PERROT, PIRATES AND PARISIAN GROCERS: SIR JOHN PERROT, COURT FACTION, JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT AND THE AFFAIR OF THE PETER AND PAUL

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-498
Author(s):  
Roger Turvey
Keyword(s):  
Privy Council ◽  
High Court ◽  
Royal Court ◽  
Royal Courts ◽  
Earl Of Essex

The Marseilles ship, the Peter and Paul, became the object of a bitter dispute that internationalized an incident involving the royal courts of England, France, Portugal and Spain. At the time it was something of a cause célèbre that preoccupied the court, Privy Council and High Court of Admiralty. The significance of the ship's detention lies not so much in the incident itself but in the events surrounding it and the light it sheds on competing and conflicting jurisdictions involving the Westminster and Dublin governments. It reveals much about the bitter factionalism at the royal court which involved the Pembrokeshire magnate Sir John Perrot and Walter Devereux, earl of Essex.

Parliament, Privy Council, and Local Politics in Elizabethan England: The Yarmouth-Lowestoft Fishing Dispute

1990 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Dean
Keyword(s):  
Central Government ◽  
Local Politics ◽  
Local Communities ◽  
Henry Viii ◽  
Central Authority ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Clearing House ◽  
Royal Court ◽  
Major Exception ◽  
The Government

In his celebrated presidential addresses to the Royal Historical Society between 1974 and 1976 Sir Geoffrey Elton explored three “points of contact” between central authority and local communities: Parliament, the royal council, and the royal court. Parliament, he argued, was “the premier point of contact,” which “fulfilled its functions as a stabilizing mechanism because it was usable and used to satisfy legitimate and potentially powerful aspirations.” Elsewhere Elton, and other parliamentary historians such as Michael Graves, Norman Jones, and Jennifer Loach, have stressed parliament's role as a clearing house for the legislative desires of the governing class. The author of this article has recently drawn attention to the pressures which private legislation placed on the parliamentary agenda and the attempts by the government to control it. All of this supports Elton's contention that parliament, from the perspective of central government, was indeed a vital means of ensuring stability and channelling grievances.However, few studies have viewed parliament from the perspective of the local communities and governing elites who sought parliamentary solutions to their problems or even parliamentary resolutions to their disputes with others. The major exception to this has been London. Helen Miller's seminal study of London and parliament in the reign of Henry VIII and Edwin Green's on the Vintners lobby, have been recently complemented by Ian Archer's on the London lobbies in Elizabeth's reign, Claude Blair's on the Armourers lobby, and my own study of the struggle between the Curriers and Cordwainers. These not only reveal the broader context of such disputes, but emphasize that parliament was only one of many arenas available to participants. This important point has also been stressed by Robert Tittler in his study of parliament as a “point of contact” for English towns.

The Development of the High Court's Willingness to Overrule Common Law Precedent

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-314
Author(s):  
Sonali Walpola
Keyword(s):  
National Identity ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Economic Ties

In its first 60 years the High Court showed a complete deference to English precedent, and did not of itself initiate changes to common law doctrines. The High Court took its first steps towards autonomy in common law matters only in the 1960s when it abandoned its policy of following decisions of the House of Lords, thereby ending the practice of automatically incorporating English common law developments into Australian law. It is shown that the Court acquired a willingness to overturn ‘recent’ common law rules (those of 20th century origin) after the abolition of appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council in the 1970s. The elimination of appeals from State Supreme Courts to the Privy Council in the 1980s led to a further broadening of the range of doctrines the Court was prepared to reconsider. Notably, since the 1990s, the Court has shown its willingness, in compelling circumstances, to overrule ancient common law doctrines acquired before Federation. This paper gives a detailed account of the emergence and expansion of the High Court's willingness to overrule common law precedent. It reveals how the High Court's autonomy in common law matters was developed in distinct stages that are linked to Australia's changing legal, political and socio-economic ties with Britain, and its growing sense of an independent national identity.

Federal Constitutional Guarantees of the States: Section 106 and Appeals to the Privy Council from State Supreme Courts

1978 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-374
Author(s):  
Christopher D. Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Case Law ◽  
State Courts ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Recent Statement ◽  
The Subject

The abolition of all appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council, coupled with the High Court's recent statement that it no longer regards itself as bound by Privy Council decisions, highlights the fact that appeals still lie, in many matters of State jurisdiction, from State Supreme Courts direct to the Privy Council. In this article, Mr Gilbert is primarily concerned to examine the extent to which section 106 of the Commonwealth Constitution may provide protection for these “direct” appeals. To this end, Mr Gilbert examines what case-law exists on section 106, and attempts to place the section in perspective in relation to the rest of the Constitution. The difficult (and largely unexplored) relationship between section 106 and section 51 is considered, to discover the possible reaches of Commonwealth legislative power with respect to the subject-matter protected by section 106. The position of “direct” appeals within the States’ constitutional structures is looked at, in order to determine the possible ambit of whatever protection is offered by section 106, and finally, Mr Gilbert analyses the recent comments by Mr Justice Murphy that the abolition of Privy Council appeals from the High Court has meant the consequential demise of “direct” appeals from State courts.

scholarly journals ACCESSORY LIABILITY: PERSISTING IN ERROR

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (01) ◽  
pp. 7-11
Author(s):  
Beatrice Krebs
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
South Australia ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
High Court ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Bodily Injury ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
High Court Of Australia

IN Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, the High Court of Australia (HCA) declined to follow the Privy Council and UK Supreme Court (UKSC) in abolishing the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise, as PAL is known in South Australia. Under the Australian doctrine, liability for murder is imposed where an individual “is a party to an agreement to commit a crime and foresees that death or really serious bodily injury might be occasioned by a co-venturer acting with murderous intention and he or she, with that awareness, continues to participate in the agreed criminal enterprise” (at [1]). This reflects the very position that was abandoned in Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681 Ruddock v The Queen UKPC 7 as a “wrong turn” of the English common law.

scholarly journals The ‘Praecipe Quod Reddat’ Writ as a Forerunner of the English Common Law. History

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 63-70
Author(s):  
Vsevolod F. Baranov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Historical Development ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Previous Article ◽  
Royal Court ◽  
Royal Courts ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common

In our previous article we defined the conception of the ‘praecipe’ writ and its significance. This article is devoted to the history of its origin and development. The role of the writs ‘praecipe’ in the development of the English Common Law is exceptionally great. No other type of writ brought so much litigation to the royal courts. We find the writ in Glanvill, but its origins go back very far and its later developments were prolific. ‘Praecipe’ is the writ in which the origin of the common law writs and actions and the sense of their history can be seen most clearly. Indeed, there the process of judicialisation of the old high-handed method of redress, that remarkable joining of power and law, can be grasped most easily. It will also be seen that the vast group of ‘praecipe’ writs was not a ready-made, cleverly invented technique to bring cases to the royal court. In fact, the writs ‘praecipe’ were the outcome of a slow historical development that stretched over many generations. The embryo of ‘praecipe’ was a royal order without a tinge of judicial implication and of a mere police character, whereas its latest forms and ultimate development, was purely judicial, not only in essence but also in forms, being a summons to a law court.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document