The Significance of the Moral Education of a Multi-Perspective Narrative Based on Jürgen Habermas' Discourse Ethics

2016 ◽  
Vol null (51) ◽  
pp. 29-57
Author(s):  
Kang, Su-Jeong
2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Gusti A. B. Menoh

Abstrak: Tulisan ini bertujuan mempresentasikan etika diskursus Jürgen Habermas dan kemudian menarik kemungkinan relevansinya bagi dialog interreligius. Berbeda dengan global ethics Hans Küng yang menjadikan “problem of the good” sebagai pokok pembicaraan, etika diskursus hanya membicarakan bagi kehidupan bersama dalam masyarakat majemuk. Karena itu, etika diskursus tidak ber-tendensi mengejar substansi nilai-nilai etis dari berbagai pandangan dunia (world-view) dalam kelompok-kelompok kultural maupun religius yang berbeda-beda itu. Sebaliknya, etika diskurus hanya menawarkan sebuah prosedur untuk memecahkan masalah hidup bersama secara adil di tengah kemajemukan pandangan nilai dan keyakinan yang tak terbantahkan. Etika ini tidak bertujuan melenyapkan perbedaan-perbedaan identitas para warga dengan segala kekayaan kultural dan religiusnya, melainkan berupaya menjamin kelangsungan hidup bersama secara bermartabat tanpa kehilangan identitas individual. Tulisan ini dibagi dalam dua bagian. Pertama, penulis akan mendeskripsikan hakikat etika diskursus. Kedua, penulis akan menarik kemungkinan aplikasi etika diskursus bagi dialog interreligius. Tulisan ini akan diakhiri dengan penutup singkat. Kata-kata Kunci: Lebenswelt (dunia-kehidupan), tindakan komunikatif, etika diskursus, dialog interreligius, teologi agama-agama. Abstract: This paper aims to present the Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas and find its relevance for interreligious dialogue. In contrast to the global ethics of Hans Küng that concerns the “problem of the good,” discourse ethics deals only with “the problem of justice” within a pluralistic society. Therefore, discourse ethics does not attempt to find the commonality of the ethical different values of the various group either culturally or religiously. Rather, discourse ethics offers a procedure for solving inter-religion and inter-cultural problems within a community or society fairly and reasonably. In other words, discourse ethics does not aim to eliminate the distinctive attributes of every citizen within their own cultural and religious belief, but rather ensures that each person or each group live together with dignity without losing their identity. This paper is divided into two parts. First, the author will describe what discourse ethics is. Second, the authors will discuss the possible application of discourse ethics for interreligious dialogue. This paper will end with a short conclusion. Keywords: Lebenswelt (world-lives), communicative action, discourse ethics, interreligious dialogue, theology of religions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 70-82
Author(s):  
Jorge Adriano Lubenow

O artigo sublinha o mtodo do discurso prtico na fundamentao da tica do discurso e as possveis diferenas que traam a separao da tica discursiva da tica kantiana. Mais do que investigao e demonstrao, trata-se de uma exposio dos movimentos conceituais importantes sobre o mtodo do discurso prtico da tica habermasiana.The paper highlights the method of practical discourse on the grounding of discourse ethics and the possible differences that draws the distinction of discursive ethics from Kantian ethics. More than investigation and demonstration it is an exposition of the central conceptual movements about the method of practical discourse of habermasian ethics.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Kettner

Karl-Otto Apel, not Jürgen Habermas (as is often wrongly supposed) is the philosophical originator of discourse ethics (“Diskursethik”).The central contention of a discourse ethics, according to Apel’s lectures in the mid-sixties, is that some necessary presuppositions of discourse have universally valid moral content, or at least some content that is morally relevant, i.e. relevant for outlining a morality the principles of which have unassailable rational credentials. If any such presuppositions can be identified as governing the practice of rational argumentation, then for any interlocutor’s communicative intention in a debate, waiving such presuppositions will clash with the construal of that debate as rationally meaningful debate, since it involves the interlocutor in a kind of inconsistency that Apel (like Habermas), drawing on speech-act theory, conceptualizes as a “performative self-contradiction”.


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