scholarly journals Jules Coleman y las objeciones al Análisis Económico del Derecho como fundamento filosófico de la responsabilidad por daños extracontractual/Jules Coleman and the argues against Economic Analysis of Law as adequate philosophical foundation of Tort Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 176
Author(s):  
Virginia De Carvalho Leal

En la teoría general y la filosofía del derecho del daño extracontractual son dos las grandes orientaciones en las que podemos encuadrar las doctrinas concurrentes. Una es aquella que cree que esta rama del derecho tiene su sentido, fundamento y razón de ser en una concreta y específica pauta de justicia. La otra gran orientación es la que corresponde a las doctrinas que a menudo se denominan instrumentalistas, en que el daño es nada más que el pretexto o el factor desencadenante para una medida que debe incrementar algún resultado socialmente beneficioso. Ese es el planteamiento del análisis económico del derecho, en la que el fin social en cuestión suele describirse como el de eficiencia, en cuanto maximización de los recursos sociales disponibles. Este artículo analiza los principales argumentos y críticas de Jules Coleman al análisis económico del derecho como fundamento filosófico de la responsabilidad extracontratual y la elección de la eficiencia y de la maximización de la riqueza como sus criterios de justificación. 

Author(s):  
Maryna Velykanova

Damage to property and (or) non-property rights of persons occurs quite often. The right to compensation for such damage is indisputable. However, civil doctrine ambiguously addresses the issue of risk sharing in tort obligations. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to discuss approaches to the distribution of risk of harm in delictual responsibility and to determine their effectiveness from an economic and legal standpoint. The paper, based on economic and systematic analysis using dialectical, comparative, logical-dogmatic and other methods, including economics, describes the approaches to determining the purpose of tort law and its ability to ensure effective distribution of risk of harm. It has been proven that tort law can have direct regulatory consequences by restraining behaviour and sharing risks. It is concluded that the task of tort law is the optimal distribution of risk of harm between the perpetrator and the victim and to ensure the implementation of risky activities only if its social value justifies the risk. Based on the economic analysis of tort law, it has been substantiated that the distribution of the risk of damage in tort liability is carried out through the institutions of insurance and liability. Insurance is cost-effective when it comes to compensation for damage. However, only liability, in addition to the function of compensation, can also perform the function of preliminary prevention of harm. Therefore, the risk of causing harm in tort liability is mainly borne by the person who caused the damage. In obligations to compensate for damage caused by a source of increased danger, a person who on the appropriate legal basis (property rights, other property rights, contracts, leases, etc.) owns a vehicle, mechanism, other object, the use, storage or maintenance of which creates an increased danger, bears such risk even in the absence of guilt in causing harm. The grounds for imposing such risk on the victim are his intention or force majeure. It is this approach to the distribution of harm risk in tort liability that is fair and cost-effective and contributes to public well-being


Author(s):  
Jacob Rosenberg

This article presents an example of the use of economic analysis to understand Jewish law. The model used is an application of the economic analysis of law, which has become increasingly prominent in the philosophy and study of law. Economic analysis of law deals not only with those aspects of law that are usually regarded as purely “economic,” but also with more general categories of law, such as property rights, torts, and family law. Indeed, it can be said to deal with all aspects of civil and criminal law. Following this new approach, this article seeks to apply the economic analysis of law to Jewish tort law and, specifically, to laws relating to fire damage. It explains the economies of the laws of fire damage followed by proper care and due care as well as efficient care. This article enumerates a graphical illustration of the unilateral care model; an analysis of differential care concludes the article.


Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir ◽  
Doron Teichman

In the past few decades, economic analysis of law has been challenged by a growing body of experimental and empirical studies that attest to prevalent and systematic deviations from the assumptions of economic rationality. While the findings on bounded rationality and heuristics and biases were initially perceived as antithetical to standard economic and legal-economic analysis, over time they have been largely integrated into mainstream economic analysis, including economic analysis of law. Moreover, the impact of behavioral insights has long since transcended purely economic analysis of law: in recent years, the behavioral movement has become one of the most influential developments in legal scholarship in general. Behavioral Law and Economics offers a state-of-the-art overview of the field. The book surveys the entire body of psychological research underpinning behavioral analysis of law, and critically evaluates the core methodological questions of this area of research. The book then discusses the fundamental normative questions stemming from the psychological findings on bounded rationality, and explores their implications for establishing the aims of legislation, and the means of attaining them. This is followed by a systematic and critical examination of the contributions of behavioral studies to all major fields of law—property, contracts, consumer protection, torts, corporate, securities regulation, antitrust, administrative, constitutional, international, criminal, and evidence law—as well as to the behavior of key players in the legal arena: litigants and judicial decision-makers.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document