Spatial Competition in Local Audit Markets and the Fallout on Deloitte from the 2007 PCAOB Censure

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Face ◽  
Market Leader

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.

Did the 2007 PCAOB Disciplinary Order against Deloitte Impose Actual Costs on the Firm or Improve Its Audit Quality?

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rates ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Other ◽  
Archival Studies ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee

ABSTRACT We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

Does Audit Fee Homogeneity Exist? Premiums and Discounts Attributable to Individual Partners

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 249-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart D. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Homogeneity Assumption ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Made In

SUMMARY This paper investigates the implied assumption, made in many audit fee determination studies, that, within a given audit firm, all partners produce a statistically identical level of audit quality and earn a statistically identical level of audit fees. This is referred to as the “homogeneity assumption.” However, this is contradicted by the individual auditor behavioral literature, which shows that different individual auditor characteristics can have an impact on audit quality. Given the fact that audit partners differ in their quality, this paper hypothesizes that different audit partners will be able to earn differing levels of fees. This hypothesis is tested by estimating an audit fee model using data from 822 Australian publicly listed companies for the year 2005. Australia is an ideal audit market for this research, as the disclosure of the name of the audit engagement partner in the audit report is mandatory. The empirical results indicate that individual audit partners earn individual audit fee premiums (or discounts) that are not explainable by the audit firms of which they are members. Data Availability: All data have been extracted from publicly available sources.

Audit prices and Big 4 fee premiums: further evidence from Thailand

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thanyawee Pratoomsuwan
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Using Data

Purpose Because there is mixed evidence regarding Big N fee premiums across countries, the purpose of this paper is to re-examine the phenomenon of audit price differentiations in the market for auditing services in Thailand. Although Hay et al. (2006) and Hay (2013) reviewed over 80 audit fee papers from 20 countries over 25 years, 13 of which were based in emerging economies, the understanding of the market for auditing services in Thailand remains limited. Because the Thai auditing market is also classified as a segmented market – i.e., a market that is less competitive for large-client firms and more competitive for small-client firms – this study tests audit price competition in an emerging audit market using Thailand as an example. Design/methodology/approach The traditional audit fee model is used to estimate audit fee premiums for a sample of over 300 non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 2011. Findings Although the market for auditing services in Thailand is consistent with that described in Ferguson et al. (2013) – in which Big N audit firms dominate only the large-client segment – the results show that Big N auditors charge higher audit fees and earn higher fee premiums compared with non-Big N auditors in both the small- and large-client segments of the audit market. Research limitations/implications The evidence from this study reveals the existence of Big N fee premiums across market segmentations. Audit price differentials between Big N and non-Big N firms in both small- and large-client market segments might concern regulators regarding competition in the audit market with respect to whether the Big N firms are charging uncompetitive audit fees. These findings also imply that audit pricing varies across countries and the Big N price deferential is typically larger in emerging markets than in more developed audit markets and that it might be inadequate to study single-country audit pricing. However, the question whether the Big N fee premium results from Big N product differentiation is not directly investigated in this study. Originality/value Because earlier studies focusing on audit fee premiums have been conducted using data from the USA and Australia, the findings add to the limited evidence regarding audit fee premiums in an emerging country such as Thailand.

Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Association Member ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Control Samples

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

Audit Market Structure and Audit Pricing

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Daniel Eshleman ◽  
Bradley P. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
First Year ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
The U.S

SYNOPSIS Extant literature finds mixed evidence on the association between audit market concentration and audit fees. We re-examine this issue using a large sample of U.S. audit clients covering 90 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) spanning 2000–2013. We find that audit market concentration is associated with significantly higher audit fees, consistent with the concerns of regulators and managers. We also find that increases in audit market concentration are associated with fewer initial engagement fee discounts (i.e., reduced lowballing), particularly for non-Big 4 clients. We reconcile our findings with those of prior research and find that our divergent findings are attributable to controls for MSA fixed effects. In supplemental analyses, we find that audit market concentration is associated with higher audit quality. We also find that concentration is associated with higher audit quality for first-year engagements, but only if the auditor does not lowball on the engagement. Our results are relevant to the ongoing debate regarding the consequences of increased concentration within the U.S. audit market (GAO 2003, 2008). JEL Classifications: M41; M42; L13.

Spatial Competition at the Intersection of the Large and Small Audit Firm Markets

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Nathaniel M. Stephens
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Differential Impact ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY In this paper, we study spatial competition in the U.S. audit market while accounting for its two-tiered nature. We provide evidence on the differential impact that market share distances within and between the players in the large and small audit markets have on competition. We find that the market share distance from small audit firm competitors has a greater effect on the Big 4's audit fees than distances from other Big 4 competitors. This finding suggests that small audit firms play a significant part in the competitive landscape in local markets. Further, we find that audit fees are increasing with the distance between a small audit firm and its closest competing small audit firm while audit fees are decreasing with the distance between a small audit firm and its closest competing large audit firm. This suggests that while obtaining separation in market space from competing small audit firms reduces competitive pressure from other small audit firms, as a small audit firm gets closer to the market space of a large audit firm it is perceived as being more like the larger audit firm and is able to obtain a fee premium like that attained by the larger audit firms. JEL Classifications: M4; M40; M41; M42; M49.

Does Fee Disclosure Type Matter? Evidence from Price Adjustment in the Audit Market of Taiwan

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-61
Author(s):  
Jengfang Chen ◽  
Rong-Ruey Duh ◽  
Kuei-Fu Li
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT While mandatory audit fee disclosure makes fee information transparent, there have been concerns about the impact of price adjustment on audit quality. Taking advantage of a regulatory change in Taiwan that required public companies to disclose audit fee but allowed two alternative disclosure forms (amount disclosure or range disclosure), this study investigates the impact of the fee disclosure form on price adjustment and the influence of such adjustment on audit quality. Using a dataset including audit fees under the two disclosure forms, we find that, for overcharged companies, the downward adjustment is larger for amount disclosure companies than range disclosure companies and such downward adjustment increase discretionary accruals in amount disclosure companies but not for range disclosure companies. Our study helps understand the impact of different fee disclosure forms on price adjustment and audit quality, which should be of interest to regulators and financial statement users in Taiwan and beyond.

On the Benefits of Audit Market Consolidation: Evidence from Merged Audit Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qihui Gong ◽  
Oliver Zhen Li ◽  
Yupeng Lin ◽  
Liansheng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Market Consolidation ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACT We examine efficiency improvement associated with audit firm mergers. Our analysis is made possible by a unique dataset of audit hours in China. We find a significant reduction in audit hours, unaccompanied by a deterioration in audit quality, of merged audit firms. Further, we find a larger reduction in audit hours when acquirers are Chinese domestic Big 10 audit firms and when client firms are more complex. These results are consistent with the notion of economies of scale arising from horizontal mergers. However, enhanced efficiency does not necessarily reduce audit fees. Instead, we find an increase in audit fees when acquirers are international Big 4 audit firms even when we control for possible changes in market power. This premium is at least partially due to the certification effect of international Big 4 audit firms.

Changes in Audit Market Competition and the Big N Premium

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Carson ◽  
Roger Simnett ◽  
Billy S. Soo ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Big 5 ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY We respond to calls for research into the effect of the decline in the number of Big N firms on market power and consequential impact on competition (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008; European Commission 2010; U.K. House of Lords 2011) by analyzing the change in Big N audit fee premium over the Big 6, Big 5, and Big 4 periods, and across different client segments. Using a large sample of Australian publicly listed companies over the years 1996–2007, we find that while premiums paid to Big N auditors have increased significantly for the Big 4 and Big 5 periods compared to the Big 6 period, the growth has not been shared equally across all client segments. In particular, while the largest global clients pay some of the highest premiums, the increase in premiums for this group in the Big 4 period has been lower than those experienced by other clients. We also observe that premiums paid to industry specialists have declined relative to the Big 6 period, but fee discounts offered to clients switching to a Big N auditor from a non-Big N auditor have increased. In all, we find that the premiums paid by Big N clients increased in line with consolidation in the number of Big N audit firms, but the impact varied across client segments.

“Big 4 fee premium” and audit quality: latest evidence from UK listed companies

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (8) ◽  
pp. 680-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Campa
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Research Questions ◽  
The Uk

PurposeUsing the most recent observations (2005‐2011) from a sample of UK listed companies, This paper aims to investigate whether Big 4 audit firms exhibit a “fee premium” and, if this is the case, whether the premium is related to the delivery of a better audit service.Design/methodology/approachUnivariate tests, multivariate regressions and two methodologies that control for self‐selection bias are used to answer the proposed research questions. Data are collected from DataStream.FindingsFindings provide consistent evidence about the existence of an “audit fee premium” charged by Big 4 firms while they do not highlight any significant relationship between audit quality and type of auditor with respect to the audit quality proxies investigated.Research limitations/implicationsEvidence from this paper might signal the need for legislative intervention to improve the competitiveness of the audit market on the basis that its concentrated structure is leading to “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients. Findings might also enhance Big 4 client bargaining power. However, as the paper analyses only one country, generalizability of the results might be a limitation.Originality/valueThis study joins two streams of the extant literature that investigate the existence of a “Big 4 audit fee premium” and different levels of audit quality among Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients. Evidence supports the concerns raised by the UK House of Lords in 2010 that the concentrated structure of the audit market could be the driver of “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients as it does not find differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document