implications as opposed to when disputes are purely over particularistic stakes, such as territory. Regression analyses support this insight. Both ideological differences and IGO membership patterns affect dispute participation in dyads that include a major power but not among neighboring states or states involved in a territorial dispute. One implication is that IGO memberships affect the distribution of militarized disputes, but it is unclear whether IGOs in the aggregate reduce militarized conflict.

Blood and Oil

This chapter determines whether oil causes international conflict and clarifies the meaning of oil wars. It describes militarized conflict that is linked to oil and examines oil-related civil wars along with oil-related interstate violence. The chapter identifies distinct causal pathways from petroleum to international conflict, ranging from conquest of oil resources, to fights over petroleum transportation routes, to externalization of oil-oriented civil wars, and to conflicts aimed at preventing the consolidation of control over global petroleum supplies. It argues that countries' willingness to fight for oil resources has been overstated. It also points out how oil is an exceptionally valuable commodity.

How Democracies Keep the Peace: Contextual Factors That Influence Conflict Management Strategies

Some studies find that democratic states are more amenable to third party forms of conflict management, while other studies indicate that democracies are able to resolve contentious issues on their own through bilateral negotiations. Using data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project, the authors investigate peaceful and militarized conflict management strategies that democratic states employ to resolve contentious issues. Theoretically, the authors focus on how militarized conflict history, relative capabilities, and issue salience influence the tools of conflict management that democratic states employ. Empirical analyses suggest that democratic dyads employ bilateral negotiations more often to resolve contentious issues when the issue has been militarized previously, when the issue is more salient, and when they are facing an equal adversary. Democratic dyads seek out non-binding third party settlement more frequently in situations of power preponderance than non-democratic dyads, although binding forms of third party settlement occur most often in relatively equal democratic dyads. Pairs of democracies are more likely to employ militarized conflict management strategies when they have resorted to force over the issue previously, when the issue is highly salient, and when they are evenly matched.

Four Ways We Know the Democratic Peace Correlation Does Not Exist in the State of Knowledge

Multiple studies have shown that when advanced-market “contract-intensive” economy is considered in a regression of fatal militarized interstate disputes, crises, or wars, the democratic peace correlation, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, becomes near zero and insignificant. Defenders of the existence of a correlation of democracy with peace claim these studies contain multiple errors. This article examines the state of evidence behind all claims in this debate. Four crucial facts are identified: (1) There is no report in print that shows democracy significant in a regression of fatal disputes controlling for contractualist economy that is unencumbered with controversial practices; (2) Every empirical defense of democracy has been rebutted, and the rebuttals remain uncontested; (3) There is no democratic peace in the nineteenth century, when there were no contractualist dyads but were democratic dyads; and (4) New analyses with revised direct data on contractualist economy covering 94% of observations over the largest-observed 1920–2010 period show that democracy without contractualist economy has a near-zero correlation with peace. Together, these facts inform us that there are no scientific grounds for deeming the democratic peace correlation as existing in the state of knowledge.

Energy resources and the risk of conflict in shared river basins

This study examines the effect of energy resources on the chances for militarized conflict, water related conflict and cooperation events, and cooperative river treaties between pairs of states on shared international river basins. We examine trade-offs that riparian states can make between energy resources such as oil or natural gas and fresh water resources. Integrating upstream and downstream states’ geographical position in a river basin with energy resource information, we examine four related scenarios of states sharing rivers: (1) Joint energy where both upstream and downstream countries have energy resources, (2) Downstream energy where only the downstream state has energy resources, (3) Upstream energy where only an upstream country has energy resources, and (4) No energy. Theoretically, we argue that Downstream energy dyads are most likely to find cooperative solutions to conflicts over shared river resources because downstream states can offer oil and natural gas side payments to upstream states in exchange for greater water supplies. Empirical analyses of dyadic data in shared river basin dyads from 1945 to 2001 provide strong support for the theory. Riparian cooperation through river treaties and diplomacy is best achieved in Downstream energy dyads, where the downstream states have energy resources that can be traded for water resources with upstream states. Militarized conflict and water related conflict events are most likely in Joint energy dyads. Case illustrations from the Aral Sea and Ganges river basins are used to demonstrate the theoretical arguments.

What Is the Relationship Between Alliance and Militarized Conflict? Analysis of Reciprocal Causation

Despite the importance of alliances in international politics, little is known about how they theoretically and empirically affect militarized conflicts and vice versa. This study aims to examine the reciprocal relationship between alliances and militarized conflicts. The literature has focused only on the effects of alliances on militarized conflicts without paying much attention to the simultaneous causation between them. Thus, previous studies have not consistently revealed a relationship between alliances and conflict. Moreover, they are limited due to the use of dichotomous measures of shared alliance ties. Using a continuous measure of alliance ties, this study clearly demonstrates that shared alliance ties can be effective in reducing the likelihood of militarized conflicts. In addition, this study finds that there is a reciprocal relationship between shared alliances and militarized conflicts. It finds that militarized conflicts tend to decrease the level of shared alliance ties. Then, this study argues that alliance might be added to the next element behind the Kantian tripod as a salient factor that reduces militarized conflict. Finally, this study points to insights to be gained from the findings and suggests some policy implications.