Issues and Solutions Regarding the Outside Director System for Corporations

This paper aims to examine the relationship between Ownership Structure Mechanisms (Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Block holder Ownership and Outside Director Ownership) and Investment Efficiency by using panel data analysis. To investigate this relationship used the multiple regression models. Findings of investigation of 35 firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange in the period 2006 to 2015 by balanced Panel model representative. Results indicated that Managerial Ownership isn’t related with investment efficiency. In contract, institutional ownership, block holder ownership and outside director ownership have a negative relationship with investment efficiency. In addition, the researcher found that control variables (Firm size, Debt ratio, Tobin’s Q) not related to investment efficiency. These findings imply that the Majority of Egyptians firms relies on institutional without individual ownership and then reduces much of possible from agency problems and decreasing information asymmetry and facilitating the monitoring of investment decisions.

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Family business, director compensation and board efficacy: the case of Taiwan

Corporate Ownership and Control ◽

10.22495/cocv11i1art7 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 81-91

Author(s):

Tsun-Jui Hsieh ◽

Yu-Ju Chen

Keyword(s):

Firm Performance ◽

Family Business ◽

Positive Impact ◽

Specific Pattern ◽

Chinese Family ◽

Outside Directors ◽

Director Compensation ◽

Outside Director ◽

The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors on firm performance during legal transitions and examines how the roles of family business and director compensation influence board efficacy. By using Taiwanese listed companies as our sample, the empirical results show that outside directors who are appointed by legal mandate have less positive impacts on firm performance than outside directors appointed voluntarily. Family business weakens the positive impact of outside director on firm performance. The evidence further suggests that director compensation contributes to firm performance, particularly when outside directors are voluntarily appointed. The findings provide western managers with an understanding of how the typical Chinese family business affects board independence. We also demonstrate and incorporate the cultural and the ownership characteristics into the analysis to present a country-specific pattern that should be informative for foreign investors who are concerned about the quality of corporate governance in East Asia.

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Executive and Outside Director Benetits

Compensation & Benefits Review ◽

10.1177/088636879903100603 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 31 (6) ◽

pp. 15-17 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Deanna S. Brooks ◽

David J. Taylor ◽

Kevin Watts

Keyword(s):

Outside Director

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The Demand for Monitoring of Financial Reporting Process and Outside Director Compensation

The Academic Society of Global Business Administration ◽

10.38115/asgba.2019.16.6.109 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 16 (6) ◽

pp. 109-132

Author(s):

Bum-Jin Park

Keyword(s):

Financial Reporting ◽

Director Compensation ◽

Reporting Process ◽

Outside Director

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Corporate governance and turnaround: Evidence from Australia

Australian Journal of Management ◽

10.1177/0312896220902225 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 45 (4) ◽

pp. 549-578

Author(s):

Seema Miglani ◽

Kamran Ahmed ◽

Darren Henry

Keyword(s):

Institutional Ownership ◽

Jel Classification ◽

Board Independence ◽

Outside Directors ◽

Firm Level ◽

Corporate Turnaround ◽

Outside Director ◽

Director Ownership ◽

The Relationship ◽

Matched Samples

We examine the relationship between ownership and outside director attributes and corporate turnaround outcomes using matched samples of 99 turnaround and 99 non-turnaround listed Australian firms during the 2004–2015 period. Based on agency theory principles, we propose that key shareholder groups (block ownership, director ownership, institutional ownership) and outside directors are related to firm-level turnaround outcomes, and particularly changes in these attributes across decline to turnaround periods. Our results provide evidence that turnaround and non-turnaround firms differ in terms of their ownership and board composition structures, and that changes in director ownership and the degree of board independence are important in determining the likelihood of turnaround success. JEL Classification: G33, G34, M40

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