NEW ACT ON AUDITORS AND AUDIT COMPANIES − REINFORCEMENT OR DEBILITATION OF AUDIT MARKET?

Author(s):  
Joanna Kogut
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth N Cowle ◽  
Jonathan Shipman ◽  
Tyler Kleppe ◽  
James R. Moon, Jr.
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-215
Author(s):  
Hyun Jae Park ◽  
Jaewan Park ◽  
Hye Jeong Nam

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Kwang-Hwa Jeong ◽  
Tae-Hyun Cho ◽  
Yi-Bae Kim

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L. Buslepp ◽  
Matthew Notbohm
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Cowle ◽  
Tyler J. Kleppe ◽  
James Moon ◽  
Jonathan E. Shipman
Keyword(s):  

1999 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris E. Hogan ◽  
Debra C. Jeter

Dramatic changes in recent years in the audit market suggest the timeliness of an investigation of trends in auditor concentration and an extension of prior research (e.g., Danos and Eichenseher 1982). In recent press, large audit firms have claimed that specialization is a goal of increasing importance. Peat Marwick, for example, has restructured along industry lines, claiming to be recruiting professionals for national teams of multidisciplinary experts organized to “focus on the same industry to serve clients optimally.” On the other hand, litigation concerns might prompt auditors to diversify their risks by diversifying their clientele. In this study, we examine trends in industry specialization from 1976 to 1993 and the industry factors which may affect specialization; whether market share increases are greater for audit firms classified as specialists; and whether the nation's largest audit firms have increased their market share in the industries which they have identified as their focus industries. We find evidence that concentration levels have increased over this period, consistent with the claims of the large audit firms. We find that auditor concentration levels are higher in regulated industries, in more concentrated industries and in industries experiencing rapid growth, but lower in industries with a high risk of litigation. Levels of concentration have increased over time in nonregulated industries providing evidence that scale economies or superior efficiencies of heavy-involvement auditors are not limited to regulated industries but extend to nonregulated industries as well. We also find that for the audit firms classified as market leaders at the beginning of the year, market share has increased over time, whereas market share has declined for firms with a smaller share at the beginning of the year. This suggests that there are returns to investing in specialization.


2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.


2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting-Chiao Huang ◽  
Hsihui Chang ◽  
Jeng-Ren Chiou

SUMMARY We investigate the effects of audit market concentration on audit fees and audit quality in China, where competition is intense and the legal environment is relatively weak compared with developed countries. Analyzing 12,334 firm-year observations for the period 2001 to 2011, we find a significant positive relation between concentration and audit fees. Path analysis shows that concentration improves client earnings quality and reduces the need for auditors to issue modified audit opinions through increased audit fees. Additional analysis indicates that the increased audit fees and client earnings quality resulting from increased concentration are associated with a lower likelihood of executives and auditors being sanctioned by regulators for audit failures. Together, our results suggest that concentration improves audit quality indirectly through increased audit fees and this positive indirect effect offsets the negative direct effect of concentration on audit quality. By separating the direct and the indirect effect of concentration on audit quality, our study would explain why previous studies that do not have a separation document mixed evidence. Our findings inform regulators that actions taken to eliminate the indirect effect of concentration, for example restricting the upper bound of audit fees, could produce unintended outcomes such as decreased audit quality.


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