Federal Constitutional Guarantees of the States: Section 106 and Appeals to the Privy Council from State Supreme Courts

1978 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-374
Author(s):  
Christopher D. Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Case Law ◽  
State Courts ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Recent Statement ◽  
The Subject

The abolition of all appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council, coupled with the High Court's recent statement that it no longer regards itself as bound by Privy Council decisions, highlights the fact that appeals still lie, in many matters of State jurisdiction, from State Supreme Courts direct to the Privy Council. In this article, Mr Gilbert is primarily concerned to examine the extent to which section 106 of the Commonwealth Constitution may provide protection for these “direct” appeals. To this end, Mr Gilbert examines what case-law exists on section 106, and attempts to place the section in perspective in relation to the rest of the Constitution. The difficult (and largely unexplored) relationship between section 106 and section 51 is considered, to discover the possible reaches of Commonwealth legislative power with respect to the subject-matter protected by section 106. The position of “direct” appeals within the States’ constitutional structures is looked at, in order to determine the possible ambit of whatever protection is offered by section 106, and finally, Mr Gilbert analyses the recent comments by Mr Justice Murphy that the abolition of Privy Council appeals from the High Court has meant the consequential demise of “direct” appeals from State courts.

The Development of the High Court's Willingness to Overrule Common Law Precedent

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-314
Author(s):  
Sonali Walpola
Keyword(s):  
National Identity ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Economic Ties

In its first 60 years the High Court showed a complete deference to English precedent, and did not of itself initiate changes to common law doctrines. The High Court took its first steps towards autonomy in common law matters only in the 1960s when it abandoned its policy of following decisions of the House of Lords, thereby ending the practice of automatically incorporating English common law developments into Australian law. It is shown that the Court acquired a willingness to overturn ‘recent’ common law rules (those of 20th century origin) after the abolition of appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council in the 1970s. The elimination of appeals from State Supreme Courts to the Privy Council in the 1980s led to a further broadening of the range of doctrines the Court was prepared to reconsider. Notably, since the 1990s, the Court has shown its willingness, in compelling circumstances, to overrule ancient common law doctrines acquired before Federation. This paper gives a detailed account of the emergence and expansion of the High Court's willingness to overrule common law precedent. It reveals how the High Court's autonomy in common law matters was developed in distinct stages that are linked to Australia's changing legal, political and socio-economic ties with Britain, and its growing sense of an independent national identity.

scholarly journals Cyber Attacks, Information Attacks, and Postmodern Warfare

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jozef Valuch ◽  
Tomáš Gábriš ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Information Warfare ◽  
Law Of War ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as “war” if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived “only” as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a “war” proper, in its new, postmodern sense.

EL JUEZ COMPETENTE PARA CONOCER DEL PROCEDIMIENTO MONITORIO: CUESTIONES PRÁCTICAS

2010 ◽  
pp. 493-519
Author(s):  
AINHOA GUTIÉRREZ BARRENENGOA
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Territorial Jurisdiction ◽  
Procedural Code ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Given

El procedimiento monitorio se concibe en la Ley 1/2000, de Enjuiciamiento Civil como un procedimiento de tutela privilegiada de determinados créditos. Sin embargo, estos postulados se contradicen con los problemas que, en la práctica forense, se han suscitado, en muchos casos, por la determinación de la competencia del órgano que debe conocer del procedimiento. En el presente estudio, se analizan las principales cuestiones que se han suscitado en relación con la determinación de la competencia objetiva y territorial en el procedimiento monitorio, con un repaso crítico de las distintas soluciones doctrinales aportadas, y una revisión de la última doctrina jurisprudencial en la materia. Prozedura monitorioa Prozedura Zibilaren 1/2000 Legeak taxutu zuen, zenbait kredituren tutoretza pribilejiatua izateko prozedura moduan. Hala eta guztiz ere, postulatu horiek ez datoz bat praktika forentsean sortu diren arazoekin; izan ere, maiz, prozedura ezagutu behar duen organoaren eskumena nork duen jakitea ez da gauza argia. Lan honetan, prozedura monitorioaren inguruan eskumen objektiboa eta lurraldekoa zehaztu beharraz sortu diren eztabaida nagusiak aztertzen dira, horri buruz agertu izan diren konponbide doktrinalen azterketa kritikoa eginez, eta gaiari buruzko azken jurisprudentzia-doktrina ere lantzen da. The payment procedure is envisaged by Act 1/2000 on the Civil Procedural Code as a procedure for a privileged guarantee of some debts. However, theses propositions conflict with the problems which arose in practice when deciding the subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction in payments procedures. By this study, main questions regarding the subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction within the payment procedure are analyzed with a critical review of the given different doctrinal solutions and a revision of the last case law doctrine on the topic.

scholarly journals Reframing Black Southerners’ Experiences in the Courts, 1865–1950

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 1113-1140
Author(s):  
Melissa Milewski
Keyword(s):  
Black Men ◽  
Jim Crow ◽  
State Courts ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Southern State ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Civil Cases ◽  
Black Defendants

In civil cases that took place in southern courts from the end of the Civil War to the mid-twentieth century, black men and women frequently chose to bring litigation and then negotiated the white-dominated legal system to shape their cases and assert rights. In some ways, these civil cases were diametrically opposite from the criminal cases of black defendants who did not choose to enter a courtroom and often received unequal justice. However, this article draws on almost 2,000 cases involving black litigants in eight state supreme courts across the South between 1865 to 1950 to argue that in both civil and criminal cases African Americans were at times shaping their cases and fighting for their rights, as well as obtaining decisions that aligned with the interests of white elites. Southern state courts during the era of Jim Crow were thus spaces for negotiating for rights and sites of white domination, in both criminal and civil cases.

Part I General and Introductory, 4 Subject-Matter Scope: Civil and Commercial Matters

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hartley Trevor C
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Hague Convention ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Hague Convention ◽  
Civil Matter

This chapter discusses the ‘subject-matter scope’ of Brussels 2012, Lugano 2007, and the Hague Convention. ‘Subject-matter scope’ refers to the scope covered by a measure as regards its subject matter, that is to say the branches and areas of the law to which it applies. For the three legal instruments under consideration, the relevant provisions are contained in Article 1 of Brussels 2012 and Lugano, and Articles 1 and 2 of Hague. A review of case law shows that the distinction between a civil matter and public matter is far from straightforward. There is a significant grey area in which the Court of Justice of the European Union could legitimately go either way.

Part III Structure of State Government, 10 The State Judicial Branch

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Williams Robert F
Keyword(s):  
State Government ◽  
State Courts ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
Adequate Funding ◽  
State And Local Government ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Advisory Opinions

This chapter discusses the differences between the federal and state judiciary. Many state judges are elected through a variety of mechanisms. The workload of state supreme courts has evolved over the years from a private-law orientation to more constitutional law and public policy kinds of cases. In addition, state courts exercise a number of nonadjudicatory powers such as rulemaking on practice and procedure before the courts and regulation of lawyers. Some state courts have the authority to issue advisory opinions and answer certified questions, and some of them have asserted certain inherent powers such as to require adequate funding levels. State courts also retain the power to develop common law doctrine, as well as to resolve disputes among state and local government officials and agencies in ways that rarely involve the federal judiciary. State courts are also not bound by the rigid federal doctrines of standing, mootness, and ripeness.

Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 825-851 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Faust
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Analysis Of Law ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter discusses the relationship between comparative law and economic analysis of law. After providing an overview of the characteristics of the economic analysis of law, it explains how one of the two disciplines can operate as an ancillary discipline to the other; this has been termed ‘Comparative Law and Economics’. The next section describes how comparative law and economic analysis of law can be brought together by making one discipline the subject matter of the other. It suggests that the role of economic analysis of law may be greater in case law systems than in codified systems and that this role may vary according to the subject of legislation. The section concludes with considerations on the role comparative law plays and should play in different contexts. Finally, it is argued that comparative law and economics should not be considered a discipline on its own.

Ten Years of the Botswana Matrimonial Causes Act—Further Proposals for Divorce Reform

1982 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-176
Author(s):  
A. J. G. M. Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Frame Of Reference ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1 of 1973 (Cap. 29:07 of the Laws of Botswana) was passed by the National Assembly on 27 October, 1972. It was assented to by the then President of Botswana, the late Sir Seretse Khama, on 2 February, 1973, and entered into force a week later on 9 February, 1973. The Act applies to civil marriages only, i.e. marriages concluded in terms of the Marriage Act (Cap. 29:01); customary law marriages have been excluded from its operation. As its short title indicates, the Act deals with matrimonial causes, that is to say divorce, judicial separation and the annulment of marriages and matters incidental thereto such as the property rights of spouses, custody, guardianship, maintenance and the jurisdiction of the courts.During its first 10 years of existence the Act has been the subject-matter of many a decision of the High Court and provisions of it have been considered also by the Court of Appeal. Most of these decisions deal with divorce. In academic circles, too, the Act received attention, witness the review by Chris Himsworth in theJournal of African Law. This review was written immediately after the Act came into force. An updated account is therefore appropriate. As I intend to approach the Act from a broader historical and jurisprudential angle, I will deal with it afresh rather than use Himsworth's penetrating but positivistic analysis as a frame of reference.

10. Introduction to administrative lawThe foundations and extent of judicial review

2021 ◽  
pp. 142-160
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
High Court ◽  
Court Judge ◽  
Public Body ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Public Bodies

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the concept of judicial review. Judicial review allows a High Court judge to examine the lawfulness of decisions made by public bodies carrying out their public functions and enactments where there is no right of appeal or where all avenues of appeal have been exhausted. The defendant must be a public body, the subject matter of a claim must be a public law matter, and the claimant must have the right to claim. This chapter also looks at the basis procedure for judicial review.

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