scholarly journals ON CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY FOR MATRIX GAMES WITH L-R FUZZY PAYOFFS

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 158-174
Author(s):  
Masamichi Kon
2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dino Gerardi

I develop a model of decision making in juries when there is uncertainty about jurors' preferences. I provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategy under any voting rule and show that nonunanimous rules are asymptotically efficient. Specifically, large juries make the correct decision with probability close to one. My analysis also demonstrates that under the unanimous rule, large juries almost never convict the defendant. The last result contrasts markedly with the literature and suggests that the unanimity rule can protect the innocent only at the price of acquitting the guilty.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 2195-2206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chao Xu ◽  
Fanyong Meng ◽  
Qiang Zhang

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiuping Xu ◽  
Liming Yao

We concentrate on discussing a class of two-person zero-sum games with rough payoffs. Based on the expected value operator and the trust measure of rough variables, the expected equilibrium strategy andr-trust maximin equilibrium strategy are defined. Five cases whether the game existsr-trust maximin equilibrium strategy are discussed, and the technique of genetic algorithm is applied to find the equilibrium strategies. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed technique.


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