scholarly journals Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types

2017 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 153-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryoji Kurata ◽  
Naoto Hamada ◽  
Atsushi Iwasaki ◽  
Makoto Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Extended Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Distributional Constraints ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Stability Definition ◽  
Model Computer ◽  
Straightforward Extension

School choice programs are implemented to give students/parents an opportunity to choose the public school the students attend. Controlled school choice programs need to provide choices for students/parents while maintaining distributional constraints on the composition of students, typically in terms of socioeconomic status. Previous works show that setting soft-bounds, which flexibly change the priorities of students based on their types, is more appropriate than setting hard-bounds, which strictly limit the number of accepted students for each type. We consider a case where soft-bounds are imposed and one student can belong to multiple types, e.g., “financially-distressed” and “minority” types. We first show that when we apply a model that is a straightforward extension of an existing model for disjoint types, there is a chance that no stable matching exists. Thus we propose an alternative model and an alternative stability definition, where a school has reserved seats for each type. We show that a stable matching is guaranteed to exist in this model and develop a mechanism called Deferred Acceptance for Overlapping Types (DA-OT). The DA-OT mechanism is strategy-proof and obtains the student-optimal matching within all stable matchings. Furthermore, we introduce an extended model that can handle both type-specific ceilings and floors and propose a extended mechanism DA-OT* to handle the extended model. Computer simulation results illustrate that DA-OT outperforms an artificial cap mechanism where we set a hard-bound for each type in each school. DA-OT* can achieve stability in the extended model without sacrificing students’ welfare.

scholarly journals Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (4) ◽  
pp. 1486-1529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabrielle Fack ◽  
Julien Grenet ◽  
Yinghua He
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Test Scores ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Student Preferences ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Novel Approaches

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings. (JEL D11, D12, D82, I23)

scholarly journals Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (5) ◽  
pp. 1274-1315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam J. Kapor ◽  
Christopher A. Neilson ◽  
Seth D. Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Heterogeneous Beliefs ◽  
Welfare Costs ◽  
Subjective Beliefs ◽  
Opposite Conclusion ◽  
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof

This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances differ from rational expectations values and predict choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of school choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium effects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households’ belief accuracy. We find that a switch to truthful reporting in the DA mechanism offers welfare improvements over the baseline given the belief errors we observe in the data, but that an analyst who assumed families had accurate beliefs would have reached the opposite conclusion. (JEL D83, H75, I21, I28)

scholarly journals School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 1095-1133
Author(s):  
Andrew Kloosterman ◽  
Peter Troyan
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
School Choice ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Interdependent Preferences ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Positive Results

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy‐proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these results to a curse of acceptance. However, we also show that if priorities are designed appropriately, positive results are recovered: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome is stable, and less informed students are protected from the curse of acceptance. Our results have implications for the current debate over priority design in school choice.

Privatization, School Choice and Educational Equality

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yossi Dahan
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Lower Class ◽  
Educational Equality ◽  
Educational Justice ◽  
Students With Special Needs ◽  
Market Mechanisms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Ideological Background

This Article looks at aspects of the relationship between privatization in education and educational justice, examining these relationships from normative and empirical points of view. It explores different meanings of privatization in the realm of education and assesses underlying reasons for certain aspects of privatization in light of two educational justice: the adequacy approach and the fair equality of opportunity approach. The Article argues that given the competitive nature of the sphere of education, considerations of fairness, as well as utility, solidarity, and democracy supply strong reasons for rejecting various arguments that support the existence of private schools. In the last thirty years, vouchers and school choice schemes have constituted the main modes of privatization, importing market mechanisms and the logic of competition into the realm of education. Empirical evidence suggests that vouchers and school choice schemes have not fulfilled the promise of reducing educational inequalities, partly due to the political, social, economic and ideological background in which they were implemented. The introduction of competition in the realm of education has created a reality that encourages schools to prefer “low cost” students—students from middle and upper classes families—over “high cost” disadvantaged students—who come mainly from the lower class, and students with special needs. Not only have marketization and privatization changed the way that society distributes educational services, they promote a social ethos that emphasizes self-interest over the advancement of the public good and erodes democratic public forums in which collective societal decisions should be resolved.

scholarly journals Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schneider ◽  
Paul Teske ◽  
Melissa Marschall ◽  
Michael Mintrom ◽  
Christine Roch
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
School Choice ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Parental Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public School Choice ◽  
Quasi Experimental

While the possible decline in the level of social capital in the United States has received considerable attention by scholars such as Putnam and Fukuyama, less attention has been paid to the local activities of citizens that help define a nation's stock of social capital. Scholars have paid even less attention to how institutional arrangements affect levels of social capital. We argue that giving parents greater choice over the public schools their children attend creates incentives for parents as “citizen/consumers” to engage in activities that build social capital. Our empirical analysis employs a quasi-experimental approach comparing parental behavior in two pairs of demographically similar school districts that vary on the degree of parental choice over the schools their children attend. Our data show that, controlling for many other factors, parents who choose when given the opportunity are higher on all the indicators of social capital analyzed. Fukuyama has argued that it is easier for governments to decrease social capital than to increase it. We argue, however, that the design of government institutions can create incentives for individuals to engage in activities that increase social capital.

scholarly journals Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof

2018 ◽  
Vol 177 ◽  
pp. 405-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itai Ashlagi ◽  
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Keyword(s):  
Stable Matching ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Matching with Constraints

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaohong Sun
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
School Choice ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Efficient Algorithms ◽  
Matching Theory ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Timely Manner ◽  
Distributional Constraints ◽  
New Challenges

In recent years, a number of new challenges have been observed in the application of matching theory. One of the most pressing problems concerns how to allocate refugees to hosts safely and in a timely manner. Currently, this placement is implemented on an ad hoc basis where the preferences of both refugees and hosts are not taken into account. Another important realization is that real-life matching markets are often subject to various distributional constraints. For example, there has been increased attention to school choice models that take account of affirmative action and diversity concerns. The objective of this research is to design efficient algorithms while satisfying desirable properties for these new emerging problems.

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